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Introduction
1.1 Ambiguity and decision making under 
ambiguity
The four studies in this dissertation are inspired by one question: “How do people
behave in a world with little information, so that it is not possible to have precise
probability distributions?” The differentiation between risk and ambiguity dates back
to the early twentieth century, when Knight (1921) distinguished between risk and
ambiguity in his book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit for the first time:
Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar
notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly separated. The
term “risk", as loosely used in everyday speech and in economic discus-
sion, really covers two things which [...] are categorically different. [...]
It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or “risk” proper, as we shall
use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not
in effect an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict the term
“uncertainty” to cases of the non-quantitive type. [...] It is this “true"
uncertainty, and not risk, as has been argued, which forms the basis of
a valid theory of profit and accounts [...]. (Knight, 1921, pp.19–20)
The measurable uncertainty mentioned above is known as risk, while the unmeasurable
uncertainty is later known as—and is mostly referred to as—ambiguity.1 As one of
the fundamental rules for individuals’ decision making, expected utility (EU) theory,
proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), models individuals’ preferences
in scenarios where probabilities of outcomes can be objectively given. EU assumes
that individuals’ preferences are based on the expected utility of each choice—i.e.,
choices with higher expected utility are preferred—which is calculated as the sum of
the utility of each outcome weighted by its probability.
Savage (1954) proposed subjective expected utility (SEU) theory to model individuals’
preferences in situations in which the probabilities of outcomes are not necessarily
1Unmeasurable uncertainty has many names, e.g., uncertainty (Knight, 1921), ambigu-
ous probability (Ellsberg, 1961), vague probability (Savage, 1954), and epistemic probability
(Gärdenfors and Sahlin, 1982). To be consistent with most recent studies in this field, we
call it ambiguity in this dissertation.
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objectively known. Thus, the situations studied in SEU are wider than those in EU. 
Individuals in SEU are assumed to have subjective probabilities over outcomes and 
make choices according to the subjective expected utility of each choice—i.e., choices 
with higher subjective expected utility are preferred—which is calculated as the sum 
of the utility in each state weighted by the subjective probability of that state.
SEU extends the applications in EU, since it additionally considers the scenarios in 
which there exist no objective probability distributions. Those situations are perhaps 
more common than risky scenarios. Since its appearance, SEU has been accepted 
as the standard model of decision making under ambiguity. However, significant 
challenge exists for the way that SEU models individuals’ preferences. One of the 
leading examples is the seminal work by Ellsberg (1961), which shows that individuals’ 
preferences are also influenced by how much they know about the probabilities of 
outcomes. More specifically, individuals are found to prefer betting on situations 
where there is a precise probability (risky gambles) over betting on situations where 
probabilities are not known (Camerer and Weber, 1992), which is called ambiguity 
aversion.
Individuals’ ambiguity attitudes play an important role in a number of important areas. 
For example, it has been shown that ambiguity aversion can be used to explain the 
equity premium puzzle, a prominent puzzle that has received tremendous attention 
and is traditionally modelled as valuation under risk (Maenhout, 2004; Gollier, 2011). 
It can also explain the low participation rate of people in stock markets (Dimmock 
et al., 2016b), the decisions of Peruvian farmers adopting new crops (Warnick et al., 
2011), and the decisions regarding the take-up of genetic tests (Hoy et al., 2014). 
Following, and built upon, the strand of studies on decision making under ambiguity, 
this dissertation aims to provide some insights on how individuals make decisions when 
they face ambiguity. In particular, we focus on the role of ambiguity in the updating 
of beliefs and the valuation of assets.
1.2 Contributions and overview
This dissertation consists of four papers. In each paper, we approach decision mak-
ing under ambiguity from a different perspective. In the first paper, we consider 
the updating of beliefs when individuals have ambiguous priors. We show that the 
famous base rate neglect is a rational response of individuals taking the ambiguity
4
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of priors into consideration. In the second paper, we examine the role of ambiguity 
attitudes—ambiguity aversion in particular—in belief polarization, i.e., individuals 
opinions disagree with each other even more after a common signal. In particular, we 
follow the model of Baliga et al. (2013) and experimentally examine whether belief 
polarization could occur when individuals are ambiguity averse and dynamically 
consistent. In the third paper, we look at the real financial markets and consider an 
important anomaly: the tendency of investors to hold losing stocks too long and sell 
winning stocks too soon, also known as the disposition effect. In the fourth paper, 
we study a methodological question concerning whether different methods of 
composing ambiguity in experimental studies measure the same ambiguity attitudes.
1.2.1 Chapter 2
In Chapter 2, we investigate the role of individual ambiguity aversion in determining 
the consideration of prior information in belief updating under ambiguity. It has been 
documented that individuals tend to neglect or underweight prior information, while 
overweight the signal: this is known as base rate neglect (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1973). In most previous studies, base rate neglect concerns the underweighting of pri-
ors with objectively known probabilities. However, individuals in the real world mostly 
face scenarios with ambiguous priors, in which individuals have no full confidence.
In this chapter, we first show theoretically that base rate neglect, which is typically 
regarded as an individual judgmental bias under risk, is a natural or optimal strat-
egy for ambiguity-averse individuals who have incentives to hedge against ambiguity 
about prior information. Second, in a lab experiment, we examine how individuals 
consider prior information when ambiguity about prior information increases, and how 
individuals with different degrees of ambiguity aversion consider ambiguous prior in-
formation. Our results suggest that individuals put lower weight on prior information 
when it becomes more ambiguous. Furthermore, individuals tend to put lower weight 
on ambiguous prior information when they become more ambiguity averse. Our re-
sults in this chapter broaden the view of base rate neglect behavior by confirming our 
theoretical predictions and concluding that base rate neglect is a natural outcome for 
ambiguity-averse individuals under ambiguity.
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1.2.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, we focus on a phenomenon that is commonly seen in real life but 
contradicts the standard economic model of belief updating, i.e., belief polarization, 
which is defined as the increase in disagreements among people after a common 
observation. Existing studies uses the theory of confirmation bias (Rabin and Schrag, 
1999) as the main explanation for the occurrence of belief polarization. In a more 
recent study, Baliga et al. (2013) explain belief polarization from a completely new 
perspective, as the consequence of dynamically consistent individuals hedging against 
exposure to ambiguity. Applying the theory of Baliga et al. (2013) as the theoretical 
background, we examine the role of individual ambiguity attitudes and the dynamic 
consistency condition in the occurrence of belief polarization in a lab experiment.
To do this, we design the experiment in a way that satisfies the conditions required 
(as closely as possible) in Baliga et al. (2013) for the occurrence of belief 
polarization. We do not find that belief polarization occurs, although our design 
satisfies all the required conditions. We find that one possible reason is because 
individuals tend to use perfect-hedge strategies both ex ante and ex post, conditional 
on a neutral signal. This behavior of making strategies leaves little room for 
individuals to update beliefs. As a result, no belief polarization occurs. Moreover, we 
check the role of individual ambiguity aversion and the dynamic consistency 
condition in belief polarization. We find a positive relationship between the degree of 
ambiguity aversion and the deviation of posterior estimations from the Bayesian 
posterior, which implies a positive effect of the degree of ambiguity aversion on the 
occurrence of belief polarization. In addition, we also find that the effective 
enforcement of the dynamic consistency condition ensures a positive relationship 
between exposure to ambiguity and deviation from the Bayesian benchmark.
1.2.3 Chapter 4
In Chapter 4, one specific kind of investor trading behavior—the disposition effect—
and the impact of the disposition effect on financial market efficiency are studied 
under ambiguity. To do this, we design a two-stage experiment, in which we measure 
the levels of the disposition effect in two separated domains in the first stage and let 
traders trade an ambiguous asset in a double-auction market in the second stage. By 
doing so, we are able to observe the reaction of market prices when private signals are
6
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given to (i) either traders who have the highest levels of the disposition effect, or (ii)
those who have the lowest levels of the disposition effect.
Based on the most popular explanation, so far, for the disposition effect, i.e., the
prospect theory, which was first proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where
investors use the purchasing price as the reference point and regard stocks with prices
above the purchasing price as gains and stocks with prices below it as losses. In
the gain domain, it is more likely that investors sell stocks too quickly and lock in
gains, due to risk aversion. In the loss domain, it is more likely that investors hold
stocks too long and avoid realizing paper losses, due to risk seeking preferences. This
trading behavior is referred to as the disposition effect, first coined by Shefrin and
Statman (1985), and mainly refers to situations under risk. In an ambiguous scenario,
as studied in this chapter, the disposition effect is likely to be more pronounced, since
both risk aversion and ambiguity aversion drive investors to realize gains as soon as
possible in the gain domain, and both risk-seeking and ambiguity-seeking attitudes
induce investors to reluctantly realize losses in the loss domain. In addition, we study
the impact of the disposition effect on market price underreaction with ambiguous
assets, which resembles real financial markets, in which the probabilities of possible
asset values are not fully known.
In this chapter, under the ambiguous scenario, we find pronounced evidence of the
disposition effect in both the gain domain and the loss domain and make a distinc-
tion between the disposition effect in the two separate domains. Moreover, we find
significant evidence of market price underreaction at the market level. Regarding the
translation of investor trading behavior at the individual level into market underreac-
tion at the aggregate level, we find a stronger market price underreaction in markets
with informed traders who have higher levels of the disposition effect. Finally, we
find that the impact of the disposition effect on market price underreaction exists
only when the sign of private signals matches the domain in which the level of the
disposition effect is measured.
This chapter contributes to the literature mainly in two ways. First, we distinguish
the disposition effect in the gain domain and the loss domain, which is both necessary
and important, according to previous results, for example, Frazzini (2006) and Weber
and Welfens (2008), and also is supported by our own results. Secondly, we link the
individual trading behavior, i.e., the disposition effect, to market outcomes, i.e., mar-
ket price underreaction, by providing private signals in a fully controlled experimental
market.
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1.2.4 Chapter 5
In Chapter 5, we study a methodological question by investigating whether the method
of composing ambiguity in the classic setup of Ellsberg (1961) induces differences in
measured ambiguity attitudes. By surveying 41 previous experimental studies, we dis-
tinguish four different methods of producing the ambiguous urn in the setup of Ells-
berg (1961). Specifically, the ambiguous urn is composed by (i) the experimenters,
(ii) another randomly chosen participant, (iii) compound risk lotteries, and (iv) com-
pound risk based on random numbers found in nature. Given that there are more
and more studies using different ways to operationalize ambiguity in Ellsberg urns, it
is important to find out whether different methods of producing ambiguity confront
participants with the same degree of ambiguity aversion.
To answer this question, we compare four methods of producing ambiguity in one
experiment and use a between-subject design, in which the method of producing
ambiguity serves as the main treatment effect. The experimental data shows no sta-
tistically significant differences in the degree of ambiguity aversion across the four
methods of composing ambiguity. We also check the consistency rate in participants’
choices and, again, do not find any differences between the four ambiguity produc-
tion methods. We conclude that all production methods seem to produce similarly
strong ambiguity effects in the lab. For future lab experiments, we therefore suggest
researchers choose the most uncomplicated and straightforward method of producing
ambiguity, i.e., method (i), in which the experimenters composed the ambiguous urn.
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Base rate neglect under ambiguity
This chapter is based on a joint paper with Jianying Qiu and Utz Weitzel with the same
title.
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Base rate neglect under ambiguity
2.1 Introduction
A frequently documented judgmental bias is that individuals overweight the signal and
neglect, or underweight, the base rate information. For example, individuals overes-
timate the probability of a rare disease after obtaining a positive test result (signal),
but ignore the extremely low occurrence rate of the rare disease (base rate). This
tendency, first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and dubbed as base rate
neglect, has been examined and confirmed in many studies (Grether, 1980; Camerer,
1987; Ganguly et al., 2000), whether the signal is about more specific information
(Bar-Hillel, 1980; Joyce and Biddle, 1981), more recent information (Offerman and
Sonnemans, 2004), more representative information (Dohmen et al., 2009), or more
trustworthy information (Welsh and Navarro, 2012).
Most base rate neglect studies provide participants with risky base rates, in which the
probability distributions are clearly described. For example, in the classic engineer–
lawyer example (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973), the base rate information was de-
scribed as “70% of population are engineers and 30% of population are lawyers.”
However, risky base rates are not common in real life. For example, we seldom know
the underlying statistical models or the data generation processes of forecasts for pres-
idential elections or for GDP growth, not to mention the probability distribution over
possible alternative models. There is substantial evidence suggesting that individuals
behave differently under risk when probabilities are objectively provided and under
ambiguity when such probabilities are missing (Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer and Weber,
1992). In particular, it has been found that individuals dislike ambiguity and behave
cautiously when facing ambiguity, i.e., individuals are ambiguity averse. Thus, when
base rates are ambiguous, it is not surprising that individuals might behave cautiously
and underweight those ambiguous base rates in updating their beliefs.
In this paper we show, theoretically and experimentally, that base rate neglect is a
natural outcome of ambiguity-averse individuals updating their beliefs in the pres-
ence of ambiguous base rate information. We first demonstrate theoretically how
ambiguity-averse but otherwise rational individuals update their beliefs based on the
ambiguous base rate. We model the ambiguous base rate as multiple priors, rather
than a single prior, and the more ambiguous the base rate, the larger the set of multi-
ple priors. This idea is consistent with the notion that individuals obtain an objective
base rate as a summary of previously collected data (Welsh and Navarro, 2012). For
example, if an individual observes 999 white swans and no black swan in the first 999
observations, the objective base rate of white swans in the swan population is 100%.
13
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After seeing the first black swan at the 1000th observation, the objective base rate of
white swans becomes 99.9%.2 As long as the population is not completely sampled,
there is always some ambiguity in the objective base rate, no matter what percent-
age of the whole population is sampled. Even in the age of Big Data, where more
and more data is accessible, no one could have been 100% sure about, for example,
the exact probability that the Democrat (or the Republican) would win the 2016 US
presidential election. Of course, according to the law of large numbers, the larger the
sample size of the collected data, the more likely the objective base rate will converge
to the real probability, and consequently, the ambiguity about the objective base rate
will be lower.
Due to the ambiguity in the objective base rate, individuals are likely to have multiple
priors. We call each of the multiple priors formed in the individual’s mind a subjective
base rate. If an individual updates each subjective base rate point-by-point, according
to the Bayesian updating rule, she3 will have multiple posteriors instead of one unique
posterior, after seeing a signal. Since a more ambiguous objective base rate leads to a
larger set of subjective base rates, the set of point-updated posteriors would be larger
as well. When the individual has to report a point belief of the posterior, the reported
posterior depends on the ambiguity of the objective base rate and the ambiguity
attitudes of the individual. If the individual is ambiguity neutral, she will report a
posterior that appears to fully consider the objective base rate. An ambiguity-averse
individual, however, desires to hedge the ambiguity in the objective base rate and will
report a posterior that deviates from the posterior reported by the ambiguity-neutral
individual. The more ambiguous the objective base rate, the stronger the incentive to
hedge the ambiguity. As a consequence, the more ambiguous an individual perceive
the objective base rate, the lower weight she assigns to the objective base rate, and
therefore, there will be more base rate neglect. Similarly, given a certain level of
ambiguity about the objective base rate, the more ambiguity-averse individual will have
a stronger desire to hedge against ambiguity, and report a posterior further deviating
from the posterior reported by the ambiguity-neutral individual, and therefore the
more base rate neglect will be.
2There are many aspects of the collected data that could have an influence on the ambi-
guity about the objective base rate. For example, the location where the data was collected
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002), i.e., data collected from a local area vs. data collected from
abroad; the source of the collected data, i.e., data collected by oneself vs. data collected by
someone else (Langer, 1975); or the sample size of the collected data, i.e., data collected
with a large sample size vs. data collected with a small sample size.
3In this thesis, I will use “she” or “her” to refer to individuals.
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We then experimentally tested how ambiguity-averse individuals used the ambiguous
objective base rate by varying the levels of ambiguity in the objective base rate. The
task in our experiment was based on Grether (1980). To facilitate understanding,
we framed our task as a mineral mining scenario. In this mineral mining scenario,
there were three elements, mining site, mining area, and mining field (see Figure 2.1).
Mining sites could be of two types: a copper mining site and an iron mining site. A
mining area consisted of 10 mining sites of copper and iron. There were also two
kinds of mining areas: a copper mining area consisted of 8 copper mining sites and 2
iron mining sites; an iron mining area consisted of 8 iron mining sites and 2 copper
mining sites. The locations of mining sites were randomly distributed in the mining
area. 20 mining areas constituted a mining field. In a mining field, the composition
of copper and iron mining areas could be any possible combinations, from 0 copper
mining areas (and 20 iron mining areas) to 20 copper mining areas (and 0 iron mining
areas).
At the beginning of the experiment, all of the 20 mining areas in the mining field
subjects faced were covered. Thus, the composition of copper and iron mining areas
in the mining field was unknown. Subjects were allowed to sample a limited part, but
not all, of the 20 mining areas, to learn the composition of mining areas. After the
mining areas were sampled, all of the 20 mining areas were again covered. Then, one
out of the 20 mining areas in the mining field was randomly chosen, but its type of
mining areas (copper or iron) was hidden. Subjects were allowed to reveal one mining
site from the randomly chosen mining area. The task for each subject was to predict
the probability that the randomly chosen mining area was a copper mining area, based
on whether the revealed mining site was copper or iron, and subjects were told that
the final expected payoff increased with predictive accuracy.
We manipulated the ambiguity about the objective base rate by controlling the sample
size of collected data. Specifically, by allowing 15 out of the 20 mining areas to be
sampled, we constructed a treatment with a relatively large sample size of collected
data, which we called treatment L, for large. Similarly, by allowing 5 out of the 20
mining areas to be sampled, we created a treatment with a relatively small sample size
of collected data, which we called treatment S, for small. Moreover, we created three
treatments, with differing levels of the objective base rate, by controlling the outcome
of the sampled mining areas. In the treatment with the objective base rate of 0.6,
out of the 5 (15) sampled mining areas in treatment S (L), 3 (9) were copper mining
areas and 2 (6) were iron mining areas. The same rule applies to the construction of
the other two treatments, with objective base rates of 0.8 and 1.0, respectively.
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Using this setup, the following example illustrates how ambiguity-averse individuals
use the ambiguous objective base rate in belief updating. Initially, all 20 mining areas
in the mining field are covered. Hence, the probability that a randomly chosen mining
area from the mining field is a copper mining area can be anything from 0 to 1.
Suppose an individual samples 5 out of the 20 mining areas, among which there are
3 copper mining areas and 2 iron mining areas, i.e., the objective base rate is 0.6.
However, due to the limited sampling, any subjective base rates in the range of [0.15,
0.9] are possible to be used. Suppose the individual randomly reveals a copper mining
site from the randomly chosen mining area. When the individual updates her beliefs
point-by-point according to the Bayesian updating rule, the individual does not form a
single posterior belief, due to the set of subjective base rates. Instead, she forms a set
of posterior beliefs [0.41, 0.97]. If the individual is ambiguity neutral, she will report
a posterior estimation of 0.86 that appears to fully depend on the objective base rate
of 0.6. However, if the individual is ambiguity averse, due to the set of posterior
beliefs, reporting the posterior estimation of 0.86 leaves her expected payoff exposed
to ambiguity. To hedge the exposure of expected payoffs to ambiguity, the ambiguity-
averse individual reports a posterior that deviates from the posterior reported by the
ambiguity-neutral individual. If the ambiguity-averse individual applies the α-Maxmin
rule (Ghirardato et al., 2004) as the rule for making decisions under ambiguity, and
α = 0.6, i.e., putting 60% weight on the most pessimistic belief and 40% weight
on the most optimistic belief, she will report a posterior estimation of 0.63 to hedge
the ambiguity. The distance between the posterior of 0.63 reported by the ambiguity-
averse individual and the posterior of 0.86 reported by the ambiguity-neutral individual
reflects the degree of underweighting the objective base rate.
Similarly, suppose there are 9 copper mining areas and 6 iron mining areas among the
15 sampled mining areas. According to the outcome of the sampled mining areas,
the base rate in the individual’s mind is a set of subjective base rates [0.45, 0.7],
instead of a single subjective base rate, i.e., the objective base rate of 0.6. Then,
suppose the individual reveals a copper mining site from the randomly chosen mining
area, according to which the individual then forms a set of posterior beliefs [0.77,
0.9]. If the individual uses the α-Maxmin rule as the rule for making decisions under
ambiguity and α = 0.6, she will report a posterior estimation of 0.82, which reflects
an underweighting of the objective base rate. Compared with the distance between
0.63 and 0.86, the smaller distance between 0.82 and 0.86 implies less underweighting
of the objective base rate.
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We recruited 272 university students and conducted the experiment online, pro-
grammed in Qualtrics which is known as an online survey platform. Our experimental
results suggest that ambiguity about the objective base rate indeed has an influence
on how participants consider the objective base rate. Based on the assumption of
Bayesian updating and ambiguity neutrality, we constructed a benchmark posterior
which was also the benchmark for the posterior that fully considered the objective
base rate. We then used the deviation of the reported posteriors from the benchmark
posterior as a proxy to examine the degree of underweighting the objective base rate.
A larger deviation implied a larger degree of underweighting the objective base rate.
We found that the deviation from the benchmark posterior in treatment S first-order
stochastically dominated the deviation from the benchmark posterior in treatment L.
Hence, our results indicated that participants put higher weight on the objective base
rate when there was less ambiguity about the objective base rate. Furthermore, we
also examined the role of ambiguity attitudes in determining how participants weighed
the objective base rate. We found that more ambiguity-averse individuals tend to put
less weight on the objective base rate than less ambiguity-averse participants. This
result held when the difference in the degree of ambiguity aversion between individ-
uals was sufficiently large. Finally, we explored whether the weight participants put
on the objective base rate differed between different levels of the objective base rate.
We found that following a confirming (contradicting) signal, when the level of the
objective base rate increased, the weight participants put on the objective base rate
would increase (decrease), and therefore there would be less (more) base rate neglect.
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this paper complements the
literature of base rate neglect. So far, most of the studies in this area investigate base
rate neglect under risk, where underweighting or neglect of the objective base rate
is not rational (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Duh and Sunder,
1986; Camerer, 1987; Koehler, 1996; Ganguly et al., 2000; Barbey and Sloman, 2007).
In this paper, we suggest a new perspective by studying base rate neglect under
ambiguity. We find that the tendency to underweight the objective base rate is a
natural outcome of ambiguity-averse individuals, who try to hedge the ambiguity in
the objective base rate. Our study thus gives a more comprehensive understanding of
base rate neglect behavior, as it includes many real-life situations where the base rate
is at least partly ambiguous. Second, this paper also enriches the literature regarding
ambiguity aversion. Many studies use ambiguity aversion to explain various decision-
making situations in real life, such as the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles
(Maenhout, 2004; Gollier, 2011; Ju and Miao, 2012), the stock market participation
puzzle (Dow and da Costa Werlang, 1992; Easley and O’Hara, 2009; Dimmock et al.,
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2015), the adoption of a new crop (Warnick et al., 2011), and the polarization of 
beliefs (Zimper and Ludwig, 2009; Baliga et al., 2013). Our study explains another 
anomaly in individuals’ decision-making, i.e., the apparently insufficient consideration 
of the objective base rate in belief updating under ambiguity.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the experimental design. Section 
2.3 elaborates on the theoretical basis and develops our hypotheses. Section 2.4 
presents the results, and Section 2.5 discusses and concludes.
2.2 Experimental design
2.2.1 Basic structure and the construction of an ambiguous
scenario
The basic structure of the task in our experiment follows a classic task used in Grether
(1980). In Grether (1980), subjects faced three bingo cages, A, B, and C, each of
which contained 20 balls of one of two colors, red and white. The proportion of red
balls is 65% in cage A, 80% in cage B, and 20% in cage C. During the experiment, a
ball was first randomly drawn from cage A, but the color was not revealed. If a red
ball was drawn from cage A, a second ball would be drawn from cage B. If a white
ball was drawn from cage A, a second ball would be drawn from cage C. Subjects
did not know whether the second ball was drawn from cage B or cage C but knew
the color of the ball. The task was to predict the color of the ball drawn from cage
A, conditional on the color of the second ball. In this task, the proportion of red to
white colored balls in cage A provided a general base rate concerning which cage the
second ball would be drawn from, while the color of the second ball provided a more
specific signal.
Following but slightly different from Grether (1980), we framed our task as a mineral
mining scenario, to facilitate the understanding of conditional probability.4 Specif-
4In a recent study by Alekseev et al. (2017), the use of meaningful contexts that could
be connected to real-life environment was found to benefit individuals carrying out tasks in
which a complicated reasoning process is required. It is shown that the use of meaningful
contexts encourages deeper understanding, reduces confusion about tasks, and leads to higher
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ically, there were three elements in our experiment, mining site, mining area, and
mining field. As shown in Figure 2.1, the minimum unit in the mineral mining sce-
nario was mining site. Mining sites could be of two types: a copper mining site and
an iron mining site. One mining area consisted of 10 mining sites. A mining area
was a copper mining area when the majority of mining sites were coper: 8 copper
mining sites and 2 iron mining sites. A mining area was an iron mining area when
the majority of mining sites were iron: 8 iron mining sites and 2 copper mining sites.
The locations of mining sites were randomly distributed in the mining area. 20 mining
areas constituted the entire mining field. In a mining field, the composition of copper
and iron mining areas could be any combination from 0 copper mining areas (and 20
iron mining areas) to 20 copper mining areas (and 0 iron mining areas). To relate our
setting to existing studies on base rate neglect, mining sites are signals for the type of
mining areas. The type of mining areas is the event of interest, for which individuals
need to estimate the conditional probability based on the signal. The mining field
represents the sample population.
Figure 2.1. A mining site, mining area and mining field
As Figure 2.2 shows, at the beginning, all 20 mining areas in the mining field were
covered. Thus, the proportion of copper and iron mining areas in the mining field was
consistency in choices. In our experiment, the task of predicting the conditional probability
requires sophisticated reasoning because of the infrequent need to calculate conditional prob-
ability in real life. Furthermore, there is evidence that individuals are likely to incur the inverse
fallacy, i.e., the tendency of equaling Prob (A|B) to Prob (B|A) when calculating conditional
probability if the task is abstract. The mineral mining scenario in our experiment has a rich
context and can be linked to real life, facilitating subjects’ understanding of the tasks and
decreasing confusion. If despite our effort to facilitate belief updating we still find base rate
neglect, the evidence is stronger.
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unknown. Unlike the way that the objective base rate was provided in most previous
studies, subjects in our experiment learned the objective base rate from sampling the
mining areas, one by one. After sampling the mining areas, all 20 mining areas in the
mining field were again covered. Then, one out of the 20 mining areas was randomly
chosen by the computer. Subjects were allowed to reveal one mining site from the
randomly chosen mining area.
Figure 2.2. The basic structure of the task
We manipulated the ambiguity about the objective base rate by controlling the 
sample size of collected data. To do this, we controlled the sample size of the mining 
areas that subjects were allowed to sample, either 5 mining areas or 15 mining areas 
of the 20 mining areas in the mining field. In this scenario, there were two mutually 
exclusive states of the world regarding the type of a randomly chosen mining area: 
i.e., S = {S1, S2}, in which S1={the randomly chosen mining area from the mining
field is a copper mining area} and S2={the randomly chosen mining area from the
mining field is an iron mining area}. The task for each subject was to predict the
probability that a randomly chosen mining area was a copper mining area, given the
type of mining site revealed from the randomly chosen mining area. Since only a
limited number, instead of all, of the 20 mining areas were sampled, it was difficult to
know the exact probability that a randomly chosen mining area was a copper mining
area. As a result, subjects faced an ambiguous scenario.
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2.2.2 Elicitation of probability estimations
To elicit subjects’ probability estimations, we chose the quadratic scoring rule (QSR).
Let RP denote the probability that an individual reports that the type of the ran-
domly chosen mining area is a copper mining area. The payment for the individual is
calculated as below:
• The payment will be 5 − 5 ∗ [1 − (1 − RP )2] euro, if a copper mining area is
randomly chosen.
• The payment will be 5− 5 ∗ [1−RP 2] euro, if an iron mining area is randomly
chosen.
Two main advantages of using the QSR are: (i) simplicity of the question and (ii) a
direct and efficient belief elicitation. Since our experiment was conducted in an online
platform, the advantages of simplicity and efficiency in belief elicitation are important.
As with every elicitation method, the QSR has its weaknesses. One important weak-
ness concerns incentive compatibility: the elicitation of subjective beliefs via the QSR
is subject to the influence of risk attitudes (Offerman et al., 2009). Risk-averse indi-
viduals tend to bias their reported subjective beliefs to 0.5. To decrease the influence
of risk attitudes, in the experiment, we informed subjects only that their payoff would
increase with the accuracy of their probability estimations, without showing them the
actual calculation of expected payoffs, according to the QSR.
Alternatives to the QSR for belief elicitation include the introspection method, the
probability matching method, and the outcome matching method (Trautmann and
van de Kuilen, 2015a). The first alternative to the QSR is the introspection method.
As the most commonly used method in psychology studies, the introspection method is
well known for its easy implementation, as it can be done by directly asking subjects
a verbal question. However, since the belief elicitation task in this method is not
incentivized, subjects might not consider the task seriously and report their true beliefs.
The second alternative to the QSR is the probability matching method. In this method,
a lottery based on the type of the randomly chosen mining area in Subsection 2.2.1
is compared with a risky lottery with the same payoff structure. For example, the
state-based lottery pays 10, if the randomly chosen mining area is copper, and nothing
otherwise. The risky lottery pays 10 with probability p, and nothing otherwise, where p
varies from 0 to 1.0. The probability in the risky lottery that makes subjects indifferent
between the risky lottery and the state-based lottery is regarded as their subjective
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beliefs. In this method, there is no need to make assumptions of risk neutrality 
(Wakker, 2010). Thus, it is also the most popular alternative to the QSR. However, 
since we also used it in the ambiguity measurement task in Subsection 2.2.4, each 
subject would face the probability matching method five consecutive times if we use 
it to elicit subjects’ beliefs, which is too lengthy for an online experiment. The third 
alternative to the QSR is the outcome matching method. In this method, a lottery 
based on the true state of the type of the randomly chosen mining areas in 
Subsection 2.2.1 is compared with a certain amount of sure payoff. By assuming a 
certain parametric utility function, subjects’ beliefs can be inferred from the amount 
of sure payoff that makes subjects indifferent between the sure payoff and the state-
based lottery. This method thus requires making parametric assumptions. 
Additionally, similar to the probability matching method, the outcome matching 
method is too lengthy for an online experiment.
2.2.3 Treatments and signal types
As mentioned in Subsection 2.2.1, we constructed the ambiguity about the objective 
base rate by controlling the sample size of the collected data. Specifically, by allowing 
subjects to sample 5 out of the 20 mining areas, a treatment with a relatively small 
sample size of the sampled mining areas was created, which we called treatment S, 
for small. Similarly, by allowing subjects to sample 15 out of the 20 mining areas, a 
treatment with a relatively large sample size of the sampled mining areas was created, 
which we called treatment L, for large. By doing so, there is more ambiguity about 
the objective base rate in treatment S than in treatment L.
In addition, we are also interested in whether the weight individuals put on the ob-
jective base rate differs between different levels of the objective base rate. To explore 
this, we created three treatments regarding the level of the objective base rate by 
controlling the outcome of the mining area sampling.5 Specifically, in a treatment 
with an objective base rate of 0.6, which we called treatment BR06, out of the 5 
(15) sampled mining areas in treatment S (L), 3 (9) were copper mining areas and
2 (6) were iron mining areas. Similarly, in a treatment with an objective base rate
of 0.8, which we called treatment BR08, out of the 5 (15) sampled mining areas in
5Note that in the experiment, we manipulated only the outcome of the sampled mining 
areas. The order of sampled copper mining areas and iron mining areas is random.
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treatment S (L), 4 (12) were copper mining areas and 1 was an (3 were) iron mining
area(s). In a treatment with an objective base rate of 1.0, which we called treatment
BR10, out of the 5 (15) sampled mining areas in treatment S (L), 5 (15) were copper
mining areas and 0 (0) were iron mining areas. Table 2.1 summarizes the process of
how we operationalized the three treatments with different levels of the objective base
rate.
Table 2.1: The operationalization of sampling mining areas in treatments
Treatment S Treatment L
Treatment BR06
3 copper mining areas,
2 iron mining areas
9 copper mining areas,
6 iron mining areas
Treatment BR08
4 copper mining areas,
1 iron mining area
12 copper mining areas,
3 iron mining areas
Treatment BR10
5 copper mining areas,
0 iron mining areas
15 copper mining areas,
0 iron mining areas
We applied a 2 × 3 design in our experiment. Each subject in our experiment expe-
rienced the mineral mining scenario described in Subsection 2.2.1 four times in four
consecutive rounds. Table 2.2 summarizes the arrangement of treatments in each
round. To fully examine the treatment effect between treatment S and treatment L,
subjects experienced both two rounds of treatment S and two rounds of treatment
L. In addition, to prevent order effects from treatment S and treatment L, subjects
were randomly assigned to either of two predetermined sequences with opposite orders
of treatment S and treatment L. As for the three treatments with different levels of
objective base rate, we were more interested in the treatment with the objective base
rate of 0.6 since both the objective base rates 0.8 and 1.0 were frequently used in
previous studies. Hence, we arranged the treatment BR06 to occur in both round 1
and round 3, so that we could have enough observations. In addition, we also had to
consider both the time limit for conducting an online experiment and the complica-
tions if we arranged each treatment in the 2×3 design to occur equally. Therefore,
we arranged the other two treatments (BR08 and BR10) to randomly occur, with a
50% likelihood, in round 2 and round 4.
Table 2.2: Arrangement of treatments in each round.
Sequence Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4
1 S+BR06 S+(BR08/BR10) L+BR06 L+(BR08/BR10)
2 L+BR06 L+(BR08/BR10) S+BR06 S+(BR08/BR10)
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In addition to the sampled mining areas, subjects also received another type of infor-
mation: the mining site revealed from the randomly chosen mining area, which we 
called the signal. We did not manipulate the occurrence of signals. Both the copper 
and the iron mining site were revealed with equal likelihood. Since all three levels of 
the objective base rate were above 0.5, revealing a copper mining site confirmed the 
possibility that the randomly chosen mining area was a copper mining area; this is 
called a confirming signal. Similarly, we called the signal of revealing an iron mining 
site a contradicting signal.
2.2.4 Measuring ambiguity attitudes
To properly account for the effect of ambiguity attitudes in base rate neglect, we 
also measured subjects’ ambiguity attitudes in our experiment. Following previous 
studies, we measured subjects’ ambiguity attitudes using the probability matching 
method (Jaffray, 1991; Kahn and Sarin, 1988; Wakker, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011; 
Dimmock et al., 2015, 2016b; Fairley and Weitzel, 2017). The advantage of using this 
method is that the ambiguous situation is compared with a risky situation, instead 
of a certain amount of payoff. As a result, there is no need to assume risk neutrality 
(Wakker, 2010).
We designed a task in which subjects faced a table with 11 rows (see Appendix 
A.1.2). In each row, subjects faced two urns: an ambiguous urn and a risky urn.
The ambiguous urn held 10 balls, which were either black or white, but the subjects
did not know the proportion of black to white, which we called urn U. In the risk
urn, there were also 10 balls, but the proportion of black to white balls was known,
which we called urn K. To decrease suspicion, subjects could choose a winning color
that, if matched to the color of the randomly drawn ball, yielded a payoff of 1 euro
(Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015b). Among the 11 rows, the composition of
colored balls in urn U was always the same but was unknown to subjects, while in
urn K, the composition changed from one row to the other. More specifically, in urn
K, the number of balls with winning colors decreased as the subject moved down the
rows, which lowered the attractiveness of urn K. Thus, there would be one row, in
which subjects switched their choices from urn K to urn U. At the end of the task,
one out of the 11 rows was randomly chosen to determine the payoff in this task. In
the randomly chosen row, one ball was randomly drawn by the computer from the urn
the subjects chose. If the color of the drawn ball was the same as the winning color
24
Base rate neglect under ambiguity
the subjects picked at the beginning of the task, they earned one euro. Otherwise, 
they earned zero euros. We took the mid point of the probability of earning one euro 
between the switched row and the row before it as the matching probability. A subject 
who had a matching probability that was smaller (larger) than the ambiguity-neutral 
subjective probability of 0.5 was regarded as ambiguity averse (seeking).
2.2.5 General procedures
The experiments were programmed in Qualtrics and administered online. In the ex-
periment, we recruited 272 students from Radboud University across all disciplines, 
of which 147 were females (mean age=21.87; sd=3.74) and 125 were males (mean 
age=22.07; sd=4.86). The average duration of the experiment was 10 minutes, and 
the average payment was 3.72 euro.
2.3 Theoretical basis and hypotheses development
2.3.1 The benchmark for the weight individuals put on the
objective base rate
We first denote the events that occurred in our experiment:
C={A randomly chosen mining area from the mining field is a copper mining area},
I={A randomly chosen mining area from the mining field is an iron mining area},
sigc ={A mining site randomly revealed from a mining area is a copper mining site},
sigi ={A mining site randomly revealed from a mining area is an iron mining site}.
Suppose an individual updates her belief according to the Bayesian updating rule.
The posterior probability that a randomly chosen mining area is a copper mining area,
conditional on a randomly revealed copper/iron mining site from the randomly chosen
mining area is:
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Prob(C|sig) = Prob(sig|C)Prob(C)
Prob(sig|C)Prob(C) + Prob(sig|I)Prob(I) (2.1)
We call the base rate that an individual obtains from the summary of previously
collected data the objective base rate, and the base rates that arise in the individual’s
mind after observing the collected data the subjective base rates. In our experiment,
after learning the outcome of the sampled mining areas, the individual forms a set of
multiple subjective base rates in her mind rather than a single subjective base rate
that equals the objective base rate, due to the limited sampling of mining areas. The
objective base rate is only one possibility among the multiple subjective base rates.
Given the set of multiple subjective base rates and the point-by-point update of each
subjective base rate, the individual forms a set of multiple posteriors rather than one
unique posterior. The choice of posterior within the set of multiple posteriors that
is reported depends on the ambiguity of the objective base rate and the individual’s
ambiguity attitude. If the individual is ambiguity neutral, she will report a posterior
that is consistent with the posterior updated from the objective base rate. However,
if the individual is ambiguity averse, she will report a posterior that deviates from
the posterior reported by the ambiguity-neutral individual due to ambiguity aversion.
For the purpose of hypothesis development in this section and the data analysis in
Section 2.4, we define the posterior reported by the ambiguity-neutral individual as the
benchmark posterior. It can be shown that ambiguity in the base rates and ambiguity
aversion together result in the underweighting of base rates. Therefore, we also use
the benchmark posterior as a benchmark for the weighting of the objective base rate,
according to which we define the deviation from the benchmark posterior in Equation
2.2, and use it as a proxy to measure the underweighting of the objective base rate.
Deviation =
BP −RP, if sigc or if the objective base rate = 1.0,RP −BP, if sigi, (2.2)
where BP stands for the benchmark posterior, and RP stands for the posterior re-
ported by the subjects. Hence, a larger value ofDeviation implies a stronger deviation
of the reported posterior from the benchmark posterior and inappropriate weight on
the objective base rate. A positive Deviation means an insufficient use of the ob-
jective base rate, while a negative Deviation means an overuse of the objective base
rate. In the remainder of this paper, we use the variable Deviation to indicate the
deviation of reported posteriors from the benchmark posterior.
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2.3.2 Reporting a posterior updated from ambiguous base
rates: An example
In this section, we investigate how an ambiguity-averse individual weighs the am-
biguous objective base rate in belief updating. Figure 2.3 shows the process of an
ambiguity-averse individual updating her beliefs, conditional on the objective base rate
of 0.6. We use the objective base rate of 0.6 as an example, to demonstrate concretely
how an ambiguity-averse individual considers the objective base rate when the base
rate is ambiguous.6
Figure 2.3. The set of, and the confidence weight on, subjective base rates and posterior
beliefs
Consider first the initial situation where no information about the mining field is
available. At that moment, any composition of mining areas is possible. That is,
6The simulation results of applying other levels of the objective base rate and other types
of signals can be found in Appendix A.3. Qualitatively similar results hold.
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the probability that a randomly chosen mining area from the mining field is a copper
mining area, Proc(C), can be anything from 0 to 1. For simplicity, we assume that
the individual’s confidence weight on each of the possibilities between 0 and 1 is
uniformly distributed. Thus, the individual believes that Proc(C) is equally likely to
be any value between 0 and 1 (see the solid black line without a marker in Figure
2.3).
Second, after sampling 5 mining areas (3 copper mining areas and 2 iron mining
areas) from the mining field in treatment S or 15 mining areas (9 copper mining areas
and 6 iron mining areas) from the mining field in treatment L, the original set of the
subjective base rates [0,1] is narrowed down to [0.15, 0.9] in treatment S and to [0.45,
0.7] in treatment L (see the intervals of the two blue lines in Figure 2.3). Note that
the objective base rate 0.6 is just one subjective base rate in the intervals. Comparing
treatment L, where subjects sample 15 mining areas, with treatment S, where subjects
sample 5 mining areas, the individual faces less uncertainty in Prob(C)—in the sense
of a smaller set of priors—in treatment L than in treatment S (see the two distributions
in the two blue lines in Figure 2.3).
Having induced the base rate through sampling, a mining area is randomly selected.
Suppose a copper mining site is revealed. Since we are interested in the probability that
the randomly chosen mining area is a copper area, we regard a copper mining site as
a confirming signal. Given the ambiguity about the objective base rate, the individual
updates her beliefs from a set of priors and forms a set of posteriors, instead of a single
posterior. Specifically, with a confirming signal, the set of posteriors becomes [0.41,
0.97] in treatment S and [0.77, 0.9] in treatment L. Similarly, the benchmark posterior
that is updated from the objective base rate according to the Bayesian rule is just one
posterior in the probability distribution of posteriors. Comparing treatment L with
treatment S, the smaller set of the subjective base rates in treatment L translates into
the smaller set of posteriors in treatment L. Thus, the individual faces less uncertainty
in treatment L than in treatment S (see the two distributions in the two red dashed
lines in Figure 2.3).
Finally, the individual needs to select one posterior from the set of posteriors and report
it. This process depends on the incentives provided (the belief elicitation method),
the ambiguity in the set of posteriors, and the individual’s ambiguity attitude. In our
experiment, we use the QSR as the belief elicitation method. In the following, we use
the α-Maxmin model (Ghirardato et al., 2004) to capture the individual’s ambiguity
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attitude.7 The main idea of the α-Maxmin model is that the individual considers
both the most optimistic belief and the most pessimistic belief. The parameter α
in this model measures the weight one puts on the most pessimistic belief. A more
ambiguity-averse individual tends to put more weight on the most pessimistic situation
and, therefore, has a larger α.
The main assumptions that we used to construct our simulation are as follows:
(1) Payoff function: As mentioned in Subsection 2.2.2, we used the QSR to elicit
the probability estimations and calculate the final payoff. According to the QSR,
individuals’ expected payoff when reporting a belief of RP while having the subjective
belief of p in mind is:
Ep(RP ) = p[1− (1−RP )2] + (1− p)(1−RP 2).
(2) Utility function: For simplicity, we assume that the individual in our experiment
is risk neutral (Note: this does not imply ambiguity neutrality). Thus, the utility
function of the individual is:
u(x) = x.
(3) The individual’s ambiguity attitude: The individual uses the α-Maxmin rule to
report the posterior. The ultimate decision utility of reporting RP from the set of
beliefs is:
V (RP ) = α min Epu(RP ) + (1− α) max Epu(RP ),
where α denotes the degree of ambiguity aversion, p is a subjective belief in the set of
beliefs, and RP denotes the reported posterior. The individual’s problem is to choose
the optimal RP to maximize V (RP ).
7Other popular models for decision-making under ambiguity include the Maxmin model
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), the variational preferences model (Maccheroni et al., 2006),
and the smooth model of ambiguity (Klibanoff et al., 2005). For robustness, we have also
used the smooth model of ambiguity to capture the individual’s ambiguity attitude. The
simulated result can be found in Appendix A.4. Generally, there are no significant differences
in the simulation results between the two models. However, due to the consideration of
confidence weights in the smooth model of ambiguity, the magnitude of the deviation from
the benchmark posterior, when applying the smooth model of ambiguity, is slightly weaker
than that of the α-Maxmin model. To make a sharp comparison of the deviations from the
benchmark posterior between treatment S and treatment L, we use the α-Maxmin model to
demonstrate the effects of ambiguity attitudes in updating beliefs based on the ambiguous
base rate.
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Considering the three assumptions above, Table 2.3 shows how individuals with differ-
ent degrees of ambiguity aversion (different values of α) would report the posterior in
treatment S and treatment L, based on the objective base rate of 0.6. As we can see
from Table 2.3, there is a general tendency to report a posterior that deviates from the
benchmark posterior when individuals are not ambiguity neutral. In particular, using
the deviation from the benchmark posterior as a proxy to measure the underweighting
of the objective base rate, Table 2.3 suggests that ambiguity-averse individuals, in
general, appear to underweight the objective base rate. Furthermore, deviations from
the benchmark posterior in treatment S are larger than those in treatment L, implying
even stronger base rate neglect in treatment S than in treatment L. Based on the
simulation, we develop the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: (Base rate neglect and ambiguity about the objective base rate)
Individuals tend to put less weight on the objective base rate in treatment S (treatment
with a relatively small sample size of collected data) than in treatment L (treatment
with a relatively large sample size of collected data).
Hypothesis 1 states that the ambiguity about the objective base rate has an effect
on the weight an individual puts on the objective base rate. Given a certain level of
ambiguity about the objective base rate, more ambiguity-averse individuals are more
sensitive to the ambiguity about the objective base rate than less ambiguity-averse
individuals. To hedge against ambiguity, more ambiguity-averse individuals tend to
report a posterior that deviates further from the benchmark posterior, leading to even
stronger base rate neglect.
Hypothesis 2: (Base rate neglect and ambiguity attitudes) More ambiguity-averse
individuals tend to put less weight on the objective base rate than less ambiguity-averse
individuals.
Recall that we also have three treatments with different levels of the objective base
rate. To the best of our knowledge, there are few studies in base rate neglect literature
that suggest a specific direction regarding whether the weight on the objective base
rate differs between different levels of the objective base rate. The only literature
we can find that studied base rate neglect between different levels of the objective
base rate is Duh and Sunder (1986). However, no conclusion was made in this
study regarding whether the level of the objective base rate had an influence on the
consideration of the objective base rate. Due to the lack of evidence in the literature,
we do not develop any specific hypotheses regarding the level of the objective base
rate and the weight placed on it. We nevertheless include and analyze the relationship
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between the level of the objective base rate and the weight placed on it for exploratory
purposes.
2.4 Experimental results
2.4.1 Base rate neglect and ambiguity in the objective base
rate
Figure 2.4 shows the cumulative distribution function of the variable Deviation8 (de-
fined in Section 2.3 as the deviation from the benchmark posterior) in treatment S and
treatment L. As shown in Figure 2.4 and with further tests below, we found that the
Deviation in treatment S (mean=0.2088, median=0.2) had a first-order stochastic
dominance over the Deviation in treatment L (mean=0.1648, median=0.15). Since
the variable Deviation is used as a proxy for the weight on the objective base rate,
Figure 2.4 indicates that subjects in our experiment put more weight on the objective
base rate when sampling a relatively large size of mining areas in treatment L than
when sampling a relatively small size of mining areas in treatment S.
To further examine how the weight an individual puts on the objective base rate is
influenced by the ambiguity about the objective base rate, we ran random effects
regression9 with the variable Deviation as dependent variable. We created three
variables, Large, Order and Signal, and two interaction terms, Large ∗Order and
Large ∗ Signal, which we included in the specifications of the econometric model,
together with other demographic variables, as independent variables. The variable
Large was a dummy variable, with 0 for treatment S and 1 for treatment L. The
variable Order was also a dummy variable which we used to denote the two pre-
determined sequences in treatment S and treatment L as explained in Subsection
8Note that, according to the theoretical basis in Section 2.3, the interpretation of the
results in Subsection 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 holds only if a smaller deviation means a less weight on
the objective base rate. For robustness, we rerun all analyses in both of the two subsections
but only include samples with positive Deviation in Appendix A.5. The same results still
hold.
9As an additional analysis, we also conducted the OLS regression with the same variables
included in Table 2.4. The regression results could be seen in Appendix A.5. The results
presented in Table 2.4 still held.
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Figure 2.4. The cumulative distribution function of Deviation
2.2.3. The variable Order equaled 0 if a subject experienced the pre-determined
sequence 1, and equaled 1 if a subject experienced the pre-determined sequence 2.
The interaction term Large ∗ Order was the multiplication between the variable
Large and Order, which we used to examine whether the effect from the variable
Large on the dependent variable Deviation differed between the two pre-determined
sequences. The variable Signal was a dummy variable, with 0 for a confirming signal
and 1 for a contradicting signal, which we used to indicate the occurrence of the two
types of signals. The interaction term Large∗Signal was the multiplication between
the variable Large and Signal, which we used to examine whether the effect from
the variable Large on the dependent variable Deviation differed between the two
types of signals.
Models (1) to (3) in Table 2.4 show a significant effect of the variable Large on
the dependent variable Deviation. Specifically, the results in model (1) indicated
a significantly larger Deviation in treatment S than in treatment L, which further
confirmed the results in Figure 2.4. Model (2) rejected the possibility that the effect
from the variable Large on the dependent variable Deviation was due to a certain
order of treatment S and treatment L. Similarly, model (3) rejected the possibility
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that the effect of the variable Large on the dependent variable Deviation was due
to a certain type of signal.
Combining the results from Figure 2.4 and Table 2.4, we are able to support our first
hypothesis concerning the relationship between ambiguity about the objective base
rate and the weight individuals put on the objective base rate. More specifically, we
found that when updating beliefs under ambiguity, individuals put more weight on the
objective base rate if there was less ambiguity about the objective base rate.
Table 2.4: The random effects regression on the ambiguity about the objective base rate
Dependent variable: Deviation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Large -0.0439∗∗∗ -0.0412∗∗ -0.0399∗∗
(0.001) (0.0254) (0.0329)
Order 0.0183
(0.365)
Large*Order -0.0054
(0.836)
Signal 0.0399∗∗
(0.036)
Large*Signal -0.0108
(0.686)
Matching Probability -0.019
(0.203)
Constant 0.1712∗∗∗ 0.1652∗∗∗ 0.1519∗∗∗ 0.2793∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
No. of observations 1088 1088 1088 436
Adjusted R-squared 0.0125 0.0137 0.0185 0.0305
Notes: p-value is given in the parentheses. ***, **, * represent the significance level at 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1.
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2.4.2 Base rate neglect and ambiguity attitudes
In the ambiguous scenario we built in Subsection 2.2.1, more ambiguity-averse individ-
uals tend to be more sensitive to ambiguity than less ambiguity-averse individuals. As
a result, in our second hypothesis, the posteriors reported by more ambiguity-averse
individuals deviate further from the benchmark posterior than the posteriors reported
by less ambiguity-averse individuals. In the following, we test our second hypothesis.
Figure 2.5. Deviation and ambiguity attitudes
Figure 2.5 presents the mean and 95% confidence interval of the variable Deviation
between different levels of the matching probability.10 The horizontal axis stands for
the matching probability (as measured by the ambiguity attitudes measurement task
in Subsection 2.2.4) that indicates the tendency of being ambiguity averse. When
the matching probability increased from 0.35 to 0.65, the tendency of ambiguity aver-
sion decreased. Figure 2.5 shows a decrease in the average Deviation from 0.215
to 0.109, when the matching probability increases from 0.35 to 0.65. However, this
10In this analysis, we excluded those subjects who switched more than once and those who
never switched in the ambiguity measurement task in Subsection 2.2.4 (in total, 5.5% of the
subjects).
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negative relationship between the level of matching probability and Deviation was
not significant (N=436, p=0.2049 for a Spearman correlation test). Furthermore, we
ran a random effects regression with the variable Deviation as dependent variable
and the variable Matching Probability, together with demographic variables as in-
dependent variables. Model (4) in Table 2.4 shows the results of the random effects
regression. The negative coefficient of the variable Matching Probability suggested
a negative relationship between the level of matching probability and Deviation, i.e.,
a positive relationship between the degree of ambiguity aversion and the deviation
from the benchmark posterior. However, the p-value of 0.203 indicated no statistical
significance.
One possible reason why we do not find an explanatory power ofMatching Probability
to Deviation could be that the difference between subjects’ ambiguity attitudes in
our experiment was not sufficiently large. Most of our subjects had the matching
probability of 0.45 (26.61%) and 0.55 (57.8%). The small difference between individ-
uals’ ambiguity attitudes has been documented in literature as well (see Trautmann
and van de Kuilen, 2015b; Kocher et al., 2018). In addition, according to the simu-
lation results in Table 2.3 and in Appendix A.3, there was little room for the change
of Deviation if the difference in the degree of ambiguity aversion between subjects
was small. For instance, in Table 2.3, the change of Deviation when the parameter
α changed from 0.5 to 0.6 was only 0.02 in treatment L and 0.07 in treatment S, on
average.
To check for this, we pitched subjects with the lowest tendency of ambiguity aversion
(subjects with the matching probability of 0.65) against subjects with the highest
tendency of ambiguity aversion (subjects with the matching probability of 0.35). We
found that subjects with the lowest tendency of ambiguity aversion reported posterior
estimations that deviated significantly less from the benchmark posterior than subjects
with the highest tendency of ambiguity aversion (N=68, p=0.0568 for a two-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum test). However, when focusing only on subjects whose ambiguity
attitudes were quite close, e.g., subjects with the matching probability of 0.35 and
those with the matching probability of 0.45, no significant difference in Deviation
was found (N=368, p=0.4987 for a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
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2.4.3 Base rate neglect and the level of the objective base
rate
As mentioned in Section 2.3, we are also interested in whether the level of the objective
base rate has an influence on the weight individuals put on the objective base rate.
Figure 2.6 shows the mean of Deviation between the three treatments with different
levels of the objective base rate. We found that Deviation in treatment BR08,
i.e., when the objective base rate is 0.8, was significantly smaller than Deviation in
treatment BR06 (NBR06=544, NBR08=269, p=0.000 for a two-sample t-test), and
also significantly smaller than Deviation in treatment BR10 (NBR10=275, p=0.000
for a two-sample t-test). In addition, we found thatDeviation in treatment BR06 was
significantly smaller than Deviation in treatment BR10 (p=0.0140 for a two-sample
t-test).
Figure 2.6. Deviation between different levels of the objective base rate
Figure 2.7 compares Deviation between treatment S and treatment L within each
level of the objective base rate. We found a significant difference in Deviation be-
tween treatment S and L within treatment BR06 (p=0.0838 for a two-sided Wilcoxon
rank-sum test), and within treatment BR10 (p=0.0037 for a two-sided Wilcoxon
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rank-sum test) but not within treatment BR08 (p=0.7481 for a two-sided Wilcoxon
rank-sum test).
Figure 2.7. Deviation between treatment S and L
One thing we noticed from the results in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 was the relatively
large Deviation in treatment BR10. For a more comprehensive analysis, we looked at
the Deviation within each type of revealed signals in Figure 2.8. We found that when
the level of the objective base rate increased from 0.6 to 1.0, the mean of Deviation
decreased from 0.19 to 0.1 after a confirming signal while increased from 0.23 to 0.25
after a contradicting signal. We also ran an analysis of variance (ANOVA) and found
significant differences in Deviation between the three levels of the objective base
rate after both a confirming signal and a contradicting signal (N=540, p=0.0359 for
the ANOVA after a confirming signal; and N=548, p=0.000 for the ANOVA after a
contradicting signal).
One exception in Figure 2.8 was when an objective base rate of 0.8 was followed by a
contradicting signal. As shown in Appendix A.3, when revealing a contradicting signal
with an objective base rate of 0.8, the benchmark posterior and the posterior that
completely hedges against ambiguity were both 0.5. Hence, it is not surprising that we
did not find any statistically significant difference between treatment S and treatment
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L within treatment BR08 in Figure 2.7. When focusing only on the situation of a
confirming signal with an objective base rate of 0.8, we found a significant difference
in Deviation between treatment S and L (N=269, p=0.019 for a two-sided Wilcoxon
rank-sum test).
Figure 2.8. The comparison of Deviation between the level of base rate and the type of
signal
The results in Figure 2.8 could be explained by the simulation we did in Appendix
A.2. After a confirming signal was revealed, the stronger the information an objective
base rate conveyed, the narrower the set of posterior beliefs, and therefore the less the
posterior would deviate from the benchmark posterior. However, after a contradicting
signal was revealed, the stronger the information an objective base rate conveyed,
the more the set of posterior beliefs widens, and consequently the more the posterior
would deviate from the benchmark posterior.
To further examine how Deviation differs when the level of the objective base rate
varies, we ran random effects regression with the variable Deviation as dependent
variable. Furthermore, we created two variables BR08 and BR10 to denote the level
of the objective base rate. The variable BR08 denoted the objective base rate 0.8,
with 1 for the objective base rate 0.8 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the variable BR10
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denoted the objective base rate 1.0, and it equaled 1 if the objective base rate is 1.0
and 0 otherwise. To examine whether the significant difference in Deviation between
treatment S and treatment L holds within each objective base rate, we created two
interaction terms, Large∗BR08 and Large∗BR10, by multiplying the variable Large
with the two variables BR08 and BR10, respectively. To separate the comparison of
Deviation by the type of revealed signals, we created another two interaction terms,
Signal ∗BR08 and Signal ∗BR10, by multiplying the variable Signal with the two
variables BR08 and BR10, respectively.
Models (1) to (3) in Table 2.5 present the results of the random effects regression. The
results in model (1) showed a significant difference in Deviation between the three
treatments with different levels of the objective base rate. Similar to the results in
Figure 2.6, the results in Model (2) suggested that Deviation in treatment BR06 was
significantly smaller than in treatment BR10 but significantly larger than in treatment
BR08. The significant difference in Deviation between treatment S and treatment L
did not hold within treatment BR08, confirming the results in Figure 2.7. Similar to
the results in Figure 2.8, Model (3) shows a larger (smaller) Deviation in treatment
BR06 than in treatment BR10 when revealing a confirming (contradicting) signal.
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Table 2.5: The random effects regression on the level of the objective base rate
Dependent variable: Deviation
Variables (1) (2) (3)
BR08 −0.0978∗∗∗ −0.1043∗∗∗ -0.0328
(0.000) (0.000) (0.140)
BR10 0.0362∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗ −0.0406∗
(0.021) (0.004) (0.062)
Large -0.0246
(0.166)
Large*BR08 0.0147
(0.639)
Large*BR10 −0.0591∗
(0.059)
Signal 0.0274
(0.132)
Signal*BR08 −0.1268∗∗∗
(0.000)
Signal*BR10 0.1573∗∗∗
(0.000)
Constant 0.1594∗∗∗ 0.1737∗∗∗ 0.1546∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of observations 1088 1088 1088
Adjusted R-squared 0.0501 0.0596 0.1045
Notes: p-value is given in the parentheses. ***, **, * represent the significance level at 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1.
Given the results from Figure 2.6 to 2.8 and the results in Table 2.5, we are able to
explore how individuals weigh the objective base rate when the level of the objective
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base rate differs. Generally, we found that individuals weighed the objective base rate 
differently if the level of the objective base rate they obtained differed. More 
specifically, after a confirming (contradicting) signal, the weight individuals put on 
the objective base rate increased (decreased) when the level of the objective base 
rate increased. Consequently, the base rate neglect was less (more) when the level of 
the objective base rate was larger, following a confirming (contradicting) signal.
2.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, in contrast to previous studies on base rate neglect, we studied base 
rate neglect under ambiguity. Most of the situations we face in the real world are 
ambiguous, and most of us are ambiguity averse. In such situations, base rate neglect, 
i.e., the tendency to underweight the objective base rate, which is regarded as an
irrational behavior under risk, is shown to be an optimal strategy for ambiguity-averse
individuals under ambiguity.
Our results indicated a significantly positive relationship between ambiguity about 
the objective base rate and base rate neglect. Specifically, the higher the ambiguity 
about the objective base rate, the less weight individuals put on the objective base 
rate which lead to higher base rate neglect. Our results also indicated a positive 
relationship between the degree of ambiguity aversion and base rate neglect. We 
found that more ambiguity-averse individuals put less weight on the objective base 
rate than less ambiguity-averse individuals, which induced more base rate neglect. 
However, this relationship between the degree of ambiguity aversion and the tendency 
to base rate neglect was weak and held only when the difference in the degree of 
ambiguity aversion between individuals was sufficiently large.
Furthermore, we explored whether the weight an individual put on the objective base 
rate was determined by the level of the objective base rate. Our results suggested 
that the weight subjects put on the objective base rate differed significantly between 
different levels of the objective base rate. When revealing a confirming (contradicting) 
signal, the weight subjects put on the objective base rate increased (decreased) if the 
level of the objective base rate increased. For example, after a confirming (contra-
dicting) signal was revealed, we found that subjects put more (less) weight on the 
objective base rate 1.0 than on the objective base rate 0.6.
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Our results regarding how ambiguity-averse subjects consider the objective base rate
in belief updating under ambiguity are consistent with the theoretical predictions of
the decision models that ambiguity-averse individuals apply to make decisions under
ambiguity (we assume the α-Maxmin model in this paper). Theoretically, when up-
dating beliefs under ambiguity, ambiguity-averse individuals tend to put more weight
on the objective base rate and have less base rate neglect if there is less ambiguity
about the objective base rate, because there is less desire for hedging against ambi-
guity. In addition, given a certain amount of ambiguity about the objective base rate,
more weight will be put on the objective base rate if an individual is less ambiguity
averse. As a less ambiguity-averse individual is less sensitive to ambiguity about the
objective base rate and has less desire for hedging against ambiguity as well.
Overall, our study of investigating base rate neglect under ambiguity in this paper
does not contradict the results in previous base rate neglect studies. We broaden the
view regarding base rate neglect from risk to ambiguity. In a risky situation, as most
of the previous studies, the tendency of neglecting or underweighting the objective
base rate is regarded as one kind of judgmental bias, i.e., base rate neglect. However,
in an ambiguous context, it is not necessary to require everyone to fully consider the
objective base rate. Instead, the weight on the objective base rate depends on how
much ambiguity about the objective base rate there is and how ambiguity averse an
individual is.
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Belief polarization: the role of ambiguity attitudes and 
dynamic consistency condition
This chapter is based on a joint paper with Jianying Qiu and Utz Weitzel with the
same title.
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3.1 Introduction
One interesting phenomenon in the 2016 United States presidential election is that,
during the week after the first presidential debate, voters became more convinced that
the presidential candidates they supported would win the election. According to the
poll, in the week after the first presidential debate, the support rate for the Republican
candidate Donald Trump in Ohio, where the Republican had a higher support rate,
increased from 42.7% to 43.6%.11 During the same period, the support rate for the
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton increased from 43.6% to 45.8% in Florida, where
the Democratic party was in the lead.12 That is, after seeing the same information
(i.e., the first presidential debate), individuals who have different views on a certain
issue (i.e., the winner of the presidential election) become more convinced of their
initial views. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as belief polarization.13
The most popular explanation so far for the occurrence of belief polarization is the
theory of confirmatory bias (Rabin and Schrag, 1999). Individuals who suffer from the
confirmatory bias are assumed to interpret observed signals as evidence that supports
their initial views, especially when the observed signal is mixed or inconclusive. If two
individuals who suffer from the confirmatory bias have different prior beliefs, it is very
likely that both of them will interpret the commonly observed information as evidence
of supporting their initial beliefs. Belief polarization is then possible.
A completely new perspective from a recent study by Baliga et al. (2013) (BHK)
explains belief polarization as the optimal response of dynamically consistent individ-
uals to ambiguity. According to Klibanoff and Hanany (2007), dynamically consistent
individuals make an ex ante optimal contingent strategy before seeing a signal and
carry it out after a signal is realized. In the framework of BHK, belief polarization
does not occur if dynamically consistent individuals are ambiguity neutral, and they
11Source:https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/oh/ohio_
trump_vs_clinton_vs_johnson_vs_stein-5970.html
12Source:https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/fl/florida_
trump_vs_clinton_vs_johnson_vs_stein-5963.html
13Since belief polarization is involved in many research fields, such as economics, psychol-
ogy, and philosophy as well as statistics and computer science, there is still no single definition
that applies to all areas. In this paper, following Dixit and Weibull (2007) and Baliga et al.
(2013), belief polarization is defined as follows: There are two individuals 1 and 2. The prior
of individual 1 stochastically dominates the prior of individual 2. Belief polarization occurs
if the posterior of individual 1 dominates the prior of herself while the prior of individual 2
dominates the posterior of herself.
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update their beliefs according to the Bayesian updating rule since their beliefs either
do not change or they converge with each other. However, for individuals who are dy-
namically consistent but also ambiguity averse, the final goal is not only to maximize
the expected payoff but also to hedge against the exposure of the expected payoff to
ambiguity. After a signal is realized, as there is no need to consider other contingen-
cies, the original ex ante optimal strategy leads to an extra exposure to ambiguity,
which drives individuals to depart from the ex ante optimal strategy. However, for
dynamically consistent individuals, the ex ante optimal strategy has to be kept as the
ex post optimal strategy. To offset the desire to depart from the ex ante optimal strat-
egy, dynamically consistent individuals update their posterior beliefs deviating from
the Bayesian posterior. As a consequence, belief polarization occurs. According to the
theory in BHK, belief polarization is likely to occur when heterogeneity exists either
in the prior beliefs or in the ambiguity attitudes of dynamically consistent individuals,
and when a non-extreme signal is realized.
Following BHK, this paper explores the role of individual ambiguity attitudes and the
dynamic consistency condition in belief polarization in a lab experiment. To do this,
we designed an experiment that satisfied the conditions required by BHK as much as
possible for belief polarization to occur. Specifically, we first constructed the following
ambiguous scenario. In the experiment, subjects faced a pool of urns containing two
types of urns: type 1 consisted of two black balls, three yellow balls, and five white
balls, and type 2 consisted of two black balls, three yellow balls, and five white balls.
However, the composition of the two types of urns in the pool of urns was unknown
to the subjects. One single urn was randomly drawn from the pool of urns. Each
subject was asked to predict the probability that the randomly drawn urn was of type
1. Considering the unknown combination of the two types of urns in the pool of urns,
it was difficult for the subjects to know the exact probability that the type of the
randomly drawn urn is of type 1, which leads to an ambiguous scenario. Under this
ambiguous scenario, a ball was randomly chosen from the randomly drawn urn and
shown to subjects to induce priors. Then, subjects were asked to make a prediction
strategy conditionally on the color of a second drawn ball and were required to carry
it out after the second drawn ball was revealed. By doing so, it was possible to
satisfy the dynamic consistency condition. Finally, we induced the posterior beliefs by
showing subjects a second drawn ball.
Let us illustrate how subjects in the framework of BHK update their beliefs under
ambiguity with an example in the framework of our experimental design. We first
consider the most basic situation in which subjects are not only risk neutral but also
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ambiguity neutral, and update the beliefs according to the Bayesian updating rule.
Suppose there are two subjects in the experiment, subject 1 and subject 2, and subject
1 (subject 2) is induced to have a prior belief of 0.71 (0.29) regarding the probability
that the randomly drawn urn is of type 1 after being shown a white (black) ball in the
first draw. The two subjects are assumed to be dynamically consistent, which means
that they make an ex ante prediction strategy before seeing the second drawn ball and
carry the ex ante prediction strategy out after seeing it. For subject 1, who has a prior
of 0.71, the optimal ex ante prediction strategy is to “predict 0.86 for a white ball in
the second draw, 0.71 for a yellow ball in the second draw, and 0.5 for a black ball in
the second draw.” For subject 2, who has a prior of 0.29, the optimal ex ante prediction
strategy is to “predict 0.5 for a white ball in the second draw, 0.29 for a yellow ball
in the second draw, and 0.14 for a black ball in the second draw”. After the second
drawn ball is revealed, the ex ante prediction strategy under each contingency becomes
the ex post prediction strategy according to the dynamic consistency assumption, and
the posterior beliefs are the same as the ex post prediction strategies according to
the Bayesian updating. Hence, when individual ambiguity attitudes are not taken into
account, there is no occurrence of belief polarization.
We continue by investigating how subjects in the framework of BHK update their
beliefs under ambiguity when taking the ambiguity attitudes, especially ambiguity
aversion, into account. In the ambiguous scenario we constructed, the ambiguity
concerning the real type of the randomly drawn urn implies the ambiguity about
the subjects’ expected payoff. If the subjects are ambiguity neutral, as mentioned
above, the posterior beliefs either converge or remain unchanged, which indicates
no possibility for belief polarization. If the subjects are ambiguity averse, however,
the exposure to ambiguity drives them to shift the ex ante prediction strategy. For
instance, to reduce the ambiguity concerning the expected payoff, instead of making
the same ex ante prediction strategy as the ambiguity-neutral subject, an ambiguity-
averse subject 1 shifts her ex ante prediction strategy to “predict 0.81 for a white
ball in the second draw, 0.63 for a yellow ball in the second draw, and 0.4 for a
black ball in the second draw.” For every unit shifting of a prediction strategy, we
denote a ratio between the change in the expected payoff if the randomly drawn urn
is of type 2 and the change in the expected payoff if the randomly drawn urn is of
type 1 as a measure for the exposure to ambiguity. Before seeing the second ball,
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the exposure to ambiguity for subject 1 is 1.28.14 After the second drawn ball is
revealed, since there is no need to consider the other two contingencies, the exposure
to ambiguity changes. For example, after seeing a yellow ball in the second draw, the
exposure to ambiguity varies from 1.28 to 1.38, which indicates an increase in the
exposure to ambiguity. The extra exposure to ambiguity makes subject 1 feel that
the ex post strategy of predicting 0.63 makes her expose to more ambiguity than the
ex ante prediction strategy. As a result, subject 1 is motivated to make a new ex
post prediction strategy departing from the strategy of predicting 0.63. However, as
a dynamically consistent individual, subject 1 has to keep the strategy of predicting
0.63 as the ex post prediction strategy. To deal with the two kinds of mutually
conflicting desire, subject 1 pretends that she is in a more “ambiguous” environment,
in which the ex post strategy of predicting 0.63 is the result of hedging against the
extra exposure to ambiguity, and reports a posterior estimation of 0.73. This process
also applies to subject 2. That is, after a yellow ball is observed, to hedge the extra
exposure to ambiguity, subject 2 acts as if she is in a more “ambiguous” scenario and
finally reports a posterior estimation of 0.27. From an outsider’s perspective, belief
polarization occurs after observing a common signal.
We recruited 83 university students across all disciplines and obtained 249 observations
using a within-subject design. Different from the theoretical predictions by BHK,
we find no evidence of belief polarization, although all required conditions for belief
polarization are satisfied. We explore the possible reasons for the absence of belief
polarization in our experiment. One possible reason could be that subjects tend to
make perfect-hedge ex ante strategies due to ambiguity aversion, and, due to risk
aversion, they also make perfect-hedge ex post strategies conditional on a neutral
signal. After doing so, there is almost no change in the exposure to ambiguity after a
neutral signal is realized, which leaves little room for subjects to update their beliefs.
As a result, belief polarization can hardly occur. We then examine the role of individual
ambiguity aversion, the dynamic consistency condition, and individual risk aversion in
the occurrence of belief polarization. According to the theory in BHK, the underlying
mechanism of belief polarization is the deviation of the posterior estimations from
the Bayesian posterior. Hence, we start by examining the role of individual ambiguity
aversion in the deviation from the Bayesian posterior given the absence of belief
polarization. We find that more ambiguity-averse individuals tend to report posterior
14Subsection 3.2.6 provides more details concerning the calculation of the exposure to
ambiguity.
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estimations that deviate further from the Bayesian posterior. We also examine the role
of the dynamic consistency condition and find that the effective enforcement of the
dynamic consistency condition guarantees a significantly positive correlation between
the change of the exposure to ambiguity and the deviation of posterior estimations
from the Bayesian posterior. Finally, we examine the role of individual risk aversion
in the absence of belief polarization in our experiment, and our simulation results
indicate that the existence of risk aversion does not decrease the occurrence of belief
polarization.
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, our study contributes to the
literature on belief polarization. So far, the main explanation for belief polarization
concerns the theory of confirmatory bias (Rabin and Schrag, 1999). Although other
explanations exist (Zimper and Ludwig, 2009; Kondor, 2012; Andreoni and Mylovanov,
2012; Andrea, 2014; Daron et al., 2016; Loh and Phelan, 2016; Fryer et al., 2018),
most of these explanations are still based on the confirmatory bias theory. The theory
of BHK complements this strand of literature by explaining the occurrence of belief
polarization from a completely new perspective, i.e., belief polarization is explained as
the result of ambiguity aversion. Based on BHK, our study contributes to exploring
and examining another explanation of belief polarization, i.e., individual ambiguity
aversion. Second, our study enriches the literature on ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity
aversion has been found to explain many anomalies in real life. For instance, the
stock market participation (Dow and da Costa Werlang, 1992; Easley and O’Hara,
2009; Dimmock et al., 2016b), risk and equity premium puzzles (Maenhout, 2004;
Gollier, 2011; Ju and Miao, 2012) in financial economics, the adoption of new crops
in developmental economics (Warnick et al., 2011), the choice of treatments (Berger
et al., 2013), and the take-up of genetic tests (Hoy et al., 2014) in health economics.
In this paper, we attempt to add ambiguity aversion as the explanation for another
anomaly, i.e., belief polarization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the ex-
perimental design, Section 3.3 presents the experimental results, and Section 3.4
concludes.
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3.2 Experimental design
3.2.1 Constructing an ambiguous scenario
To construct an ambiguous scenario, we asked each subject to enter five pairs of 
numbers, X and Y , which could be any number between one and 1 million, before 
distributing the paper experimental instructions. We then randomly chose one number 
x out of all entered Xs and one number y out of all entered Y s, and the computer 
composed a pool comprising two types of urns. Each urn in the pool of urns could be 
one of two types: type 1 contained two black balls, three yellow balls, and five white 
balls; type 2 contained two white balls, three yellow balls, and five black balls. The 
number of type 1 was determined by a randomly chosen x, and the number of type 2 
was decided by a randomly chosen y. Figure 3.1 shows the composition of the pool 
of urns.
Figure 3.1. The composition of the pool of urns
Within the pool of urns, one single urn was randomly drawn but the type of it was 
hidden. This scenario comprised two mutually exclusive states of the world 
concerning the type of the randomly drawn urn, i.e., S = {S1, S2} in which 
S1={The randomly drawn urn is of type 1} and S2={The randomly drawn urn is 
of type 2}. We asked each subject to predict the probability that the randomly 
drawn urn is of type 1. Given the unknown number of each type of urn in the pool 
of urns, it is impossible for the subjects to know the probability that the randomly 
drawn urn is of type 1, thus making the scenario ambiguous.
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3.2.2 Inducing and eliciting priors and posteriors
To observe how beliefs were updated and polarized under ambiguity, we induced and
elicited both the priors and posteriors. To induce the prior beliefs, one ball was first
drawn from the randomly drawn urn with replacement and shown to the subjects. As
mentioned in the introduction, one condition for the occurrence of belief polarization
concerns the heterogeneity on priors. Thus, we manipulated the color of the first
drawn ball to be either black or white with equal likelihood. As a first white (black)
drawn ball implies that the probability that the randomly drawn urn is of type 1 is
above (below) 0.5, those who were shown a first white drawn ball would have higher
prior beliefs than those who were shown a first black drawn ball. Henceforth, we
call the former high prior subjects and the latter low prior subjects. We induced the
posterior beliefs in a similar way by showing the subjects a second drawn ball; however,
this time with no special manipulation for the color. As a second white drawn ball
provides a signal that the posterior should increase, we call it a high signal ; we call a
second yellow drawn ball a neutral signal and a second black drawn ball a low signal.
Regarding the method of eliciting the priors and posteriors, we choose the probability
matching method (Arrow, 1951; Abdellaoui et al., 2005; Hollard et al., 2010; Traut-
mann and van de Kuilen, 2015b). Specifically, after being shown the first and the
second drawn balls, subjects were asked to make six iterative decisions. Figure B.5
shows the screenshot for one of the six iterative decisions in prior elicitation. In each
decision, we asked the subjects to choose one of two options, option A and option B.
Option A concerned the type of the randomly drawn urn, and subjects earned 1,000
Experimental Currency Units (ECU) if the type of the hidden urn was urn 1, and 0
ECU otherwise. Option B was presented as a risky lottery, and subjects earned 1,000
ECU with a specified probability, and 0 ECU otherwise.
Among the six decisions, option A was always the same, while option B changed across
decisions. The probability of earning 1,000 ECU in option B changed with a bisection
procedure. Specifically, in each decision, if option A was chosen, we could infer that
option A was more attractive than option B. In the next decision, we increased the
attractiveness of option B by increasing the probability of earning 1,000 ECU in option
B. Similarly, if option B was chosen, we could infer that option B was regarded more
attractive than option A. Then, in the next decision, we decreased the attractiveness
of option B. This process was repeated six times. We took the midpoint between the
lower bound and the upper bound of the probability of earning 1,000 ECU in option
B in the last decision as the belief of how likely the randomly drawn urn is of type 1.
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3.2.3 Implementing the dynamic consistency condition
To be consistent with BHK, before seeing a signal, i.e., the color of the second drawn
ball, subjects were asked to construct an optimal prediction strategy concerning the
type of the randomly drawn urn conditional on the to-be-observed signal. Figure B.6
shows a screenshot of the prediction strategy.
We elicited the prediction strategies as follows: At the beginning of the experiment,
we assigned 10 computerized chips to each subject. Right before seeing the second
drawn ball, each subject was asked to bet the 10 chips on one of the two events below
conditionally on whether a black/yellow/white ball occurs in the second draw. The
number of chips betting on Event 1 (the randomly drawn urn is of type 1) is used to
indicate one’s prediction strategy, and the more chips one bets on Event 1, the higher
probability one predicts the randomly drawn urn is of type 1.15
Event 1: The randomly drawn urn is of type 1.
Event 2: The randomly drawn urn is of type 2.
Furthermore, considering that the prediction strategy under one contingency also
depends on the prediction strategies under other contingencies, we asked the subjects
to put the betting strategies under all three contingencies on one screen (as shown
in Figure B.6). We used the quadratic scoring rule (QSR) (Brier, 1950; McKelvey
and Page, 1986; Nyarko and Schotter, 2002; Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008;
Rey-Biel, 2009; Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015b) to elicit the betting strategy
under each contingency. Given the complication of the payoff calculation in QSR, the
details of how the payoff is calculated were only provided on the paper instructions;
whereas, a calculation button was provided on the computer screen to give them an
intuition and to minimize calculation errors. Additionally, to further highlight the idea
of considering all contingencies together, when making an ex ante prediction strategy,
the calculation button was only activated once all betting strategies had been made.
A necessary condition for belief polarization is dynamic consistency: The individual
should carry out the ex ante optimal prediction strategy as the ex-post optimal strategy
after a signal is realized. To ensure dynamic consistency, we implemented a few
15This means that the prediction strategy was elicited in probability in 11 scales from 0%
to 100% with an increment of 10%.
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experimental measures. First, subjects were told that the prediction strategy could 
not be changed once it was confirmed. Second, when eliciting posteriors, we 
reminded subjects of the resulting payoff of the ex ante prediction strategy that they 
chose in the previous decision screen conditional on the realized signal. According to 
the theory in BHK, after a signal is realized, it is the change in the exposure of the 
expected payoff to ambiguity that drives subjects to update their beliefs deviating 
from the Bayesian posterior. Therefore, by showing the resulting payoff of one’s 
prediction strategy, we expect to see a more pronounced effect in the dynamic 
consistency condition.16 We readily acknowledge that the experimental 
implementation of dynamic consistency is not trivial. Subjects in our experiment 
might not feel committed to the ex ante prediction strategy and update their 
posteriors in a dynamically consistent way. We therefore examine the effectiveness of 
the dynamic consistency condition in Subsection 3.3.1.
3.2.4 Measuring ambiguity and risk attitudes
To investigate the role ambiguity attitudes played in explaining belief polarization, 
we measured the subjects’ ambiguity attitudes using matching probabilities (Jaffray, 
1991; Kahn and Sarin, 1988; Wakker, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Dimmock et al., 
2016b; Fairley and Weitzel, 2017). The main idea of this method is to elicit the 
probability in a risky situation that makes subjects become indifferent toward a risky 
and an ambiguous situation.
Specifically, two boxes with 100 colored balls that were either purple or yellow were 
first constructed by the computer. The number of purple and yellow balls in box K 
was known to the subjects, but they did not know the composition of the balls in box 
U. Each subject was asked to make six consecutive decisions of choosing to draw a
ball from box K or box U. At the end of the experiment, one of the six decisions was
randomly chosen, and one ball was randomly drawn from the box that was chosen
randomly. If the color of the drawn ball was purple, subjects earned 1,000 ECU, and
nothing otherwise.
16It is also possible to do this by showing subjects the prediction strategy they have made 
directly. However, one concern of showing the prediction strategy is that it would likely 
increase the subjects’ confusion between the ex post prediction strategy and the posterior 
belief.
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Among the six decisions, the composition of colored balls in box U was unknown but
always the same, while in box K, the number of colored balls was known but changed
from one decision to another. Figure B.7 shows the screenshot of the first decision.
The proportion of colored balls in box K changed according to the bisection procedure.
Specifically, in the first decision, subjects faced a composition of 50 purple and 50
yellow balls in box K. If box K was chosen, we could infer that box K was regarded as
more attractive than box U. In the next decision, we then decreased the number of
purple balls in box K by 50% to decrease the attractiveness of box K. Similarly, if box
U was chosen, we could infer that box K was seen as less attractive than box U. In
the next decision, to increase the attractiveness of box K, we increased the number of
purple balls in box K by 50%. This procedure was repeated six times. The matching
probabilities were elicited as X/100, where X means the midpoint between the upper
and lower bound of the number of purple balls in box K in the last decision. We
refer to the matching probability of the ambiguity-neutral subjective probability 0.5
as m(0.5). After six iterations, the accuracy of m(0.5) was within 3%.
Previous studies show that individual ambiguity attitudes vary between likely events
and rare events. For example, individuals are mostly ambiguity averse in high and
medium likelihood events and ambiguity seeking in low likelihood events (Abdellaoui
et al., 2011; Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015b; Dimmock et al., 2016b). Thus,
we measure individual ambiguity attitudes not only in medium likelihood events, as
did previous research, but also in extremely high and low likelihood events. With
the three locally measured ambiguity attitudes indexes, we measure two global ambi-
guity attitudes indexes, i.e., ambiguity aversion and a(mbiguity-generated) likelihood
insensitivity (henceforth a-insensitivity).
To do this, we elicited the matching probabilities of the ambiguity-neutral subjective
probabilities 0.1 and 0.9, called m(0.1) and m(0.9), respectively. Compared with the
elicitation of m(0.5), there are 10 different kinds of colored balls in both box K and
box U in the elicitation of m(0.1) and m(0.9). In particular, while only a purple ball
yields payment when eliciting m(0.1), when eliciting m(0.9), all colors other than
purple produce a payoff. Therefore, the composition of colored balls in box K was
10 purple balls and 90 other colored balls in the first decision for eliciting m(0.1) and
m(0.9). Similarly, the composition of colored balls in box U remained the same in all
six decisions, while in box K, the proportion of balls with winning color(s) changed
from one decision to another according to the bisection procedure.
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Derived from the three locally measured matching probabilities, we calculated the
indexes of ambiguity attitudes as follows.
AA0.1 = 0.1−m(0.1), (3.1)
AA0.5 = 0.5−m(0.5), (3.2)
AA0.9 = 0.9−m(0.9). (3.3)
Each AAp shows the difference between the ambiguity-neutral subjective probability
p of an Ellsberg urn event and the matching probabilities elicited from subjects. A
large, positive value of AAp implies a strong ambiguity aversion attitude. A positive
AA0.1 and a negative AA0.9 means an insensitivity to likelihoods.
Following Abdellaoui et al. (2011); Dimmock et al. (2016b); Fairley and Weitzel
(2017), we measured the two global indexes of ambiguity attitudes as follows. At
each individual level, we estimated a best-fitting line between the ambiguity-neutral
subjective probability p and the corresponding elicited matching probabilities m(p)
on the open interval (0, 1) by means of OLS regression, denoting the intercept as c
and the coefficient as s, i.e., mp = c + s ∗ p. We denoted d as the distance of the
best-fitting line at p=1 from 1, i.e., d = 1 − c − s. We calculated the two global
indexes of ambiguity attitudes as follows:
a = 1− s, (3.4)
b = 1− s− 2c. (3.5)
Based on the QSR, which we used to elicit the prediction strategies in Subsection
3.2.3, individual risk aversion is likely to drive subjects to report a prediction strategy
of 0.5. Thus, we also measured subjects’ risk attitudes. Specifically, subjects faced a
multiple choice table with 11 rows (as shown in Figure B.2). In each of the 11 rows,
there were two options, option A and option B. In option A, subjects always faced
the same lottery of earning either 1,000 ECU or 0 ECU with the same probability.
In option B, subjects faced a certain but increasing amount of sure payoff from 0
ECU to 1,000 ECU when moving down the rows. Thus, option B became increas-
ingly attractive to subjects, thus leading them to switch their decisions from option
A (risky lottery) to option B (fixed payoff) at a certain row of the table. Regarding
a subject’s certainty equivalent (CE) of the risky lottery, we took the midpoint of the
sure payoff at the switching row and the sure payoff at the row above the switching
57
CHAPTER 3
row. Then, we measured the subjects’ attitudes to risk as shown in Equation (3.6).
An individual is regarded as risk averse (seeking) if r is larger (smaller) than 0, and
a larger (smaller) difference of r from 0 implies a more risk averse (seeking) individual.
r = 1− CE
the expected payoff in option A
= 1− CE500 . (3.6)
3.2.5 General procedures
The experiments were conducted in the Decision Lab at Radboud University, The 
Netherlands. We conducted four experimental sessions with 83 participants, compris-
ing 41 females (mean age=22.1, sd=3.11) and 42 males (mean age=22.45, sd=6.14), 
recruited by ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiments were computer-based and pro-
grammed by zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). All instructions were provided in the partic-
ipant’s native language to facilitate understanding (see Appendix B.1.2 for English 
instructions and Appendix B.1.3 for Dutch instructions). Each experimental session 
lasted one hour on average. The average payment was 15.12 Euros.
3.2.6 Hypotheses development
Before formally developing the hypotheses, we first simulate how the subjects in our 
experiment should update their beliefs and discuss how the polarization of beliefs 
would occur after a common observation.
Benchmark solutions
Suppose there are two individuals in our experiment, individual A and individual B. 
Individual A is assumed to be a high prior subject, i.e., being shown a white ball in the 
first draw, while individual B is assumed to be a low prior subject. The prior beliefs 
of the two individuals are:
µA = P rob(U1|W ) = 57 ,
µB = Prob(U1|B) = 27 ,
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where µi (i = A,B) is the prior belief; U1 denotes the event that the type of the
randomly drawn urn is type 1; and B/W/Y denotes the event that the color of a ball
randomly drawn from the randomly drawn urn is Black/White/Y ellow, respectively.
Assume the two individuals are neutral to both risk and ambiguity. The objective
function the two individuals used to evaluate the ex ante prediction strategies before
seeing a signal is:
Eµ,1−µEpii(C)
(
10− 0.1 ∗ (10− xi,C)2
)
,
where µ is the prior belief, E is the expectation operator, pii(C); i = 1, 2, is
the probability of drawing balls of color C conditional on type urn i, where C =
{b(lack), y(ellow), w(hite)}; and xi,C is the number of chips allocated to type urn i
conditional on the signal that the second drawn ball is of color C.
As in BHK, the two individuals are assumed to be dynamically consistent individuals,
which means that before seeing a signal, they construct an ex ante prediction strategy
conditional on each possible signal, and they carry out the ex ante prediction strategy
out after a signal is realized. Thus, the ex ante prediction strategy is supposed to
be the ex post prediction strategy. Since the other two signals no longer need to be
taken into account after a signal is realized, the objective function individuals used to
evaluate the ex post prediction strategies becomes
Ev,1−v
(
10− 0.1 ∗ (10− xi,c)2
)
,
where v is the posterior belief after a signal is observed, and xi,c is the number of
chips allocated to type urn i after the color of the second drawn ball is realized as c.
According to the objective function used to evaluate prediction strategies, an optimal
prediction strategy is required to be the unique solution to the first-order condition
of the objective function. Additionally, due to the dynamic consistency condition, the
ex ante optimal prediction strategy is kept as the ex post optimal prediction strategy.
We calculate the posterior beliefs according to the ex post prediction strategy. Table
3.1 shows the benchmark solutions for the optimal prediction strategies and posterior
beliefs.
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Benchmark solutions under ambiguity aversion
Now let us consider the belief updating of individuals who are not only dynamically
consistent but also ambiguity averse.17 For a dynamically consistent individual, an ex
ante optimal prediction strategy has to be made to maximize the expected payoff. If
the individual is also ambiguity averse, an extra goal of hedging against the exposure to
ambiguity arises when designing the optimal prediction strategy. Consistent with BHK,
we assume that the two individuals use the smooth model of ambiguity (Klibanoff
et al., 2005) to evaluate prediction strategies under ambiguity. Then, the objective
function the two individuals used to evaluate the ex ante prediction strategies could
be expressed as
Eµ,1−µΦ
[
Epii(C)
(
10− 0.1 ∗ (10− xi,C)2
)]
,
where µ is the prior belief; Φ(u) = − e−γu
γ
is the function capturing the decision utility
of ambiguity-averse individuals, with γ denoting the parameter of ambiguity aversion,
pii(C); i = 1, 2, is the probability of drawing balls of color C conditional on urn i,
where C = {b(lack), y(ellow), w(hite)}; and xi,C is the number of chips allocated
to urn i conditional on whether the drawn ball is of color C.
After a signal is realized, the ex ante prediction strategies are kept as the ex post
prediction strategies according to the dynamic consistency condition. Additionally,
because the other two signals no longer need to be considered, the objective function
the two individuals used to evaluate the ex post prediction strategies becomes
Ev,1−vΦ
[(
10− 0.1 ∗ (10− xi,c)2
)]
,
where v is the posterior belief, and xi,c is the number of chips allocated on type urn
i after a signal c is realized.
Before continuing, we define several important variables to capture the extent of
the exposure to ambiguity as well as the desire to hedge against ambiguity before
and after seeing a signal, respectively. Among the five variables we defined below,
HedgingMotive0 indicates the exposure of the individual’s ex ante expected payoff to
17Note that the assumption of risk neutrality still holds here.
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ambiguity, HedgingMotive1 indicates the actual exposure of the individual’s ex post
expected payoff to ambiguity after a signal is realized. As for the three other variables,
HedgingMotive1H means the exposure of the individual’s ex post expected payoff to
ambiguity if a high signal is realized, HedgingMotive1N means the exposure of the
individual’s ex post expected payoff to ambiguity if a neutral signal is realized, and
HedgingMotive1L means the exposure of the individual’s ex post expected payoff to
ambiguity if a low signal is realized.
HedgingMotive0 =
Φ′
[
Epi2(C)
(
10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x2,C)2
)]
Φ′
[
Epi1(C) (10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x1,C)2)
] , (3.7)
HedgingMotive1 =
Φ′
[
10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x2,c)2
]
Φ′ [10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x1,c)2] , (3.8)
HedgingMotive1H =
Φ′
[
10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x2,w)2
]
Φ′ [10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x1,w)2] , (3.9)
HedgingMotive1N =
Φ′
[
10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x2,y)2
]
Φ′ [10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x1,y)2] (3.10)
HedgingMotive1L =
Φ′
[
10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x2,b)2
]
Φ′ [10− 0.1 ∗ (10− x1,b)2] . (3.11)
Notice that the definition of HedgingMotive18 indicates the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between the expected payoff if the randomly drawn urn is of type 2 and the
expected payoff if the randomly drawn urn is of type 1. In particular, a special case
occurs when HedgingMotive equals 1, in which the prediction strategy makes the
expected payoff stay the same no matter what type of urn the randomly drawn urn
is. That is, a prediction strategy with HedgingMotive equal to 1 completely hedges
the ambiguity on expected payoff, which we call a perfect-hedge prediction strategy.
If HedgingMotive is larger than 1, one unit shifting of a prediction strategy leads
to a larger change in the expected payoff when the randomly drawn urn is type 2
18By mentioning HedgingMotive, we refer to all five variables regarding the hedging
motive defined in Equations (3.7) to (3.11).
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compared to when it is type 1. To hedge the ambiguity in expected payoff as much as
possible, a desire to decrease the prediction strategy x1,C arises. Similarly, there is a
desire to increase the prediction strategy x1,C if the HedgingMotive of a prediction
strategy is smaller than 1. Thus, for an ambiguity-averse individual, the further the
HedgingMotive is from 1, the larger the exposure to ambiguity and the larger the
desire to hedge against ambiguity.
In addition, we create another variable Diff(Exposure) (see Equation (3.12)) to
capture the change in the exposure to ambiguity following a signal. A positive value
means an increase in the exposure to ambiguity, while a negative value means a de-
crease in the exposure to ambiguity.
Diff(Exposure) =

HedgingMotive1 −HedgingMotive0, if seeing a high signal
OR high prior subjects
see a neutral signal,
HedgingMotive0 −HedgingMotive1, if seeing a low signal
OR low prior subjects
see a neutral signal.
(3.12)
Similar to the solutions presented in Table 3.1, Table 3.2 shows the solutions of predic-
tion strategies and corresponding posterior beliefs for individuals who are dynamically
consistent and ambiguity averse. It is worth noting that after a neutral signal is real-
ized, the HedgingMotive of both individuals deviated further from 1, which implies
an increase in the exposure to ambiguity. The increase in the exposure to ambiguity
makes both individuals feel that the optimal prediction strategy made ex ante is too
ambiguity seeking and no longer optimal ex post. The desire to hedge against the
extra exposure to ambiguity drives the two individuals to depart from the ex post
prediction strategy. However, for dynamically consistent individuals, the ex ante pre-
diction strategy has to be kept as the ex post prediction strategy. To offset the extra
desire to hedge against ambiguity, the two individuals report an even more “ambigu-
ous” belief to make the ex post prediction strategy not too ambiguity seeking. From
the view of an outside observer, the posterior of a high prior individual increases, while
the posterior of a low prior individual decreases after observing a common neutral sig-
nal. The polarization of beliefs then occurs. In addition, according to the simulation
results in Appendix B.2, we find that after a neutral signal is realized, the posteriors of
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more ambiguity-averse individuals are more polarized. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
the posterior beliefs will be more polarized if individuals are more ambiguity averse.
3.3 Experimental results
Before we present our experimental results, recall that the probability estimates 
(priors and posteriors) are the probability that the randomly drawn urn is of type 1 
(two black balls, three yellow balls and five white balls) rather than type 2 (five 
black balls, three yellow balls and two white balls). A high (low) prior subject 
corresponds to a subject who saw a white (black) ball in the first draw because a 
white (black) ball in the first draw increases (decreases) the prior belief of the 
randomly drawn urn being of type 1. A high (low) signal corresponds to a white ball 
in the second draw, since it implies that the posterior probability of the randomly 
drawn urn being of type 1 increases (decreases). Similarly, a neutral signal 
corresponds to a yellow ball in the second draw, since it gives no additional 
information regarding the type of the randomly drawn urn.
3.3.1 Examination of conditions for belief polarization
In this section, we check the conditions for belief polarization. According to BHK, 
a few conditions need to be satisfied to observe belief polarization: (i) signals are 
moderately informative (having a non-extreme likelihood ratio); (ii) sufficient dis-
agreement exists between the two individuals (the priors are on the opposite side 
of a threshold, which depends on the likelihood ratios of signals and the degree of 
ambiguity aversion); (iii) individuals are ambiguity averse; and (iv) individuals are 
dynamically consistent (ex ante strategies will be actually implemented). The first 
two conditions can be experimentally enforced. Given the substantial evidence on 
ambiguity aversion in general, the third condition is also relatively easy to satisfy. The 
last condition—dynamic consistency—is the trickiest condition. In the following, we 
check each condition carefully and discuss the measures that we have implemented 
to ensure those conditions.
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Moderate signals, prior heterogeneity, and ambiguity aversion
Regarding condition (i), the signal we induced in Subsection 3.2.2 has a likelihood 
ratio of 1, which makes the signal neutral. A neutral signal always satisfies the first 
condition. To enforce condition (ii), we manipulated the first drawn ball that 
subjects receive to be white or black with equal likelihood. Given the initial belief of 
0.5, a white ball induces a prior higher than 0.5, while a black ball induces a prior 
lower than 0.5. Since, the threshold in our experiment is 0.5, the priors of the two 
types of subjects are on the two sides of the threshold, and condition (ii) is satisfied. 
We checked the subjects’ prior beliefs and found that condition (ii) was satisfied in 
our sample. The prior beliefs of low prior subjects are significantly lower than 0.5 
(mean= 0.2985, N=128, p = 0.0000 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test), 
while the prior beliefs of high prior subjects are significantly higher than the 
threshold 0.5 (mean= 0.6360, N=121, p = 0.0000 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed 
rank test). Regarding condition (iii) for the ambiguity attitudes of the subjects, we 
checked the ambiguity aversion index as measured in Subsection 3.2.4 and found a 
significantly positive index, which indicates a general tendency of ambiguity aversion 
(mean= 0.0621, p = 0.0000 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test).
The effectiveness of the dynamic consistency condition
The fourth condition, enforcing dynamic consistency is trickier. Dynamic consistency 
plays a central role in the occurrence of belief polarization in BHK. It is also the 
condition that is the most difficult to construct in an experiment. In our design, we 
externally impose dynamic consistency by keeping subjects’ ex post prediction 
strategy the same as the ex ante prediction strategy conditional on a signal, and 
explicitly informing them so. Yet, despite our best effort, the subjects might not 
think that our externally imposed ex post prediction strategy was their choices and, 
accordingly, might not feel committed to it. Without a commitment to the ex post 
prediction strategy, subjects do not feel obliged to report a posterior that makes the 
ex post prediction strategy optimal after a signal is realized, which leads to a 
breakdown of dynamic consistency condition and thus fails to generate belief 
polarization. Thus, in the following, we examine the effectiveness of the dynamic 
consistency condition.
According to BHK, once conditions (i) to (iv) are satisfied, belief polarization occurs 
when the direction of belief updating is the same as the direction of the change in the
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hedging motive.19 In particular, belief polarization occurs if the hedging motive of the
high prior subjects increases and of low prior subjects decreases. To see the intuition,
consider the belief updating of a high prior subject following a neutral signal. Before
a signal is realized, the subject constructs an optimal contingent prediction strategy,
which takes into account the exposure to ambiguity. Now suppose a neutral signal
has realized. Since the signal is neutral, Bayesian updating dictates no updating of
the prior. However, if the exposure to ambiguity increases after the neutral signal,
the original belief estimate—the prior—is no longer optimal for the ex ante prediction
strategy. Rather the ex ante prediction strategy would appear to be too ambiguity
seeking given the initial prior. To ensure the ex ante prediction strategy conditional
on a neutral signal is still optimal after a neutral signal, the subject needs to report an
even more extreme belief, i.e., the posterior of a high prior subject increases further,
so that the ex ante prediction strategy does not appear too ambiguity seeking. A
similar reasoning requires a low prior subject to lower her posterior further. Together,
we observe belief polarization.
The above reasoning enables us to examine the effectiveness of the dynamic consis-
tency condition by looking at the correlation between the change in the exposure to
ambiguity and the deviation of subjects’ posterior beliefs from the Bayesian posterior.
The direct consequence of the dynamic consistency condition for ambiguity averse
individuals is that they update the posterior beliefs deviating from the Bayesian pos-
terior; thus we expect to observe a positive relationship between the change of the
exposure to ambiguity and the deviation from the Bayesian posterior.
To perform the examination, we define a variable Deviation, which captures the de-
viation of the reported posterior from the Bayesian posterior as follows:
Deviation =

BP −RP, if seeing a high signal/high prior
subjects seeing a neutral signal,
RP −BP, if seeing a low signal/low prior
subjects seeing a neutral signal,
(3.13)
19This refers to Proposition 2 in BHK, which suggests that the posterior is above/equal
to/below the prior if and only if Φ
′
[−(α′ (x))2]
Φ′ [−(1−(α′ (x)))2]
pi1(x)
pi0(x)
>
<
Φ
′
[Epi0 (−(α
′
(X))2)]
Φ′ [Epi0 (−((1−α
′ (X))2))]
.
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where BP denotes Bayesian posterior, and RP denotes the realized posterior.
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We now examine the correlation between Deviation and Diff(Exposure) (the 
change of the exposure to ambiguity, defined in Subsection 3.2.6). We consider both 
neutral signals and extreme signals. The consideration of neutral signal is warranted. 
In fact, belief polarisation is most likely to occur following neutral signals. The con-
sideration of extreme signals is less obvious. We explain briefly as follows. In BHK, 
following an extremely high (or low) signal, the polarization of beliefs cannot occur 
since the likelihood updating is too strong to allow for belief polarization. However, 
due to the change in the exposure to ambiguity, the belief updating would still 
deviate from the Bayesian updating. We thus check whether the dynamic 
consistency con-dition works by checking the correlation between Deviation and 
Diff(Exposure) after all types of signals. We find a significantly positive 
correlation between the two parts (Spearman’s ρ = 0.1432, p = 0.0238).
To further examine whether and how the change in the exposure to ambiguity 
affects the deviation from the Bayesian posterior, we run an OLS regression with the 
variable Deviation as the dependent variable, and the variable Diff(Exposure) 
and demo-graphic variables as independent variables. Table 3.3 presents the results 
of the OLS regression. We find a significantly positive effect of the change in the 
exposure to ambiguity on the deviation from the Bayesian posterior. Consistent with 
the dynamic consistency condition, this result suggests that the changes in ambiguity 
exposure leads to deviations in posteriors from the Bayesian benchmark.
Table 3.3: OLS regression on the change of the exposure to ambiguity
Variables (1)
Diff(Exposure) 0.3289∗∗
(0.025)
Constant 0.0725
(0.198)
No. of observation 249
Adjusted R-squared 0.0229
Notes: p-value is given in the parentheses. ***, **, * represent the significance level at 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1.
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Along with the positive indication of conditions (i) to (iii), the above result suggests 
that all conditions for the occurrence of belief polarisation have been satisfied. We 
now proceed to examine belief polarization.
3.3.2 Examination of belief polarization
Given that all of the conditions required in BHK for the occurrence of belief polar-
ization are satisfied, we examine the updating of beliefs after a signal is realized in 
this section. We focus on the occurrence of belief polarization. In particular, we 
examine belief updating after a neutral signal, where the theory predicts that belief 
polarization is most likely to occur, i.e., following a neutral signal, those with a low 
prior update to an even lower posterior, and those with a high prior update to an even 
higher posterior.
Figure 3.2. Belief updating following a realized signal
Figure 3.2 reports the overall belief updating pattern. There are six pairs of priors
and posteriors following a low, neutral, and high signal. The y-axis stands for the
probability estimation that the randomly drawn urn is of type 1. As we can see, in
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general, posteriors decrease following a low signal (mean(posterior−prior)=-0.1142,
N=83, p = 0.0000 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test) and increase follow-
ing a high signal (mean(posterior−prior)=0.1535, N=91, p = 0.0000 for a one-sample
Wilcoxon signed rank test). Thus, in general, our subjects update in the right direc-
tion.
To check for belief polarization, we focus on beliefs following a neutral signal. As
stated above, belief polarization implies that a neutral signal leads a high prior to
update even higher and a low prior to update even lower. However, this is not what
we observed in Figure 3.2. After a neutral signal, there is no statistically significant
difference between the prior and posterior estimations for both high prior subjects
(mean(posterior−prior)=-0.0353, N=33, p=0.1823 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed
rank test) and low prior subjects (mean(posterior−prior)=-0.0008, N=42, p=0.8447
for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test).
Figure 3.3. Belief updating after a neutral signal between ambiguity-averse and non-
ambiguity-averse subjects
As mentioned in Subsection 3.3.1, one of the conditions for belief polarization to
occur is that subjects are ambiguity averse. Although we find the evidence that sub-
jects in our experiment are mostly ambiguity averse (see Subsection 3.3.1), there are
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still some subjects who are not averse to ambiguity. To further examine the occur-
rence of belief polarization, we use the ambiguity aversion index (index-b, measured
in Subsection 3.2.4) to separate subjects into two groups: subjects who are ambi-
guity averse (69.3%) and subjects who are ambiguity neutral or seeking (30.7%).
Figure 3.3 shows the belief updating of ambiguity-averse subjects and ambiguity-
neutral or -seeking subjects after a neutral signal. Similar to the results in Figure
3.2, we find no evidence of belief polarization in either ambiguity-averse subjects
(for high prior subjects, mean(posterior−prior)=-0.0404, N=23, p=0.3581 for a one-
sample Wilcoxon signed rank test; for low prior subjects, mean(posterior−prior)=-
0.0112, N=29, p=0.3698 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test), or ambiguity-
neutral or -seeking subjects (for high prior subjects, mean(posterior−prior)=-0.0235,
N=10, p=0.2988 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test; for low prior subjects,
mean(posterior−prior)=0.0223, N=13, p=0.5289 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed
rank test).
Given that all four conditions for belief polarization are satisfied in our experiment, it
is puzzling that we do not observe belief polarization. To examine more closely the
missing link in the occurrence of belief polarization, we check the prediction strategies
that subjects made. We find significant evidence that our subjects made perfect-
hedge ex ante prediction strategies20 (i.e., ex ante strategies with HedgingMotive0
equaling 1) by looking at the ex ante hedging motive (i.e., HedgingMotive0, de-
fined in Subsection 3.2.6) induced by subjects’ ex ante prediction strategies. We
find that the ex ante hedging motive of our subjects is insignificantly different from
1 (mean(HedgingMotive0)=1.0043, p=0.2030 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank
test). Moreover, we find that subjects also tend to make perfect-hedge ex post predic-
tion strategies when conditioning on a neutral signal21 (mean(HedgingMotive1N )=1.0053,
p=0.6922 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test).22 The tendency to make a
20An example of a perfect-hedge ex ante prediction strategy could be to “predict a 0.8
conditional on a white second ball, a 0.5 conditional on a yellow second ball, and a 0.2
conditional on a black second ball.” With this perfect-hedge strategy, there is no ambiguity
in the ex ante expected payoff no matter whether the randomly drawn urn is of type 1 or
type 2.
21An example could be a strategy of predicting a 0.5 conditional on a second yellow ball.
If the second ball is a yellow ball, no ambiguity would be involved in the ex post expected
payoff by predicting 0.5.
22To make sure that our subjects made ex post prediction strategies according to the type
of signals that would be realized, we examine whether they made perfect-hedge ex post
prediction strategies when conditioning on a low signal (mean(HedgingMotive1L)=1.6715,
p=0.0000 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test) and when conditioning a high signal
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perfect-hedge prediction strategy both ex ante and ex post, conditional on a neu-
tral signal, leads to a limited change in the exposure to ambiguity, which, in turn,
leaves subjects limited room to update their beliefs if seeing a neutral signal. As a
result, belief polarization could hardly occur. This reasoning is confirmed by what we
observed in our experiment. Following a neutral signal, Diff(Exposure) is insignifi-
cantly different from 0 (mean=-0.003%, N=75, p=0.6930 for a one-sample Wilcoxon
signed rank test). The direct consequence of the insignificant change in the exposure
to ambiguity is the insignificant difference between prior and posterior after a neutral
signal is realized (mean(posterior−prior)=-0.016, N=75, p=0.4557 for a one-sample
Wilcoxon signed rank test).23
To explore the missing link in a further step, we investigate the underlying factors
that drive subjects to make the perfect-hedge strategies. Before doing so, we create
two variables, PerfectHedge0 and PerfectHedge1N . PerfectHedge0 is created to
capture the tendency of subjects to make a perfect-hedge ex ante prediction strategy
and is defined as follows:
PerfectHedge0 = |HedgingMotive0 − 1|,
where HedgingMotive0 is the hedging motive of subjects’ ex ante prediction strate-
gies. A larger value of PerfectHedge0 indicates a lower tendency to make perfect-
hedge ex ante prediction strategies.
Similarly, PerfectHedge1N is created to capture the tendency of subjects to make a
perfect-hedge ex post prediction strategy when conditioning on a neutral signal and
is defined as follows:
PerfectHedge1N = |HedgingMotive1N − 1|,
where HedgingMotive1N is the hedging motive of subjects’ ex post prediction strate-
gies conditional on a neutral signal. A larger value of PerfectHedge1N indicates a
(mean(HedgingMotive1H )=0.6892, p=0.0000 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test),
respectively. Both tests imply that our subjects considered the information from the to-be-
observed signals when making ex post prediction strategies.
23Note that the positive correlation between Deviation and Diff(Exposure) following
a neutral signal could still be found. However, this positive correlation is not statistically
significant (N = 75, Spearman’s ρ=0.1233, p=0.29). Considering the insignificant change
in the exposure to ambiguity and in the updating of beliefs, it is reasonable to infer that the
latter is the consequence of the former. Thus, the insignificantly positive correlation between
Deviation and Diff(Exposure) we find above does not necessarily imply the ineffectiveness
of the dynamic consistency condition.
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lower tendency to make perfect-hedge ex post prediction strategies when conditioning
on a neutral signal.
We then run two OLS regressions. We use the variable PerfectHedge0 as the
dependent variable in the first regression, and the variable PerfectHedge1N as
the dependent variable in the second regression. In addition, we add the variable
ambiguity aversion (represented by the ambiguity aversion index, index-b) and the
variable risk aversion (represented by the risk aversion index) in both regressions as
independent variables. Table 3.4 shows the results of the two regressions. In the first
regression, we find a significantly positive effect of the degree of ambiguity aversion
on the tendency of subjects to make perfect-hedge ex ante prediction strategy. This
result indicates that when making the overall perfect-hedge ex ante prediction strat-
egy, individual ambiguity aversion is the main underlying factor that drives subjects
to do so. Moreover, in the second regression, we find a significantly positive effect of
risk aversion on the tendency of subjects to make perfect-hedge ex post strategy when
conditioning on a neutral signal. This result indicates that when making a perfect-
hedge ex post strategy conditional on a neutral signal, individual risk aversion is the
main factor that drives subjects to do so.
Table 3.4: Perfect-hedge strategy regression
Variables (1) PerfectHedge0 (2) PerfectHedge1N
Ambiguity aversion −0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0200
(0.009) (0,156)
Risk aversion -0.0140 −0.0327∗∗
(0.233) (0.025)
Constant 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0317∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
No. of observation 249 249
Adjusted R-squared 0.0270 0.0219
Notes: p-value is given in the parentheses. ***, **, * represent the significance level at 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1.
Given the results above, we further check the relationship between the degree of am-
biguity aversion and the deviation of posteriors from the Bayesian benchmark. As
argued in Subsections 3.2.6 and 3.3.1, ambiguity aversion drives belief polarization
73
CHAPTER 3
because the desire to hedge against ambiguity drives subjects to deviate from the ex 
ante prediction strategy, a strategy which is no longer optimal following a neutral 
signal. To offset the desire to change the ex ante prediction strategy and maintain 
dynamic consistency, subjects report posteriors deviating from the Bayesian 
posterior. We find a marginally positive correlation between the ambiguity aversion 
index (index-b) and the deviation from the Bayesian posterior (Spearman’s 
ρ=0.1217, p=0.10). Similarly, according to the results in Table 3.3, the effective 
enforcement of the dy-namic consistency condition results in a significantly positive 
effect of the change in the exposure to ambiguity on the deviation from the Bayesian 
posterior. Hence, the role of individual ambiguity aversion indicates that given a 
certain change in the expo-sure to ambiguity, more ambiguity-averse subjects tend to 
report posterior estimations further from the Bayesian posterior, implying a higher 
likelihood of belief polarization occurring. Moreover, the role of the dynamic 
consistency condition ensures that for each single subject, the larger the change in 
the exposure to ambiguity after a signal, the further the subject reports the posterior 
estimation deviating from the Bayesian posterior.
3.3.3 The role of risk aversion in the absence of belief
polarization
Given the regression results in model (2) of Table 3.4, it is important to understand
the role of risk aversion in the absence of belief polarization in our experiment. In
addition, as mentioned in Subsection 3.2.6, individuals in the theoretical model of
BHK are assumed to be risk neutral. Considering that most people in the world are
risk averse (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Isaac and James,
2000; Rabin, 2000; Cox and Sadiraj, 2006; Shupp and Williams, 2007), in this section,
we explore whether the results we observed in Subsection 3.3.2 concerning the absence
of belief polarization are caused by the existence of individual risk aversion.
We first check the risk attitudes of subjects in our experiment and find that the risk
aversion index (defined and measured in Subsection 3.2.4) is significantly larger than 0
(mean=0.082, p=0.0000 for a one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test), which indicates
a general tendency of risk aversion. To investigate whether individual risk aversion
prevents from the occurrence of belief polarization, we investigate how individuals who
are both ambiguity averse and risk averse (with an utility function u(x) = −e−λx,
where λ indicates the degree of risk aversion) in BHK’s model update their beliefs.
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Table 3.5 presents how individuals who are risk averse and ambiguity averse in BHK’s
model theoretically should update their beliefs with the variation of the degree of
ambiguity aversion (γ, which can be seen in the function to capture individual ambi-
guity attitudes defined in Subsection 3.2.6) and the degree of risk aversion (λ).24 We
find that belief polarization can still occur even when individuals are risk averse. In
addition, we find that as we hypothesized in Subsection 3.2.6, generally the posterior
estimations polarize further with the increase in the degree of ambiguity aversion.
Furthermore, we find that the existence of individual risk aversion does not decrease
the possibility of belief polarization occurring. Thus, the results in Table 3.5 excludes
the possibility that individual risk aversion leads to the absence of belief polarization
in our experiment.
Table 3.5: The posterior estimations of individuals who are risk averse and ambiguity averse
Ambiguity aversion degree (γ)
1 5 10 20
0
High prior subject (prior:0.71) 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.76
Low prior subject (prior:0.29) 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24
5
High prior subject (prior:0.71) 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76
Risk aversion Low prior subject (prior:0.29) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24
degree (λ)
10
High prior subject (prior:0.71) 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76
Low prior subject (prior:0.29) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24
20
High prior subject (prior:0.71) 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
Low prior subject (prior:0.29) 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we experimentally examine the role of individual ambiguity aversion and
the dynamic consistency condition in the occurrence of belief polarization, applying the
theory from BHK as the theoretical foundation. In a lab experiment, we experimentally
enforced as close as possible the conditions required by BHK for belief polarization to
24Note that in Table 3.5, we only present the posterior estimations with the variation in the
degree of ambiguity aversion and risk aversion. For the prediction strategies under a certain
level of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, please see Appendix B.2.
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occur. However, different from the predictions in BHK, we do not find the occurrence
of belief polarization, even though all required conditions are satisfied. We find that
one possible reason is because subjects tend to make both the ex ante prediction
strategies and the ex post prediction strategies if conditioning on a neutral signal
perfect-hedge strategies. By doing so, there is little room for subjects to update their
beliefs after a neutral signal is realized. Consequently, belief polarization is difficult
to occur.
We have also performed some further checks. For example, we examined the role of
individual ambiguity aversion and the dynamic consistency condition in the deviation
of posterior estimations from the Bayesian posterior. We find that given a certain
exposure to ambiguity, more ambiguity-averse individuals tend to report posterior
estimations further deviating from the Bayesian posterior. We also find a positive
relationship between the change of the exposure to ambiguity and the deviation from
the Bayesian posterior, suggesting an effective enforcement of the dynamic consistency
condition.
Furthermore, we examine one possible explanation for the absence of belief polariza-
tion in our experiment, i.e., risk aversion, since individuals in the model of BHK are
assumed to be risk neutral. According to the simulation results presented in Appendix
B.2, we find that the increase in the degree of risk aversion does not decrease the
likelihood of belief polarization occurring, which rejects the possibility that individual
risk aversion induces the absence of belief polarization.
There are several factors that we think might be responsible for the absence of be-
lief polarization in our experiment. First, despite our efforts in the experiment (see
Subsection 3.2.3) to prevent subjects from mixing up the posterior estimations and
the ex post prediction strategies, it is still not easy for subjects to distinguish the two
elements from each other. As a consequence, subjects might not have updated their
beliefs after a neutral signal. The second reason might be related to the context used
in the experiment. In the ambiguous scenario, the neutral signal actually transfers
a clear signal that no further information is provided for posterior updating, which
might remind subjects not to update their beliefs after a neutral signal. However,
in a natural context, in which a neutral signal is more ambiguous and more incon-
clusive, belief polarization might be more likely to occur. Third, we cannot exclude
noise (random effects) in a lab experiment, especially in an ambiguous scenario. As
a result, it might be not that easy to observe the occurrence of belief polarization.
Therefore, we suggest that future studies take more steps to control the differentiation
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between posterior estimations and ex post prediction strategy. Additionally, it may be
worthwhile for future research to provide a less conclusive neutral signal, which leaves
more room for interpretation and belief polarization.
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The disposition effect and underreaction to private 
information
This chapter is based on a joint paper with Dirk-Jan Janssen, Jianying Qiu, and Utz
Weitzel with the same title. An earlier version of this paper is published in Janssen (2017):
“Birds of a Feather: Price Dynamics and Trading Behavior in Composed Markets".
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The disposition effect and underreaction to private information
4.1 Introduction
Aggregating diversified private information into prices is perhaps the most important
function of markets (Hayek, 1945). Much effort has been devoted to the design of
a market mechanism that could facilitate this function. However, markets are never
perfectly efficient (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Lo, 2004). Many factors could affect
the speed and the scope that private information is aggregated and transmitted to
prices. Identifying those factors and examining their exact implications has been an
important agenda for many researchers for decades. In this paper, we consider the
disposition effect.
The disposition effect, as first coined in Shefrin and Statman (1985), is defined as
the tendency of investors to hold stocks with capital losses too long and to sell stocks
with capital gains too soon. The disposition effect is perhaps “one of the most robust
facts about trading” (Barberis and Xiong, 2012, p.251). It has been observed in stock
markets (Odean, 1998; Chong, 2009; Hur et al., 2010), futures markets (Frino et al.,
2004; Choe and Eom, 2009; Chou and Wang, 2011; Li and Yang, 2013) and mutual
fund markets (Frazzini, 2006; Singal and Xu, 2011; Cici, 2012). Weber and Camerer
(1998), Weber and Welfens (2007a) and Weber and Welfens (2007b) find the bias
also to be present in experimental asset markets.
The possibility that the disposition effect could affect market efficiency has been
well recognized (Kaustia, 2004; Grinblatt and Han, 2005; Frazzini, 2006; Weber and
Welfens, 2007b). For a piece of private information that only a particular trader pos-
sesses to be incorporated into market prices, the trader must initiate trades. Following
positive (or negative) information, there must be sufficient buying (or selling) activ-
ities to push up (or down) prices. However, traders exhibiting the disposition effect
are likely to distort this process. They sell assets following capital gains and hold
assets following capital losses. In a market in which many traders are affected by the
disposition effect, together with limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), those
distortions might result in insufficient buying (or selling) pressure to push the price
to the correct level. As a consequence, price underreaction and subsequent return
momentum arises (Frazzini, 2006; Dacey and Zielonka, 2008), and markets become
less efficient.
We experimentally investigate the role of the disposition effect in market efficiency
following the arrival of private information to a small group of informed traders. Our
contribution is mainly threefold. First, we make an explicit distinction between the
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disposition effect in bull markets, where most traders experience capital gains, and
the disposition effect in bear markets, where most traders make losses. For this
purpose, instead of using one general measure, as in Weber and Camerer (1998) and
Weber and Welfens (2007a), we measure the disposition effect separately in the gain
domain and the loss domain. Our measurement is built on prospect theory, perhaps the
most popular explanation of the disposition effect. Traders behaving consistently with
prospect theory use the purchasing price of an asset as the reference point and code
prices above it as gains and below it as losses. The S-shaped value function predicts
a higher propensity to sell the asset with gains due to risk aversion in the gain domain
and a stronger willingness to hold the asset with losses due to risk seeking in the loss
domain, resulting a trading pattern that is consistent with the disposition effect. If
prospect theory is indeed a driving force behind the disposition effect, in bull (or bear)
markets where most traders have capital gains (or losses), only the disposition effect
driven by the value function in the gain (or loss) domain is relevant. There is no reason
to believe that traders affected by the disposition effect in bull markets are the same
ones affected in bear markets. If the disposition effect affects different populations in
bear markets than in bull markets, it might result in different market dynamics. The
latter is confirmed in Frazzini (2006), Weber and Welfens (2007a) and Weber and
Welfens (2007b), which they find that both individual disposition effect and market
underreaction are asymmetric between the gain and loss domains. Consequently, it is
important to distinguish the disposition effect in the gain domain and the loss domain.
Second, we consider the relationship between the disposition effect and market effi-
ciency using private instead of public signals. The link between the disposition effect
and price underreaction has been shown in, among others, Grinblatt and Han (2005),
Frazzini (2006) and Weber and Welfens (2007b). The focus of those studies has been
on the arrival of public information. While those studies provide important insights on
the existence and implications of the disposition effect, they neglect some important
points. First, as we point out in the beginning of the introduction, a primary function
of markets is to aggregate diversified private information rather than public informa-
tion. Hence, it is essential to know the role of the disposition effect in the translation
of private information to market prices. Second, in studies relying on public signals,
it is not entirely clear whether and how the disposition effect directly affects market
efficiency. Following public signals, market prices generally need some time to fully
reflect new information, instead of immediately jumping to the new equilibrium level,
as predicted by the efficient market hypothesis. However, it is unclear what exact
role the disposition effect plays in this process. The disposition effect is not defined
by the ability to absorb information, and traders affected by the disposition effect
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might process information and adjust their trading prices as quickly as other traders.
Therefore, the underreaction of market prices to public signals per se might come
from factors other than the disposition effect. The results found in works such as
Weber and Camerer (1998), Weber and Welfens (2007a), and Weber and Welfens
(2007b) might merely reflect a correlation of those factors with the disposition effect.
With private information, market prices adjust slowly, and the disposition effect has
a clear role in this process. Finally, different natures of signals could imply different
trading dynamics. Unlike in the case of public information, informed traders have a
distinct informational advantage over uninformed traders. They might construct trad-
ing strategies that could hide their information and exploit the information advantage
for as long as possible (e.g., Buffa, 2013). Those trading strategies might lead to a
potentially stronger underreaction when signals are private rather than public. It is
interesting to see if and to what extent the disposition effect plays a role in those
dynamics.
Finally, our investigation relies on experimental asset markets instead of empirical
data. An experimental approach, in contrast to empirical methods, provides us with
full control over the fundamental value of the asset, the information structure of
signals, and the behavioral trait—the level of the disposition effect—of the informed
traders receiving signals. Those tight controls allow us to directly test the role of the
disposition effect in market efficiency without having to worry about other confounding
factors, such as mean reversion in beliefs, portfolio re-balancing, and trading costs.
Furthermore, by examining detailed micro-structure trading data, we are able to get
a comprehensive view of the whole translation process from signals to prices and to
pinpoint the steps where things go wrong.
Specifically, our experiment consists of two main parts. In the first part, we measure
the level of the disposition effect separately in the gain and loss domains using a
novel method. The basic task in our measurement method consists of playing an
ambiguous lottery for a maximum of four rounds. The ambiguous lottery is the same
in all rounds and offers either a gain or loss of 400 Experimental Currency Units
(ECU). The task ends once subjects decide not to play the lottery. Consistent with
the empirical definition of the disposition effect, subjects who experience a gain in
playing a lottery should become less likely to proceed to next rounds, while subjects
who experience a loss in playing a lottery should become more likely to proceed to
next rounds. To more accurately and effectively measure the level of the disposition
effect, we manipulate the outcomes of the ambiguous lottery in two out of six tasks,
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such that subjects face four continuous gains in one manipulated task and face four
continuous losses in the other, if subjects play to the end.
In the second part of the experiment, nine subjects compose a market and trade an
asset via a computer-based double auction. The final value of the asset depends on the
the color of a randomly drawn ball from an ambiguous urn. It is common knowledge
that three of the nine subjects are informed traders. Each market trading is divided
into two phases. Subjects trade the asset for two minutes in the first phase, then three
subjects—informed traders—receive the same private signal, and trading continues for
another two minutes. Our central focus is on the implications of the informed traders’
level of the disposition effect on their individual trading behavior and aggregate market
performance. For this purpose, we appoint informed traders according to their levels
of the disposition effect; i.e., informed traders are three subjects either with the
highest or the lowest levels of the disposition effect in a market. We consider both
the disposition effect in the gain domain and that in the loss domain. The signals
that informed traders receive are of two types. A positive signal excludes a bad state
and implies the value of the asset is more likely to be high, whereas a negative signal
excludes a good state, and thus the value of the asset is more likely to be low. In
the experiment, we deliberately construct markets in which the sign of the signals
(positive/negative) either matches or does not match the domain in which the levels
of the disposition effect are measured. This allows us to check whether the disposition
effect measured in the two domains indeed has different implications. To cover the
the whole spectrum, we run eight treatments in total with a within-subject design so
that we have: two levels (high/low) of the informed traders’ disposition effect levels
× two domains (gain/loss) in which the disposition effect levels are measured × two
types (positive/negative) of private signals.
Our results show that disposition effect levels measured in the two domains are not
correlated, suggesting individuals exhibit different levels of the disposition effect in
bear markets than in bull markets. In line with the disposition effect, we find that
informed traders who have higher levels of the disposition effect exhibit a significantly
greater (or lower) willingness to hold the asset following a negative (or positive) signal
than informed traders who have lower levels of the disposition effect. This willingness
is evident both from the numbers and the prices of (submitted and accepted) bids
and asks. Furthermore, the differences in the trading behavior result in substantially
different asset holdings between informed traders with high and low disposition effect
levels. At the aggregate market level, we observe significant underreaction following
both types of private signals, and there is no indication that prices are approaching a
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new fundamental value within the trading period of the double auction market. We 
find some evidence that markets with informed traders who have higher levels of the 
disposition effect experience stronger price underreaction. This is true following both 
a positive and negative signal, although the difference is more obvious following a 
negative signal. Finally and most importantly, the above results hold only when the 
sign of private signals (positive/negative) matches the domain in which the disposition 
effect levels are measured.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the experimental 
design, procedures and hypotheses. In Section 4.3, our results are presented and 
discussed. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Experimental design
4.2.1 Measuring individual disposition effect levels
Our measure of individual disposition effect levels is based on prospect theory (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979). Specifically, in the basic task of our measurement method, 
subjects repeatedly face an ambiguous lottery which pays out either +400 ECU or 
-400 ECU for a maximum of four rounds.25 At the beginning of each round, subjects
need to decide whether or not to play the lottery. The task ends once subjects de-
cide not to play the lottery in a round. The fundamental idea of our measurement
is that subjects who experience a gain should become less likely to proceed to next
rounds, while those who experience a loss should become more likely to proceed to
next rounds, which is consistent with the definition of the disposition effect.
We separately measure the inclination of stopping when experiencing gains and con-
tinuing when experiencing losses. To do so, we construct six basic tasks, as described 
above. Two tasks have a particular sequence of lottery outcomes. The outcomes of 
the ambiguous lottery are four continuous gains in one basic task and four continuous 
losses in another, should subjects play to the end. In light of the disposition effect,
25The detailed construction of the ambiguous lottery is provided in Appendix C.1.2. We 
used an ambiguous instead of a risky lottery to bring our task closer to the asset in our 
experimental markets. The choice of an ambiguous lottery also resembles stocks in actual 
markets of which return distributions are unknown.
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subjects with a high disposition effect level should stop playing early in the four-gains
series and proceed further in the four-losses series. By counting the number of lotteries
that subjects play in each of the above two tasks, we are able to separately measure
the level of the disposition effect in the gain and loss domains for each subject.
The outcomes were more “normal” in the remaining four tasks. Table 4.1 shows the
outcomes of the ambiguous lottery across four rounds in the six tasks. The order
of the six tasks was randomized on the individual level. Subjects received an initial
endowment of 1600 ECU, and one of the six tasks was randomly chosen for real
payment.
Table 4.1: The outcomes of the ambiguous lottery in four rounds for each of the six basic
tasks.
Tasks round 1 round 2 round 3 round 4
1 -400 400 400 400
2 400 400 -400 400
3 400 -400 400 400
4 -400 400 -400 400
5 (L) -400 -400 -400 -400
6 (G) 400 400 400 400
Notes: Task 5 ( “Task L” ) is used to measure subjects’ disposition effect levels in the loss
domain, and task 6 (“Task G”) is used to measure subjects’ disposition effect levels in the
gain domain. The order of the tasks was randomized.
Our task shares features with some of the previous measures, such as the hypothetical
“housing task” used in Weber and Welfens (2007a) and the “stock market task” in
Weber and Welfens (2007b). Our disposition effect measurement task differs from
those measures in two important ways. First, by having the two tasks of four-gains
series and four-losses series, we are able to measure the disposition effect in the gain
and loss domains separately. We believe such a separation is important. Weber and
Welfens (2007a) and Weber and Welfens (2007b) find that both individual disposi-
tion effect and market underreaction are asymmetric following an increasing versus
a decreasing price trend. One potential reason could be that individuals exhibiting
high disposition effect levels in a bull market might not be the same ones who exhibit
high disposition effect levels in a bear market, and, consequently, this could result in
different market dynamics, such as in prices or volumes. Furthermore, it could be that
the overall traders’ levels of the disposition effect is weaker in the loss domain than in
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the gain domain. Second, our task is based on individual decisions rather than 
market tradings as, for example, the “stock market task” in Weber and Welfens 
(2007b). Like the “housing task,” it gives some distance between the measure and 
the definition of the disposition effect. This implies that it is more difficult for our 
measure to work as effectively as the market measure of the disposition effect: our 
measure would not work unless it captures (at least one of the) actual working 
mechanisms behind the disposition effect. Given that our measure method is based 
on prospect value function, evidence of the effective measurement of the disposition 
effect with our method supports the hypothesis that prospect theory is indeed an 
important source for the disposition effect.
4.2.2 Trading in markets
After the separate measurement of the disposition effect levels in the gain and loss 
domains, we compose experimental asset markets consisting of nine subjects each. 
The experimental asset markets are similar to those in Plott and Sunder (1982). 
Trades over an ambiguous asset took place in an open-book continuous double auction 
for a trading period of four minutes in total. The per unit, called “share” in the 
experiment, value of the ambiguous asset was determined by the color of a randomly 
drawn ball from a bowl consisting of 100 balls with an unknown color composition. 
The per share value of the ambiguous asset was 0 ECU for a black ball, 100 ECU for 
a white ball, 600 ECU for a yellow ball, and 700 ECU for a purple ball. The “naive” 
fundamental value was thus 350 ECU if subjects consider all colors equally likely, and 
they are ambiguity and risk neutral. We use the ambiguous asset instead of the risky 
asset to more closely resemble actual stock markets.
To investigate the role of the disposition effect in market efficiency following the 
arrival of private information to a small group of informed traders, we divided each 
trading period into two trading phases. Subjects first traded the asset without private 
information for two minutes. Trading then paused, and we provided three subjects—
informed traders whose disposition effect levels were either the highest or the lowest in 
the market—with a private signal. The signal excluded one potential color of the drawn 
ball. The positive signal excluded the white color (eliminating the possibility of 100 
ECU), and as a result, the naive expected value of the asset increased from 350 ECU 
to 433.33 ECU. Conversely, a negative signal excluded the yellow color (eliminating 
the possibility of 600 ECU), and the naive expected value dropped from 350 ECU to
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266.66 ECU. Note that after the signal, the worst state—the drawn ball is black—
and the best state—the drawn ball is purple—still remain. Trading continued for two
further minutes after the private signal was provided. A comparison of the trading
dynamics between markets where informed traders have the highest disposition effect
levels and those in which informed traders have the lowest disposition effect levels
allow us to directly examine the influence of the disposition effect on the market
efficiency.
Our subjects were measured for the disposition effect both in the gain and loss do-
mains. Accordingly, we determined the informed traders once according to the dispo-
sition effect measure in the gain domain and once according to the disposition effect
measure in the loss domain. This allows us to examine directly whether the different
domains in which the disposition effect is measured affect market efficiency differ-
ently. Furthermore, measuring the disposition effect in the two domains gives rise
to a potentially fruitful opportunity. Recall that our signal can either be positive or
negative, and a positive (or negative) signal should result in an increase (or a decrease,
respectively) in asset price. If the disposition effect measured in the gain domain is
fundamentally different from that measured in the loss domain, only the disposition
effect measured in the gain domain should affect market efficiency in a rising market.
Traders are in the gain domain when asset prices increase, and the trading behavior
determined by the value function in the loss domain should not be observed, including
the disposition effect measured in the loss domain. A similar argument applies for the
market where the private signal is negative. To check this hypothesis, we construct
markets where the nature (positive versus negative) of the signal either matches or
does not match the measurement domain (gain versus loss) of the disposition effect
according to which informed traders are determined.
To accommodate all possibilities mentioned above, we had eight rounds. Each round
corresponded to one of the following eight treatments: (1) which three subjects with
the highest or the lowest disposition effect levels were appointed as informed traders;
(2) in which domain—gain or loss—the informed traders’ disposition effect levels were
measured, and (3) which signal—positive or negative—was provided to the informed
traders. Subjects were informed that one of the eight rounds would be randomly
chosen for the final payment. Table 4.2 summarizes the eight treatments and the
rounds in which each treatment took place.26
26Each session consisted of three markets. Each market had nine subjects, among which
three were informed traders. In total, there were nine informed traders in each round. In
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Table 4.2: The eight treatments
Rounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Domains DP measured in gain domain DP measured in loss domain
Informed traders’ DP levels High Low High Low High Low High Low
Signals Pos. Neg. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Pos. Neg.
Notes: (1) who: the three subjects with the highest or the lowest disposition effect levels
were appointed as the informed traders; (2) in which domain, gain or loss, the informed
traders’ disposition effect levels were measured, and (3) which signal, positive or negative,
was provided to the informed traders, and the rounds in which each treatment took place.
DP stands for the disposition effect.
In each session, we ran three of the above described experimental asset markets in
parallel. Each subject received 4000 ECU and 15 shares of the asset at the start
of the market. Subjects were told that before trades took place, a ball was drawn
from the bowl independently for each market, with the color of the drawn ball first
hidden and announced after the market closed.27 Short selling and leverage were not
allowed. Buy orders could enter the book only when subjects had enough money
to pay for the asset, while sell orders were possible only when a seller had enough
assets to sell. Historical transaction prices were presented on the trading screen, as
in Figure C.3. The existence of informed traders and the structure of signals were
common knowledge, but subjects did not know who would be an informed trader
when entering the first trading phase of the market. After the first trading phase
and during the trading pause, the informed traders received the private signal and the
non-informed traders were notified that the informed traders had received the private
rounds 1 to 4, the informed traders were determined according to the disposition effect level
measured in the gain domain. We ranked the disposition effect levels among all 27 subjects
from the highest to the lowest. To achieve a significant difference between the disposition
effect levels of high disposition informed traders and low disposition informed traders in all
three markets, we apply the following rule of assignment: the ith, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} was composed
of subjects whose rank equaled i+ 3x, with x ranging from 0 to 8 in steps of one. The nine
subjects in each market stayed the same in rounds 1 to 4. The informed traders and markets
were determined similarly for rounds 5 to 8 where the informed traders were determined
according to the disposition effect level measured in the loss domain. Please note that we
made sure that those subjects that decided not to play any lottery in the sequence relevant
for measuring their disposition effect attitude were always classified as a non-informed trader.
This was done because in these cases, the subjects could not be classified as either high or
low disposition effect individuals.
27In experimental implementation, a slightly different approach was used. The computer
randomly drew one of the remaining colors at the end of the round and determined the value
of the per share asset. Subjects did not know this.
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signal (and thus knew that they were not selected as informed traders). Note that 
the standard deviation of the asset’s expected value (309.12) is equal following a 
positive or negative signal, while the skew differs only in sign (0.65 and -0.65 
following a positive and negative signal, respectively). See Section C.1.2 for more 
details about the experimental asset markets.
4.2.3 Measuring ambiguity attitudes
As subjects faced an ambiguous lottery in the measurement of the disposition effect 
levels and traded an ambiguous asset in the experimental asset markets, we mea-
sured ambiguity attitudes in the final part of our experiment (see Section C.1.2 for 
instructions). Specifically, subjects were first asked to pick a color, either white or 
black. Then, subjects faced a choice list with 11 rows. In each row, there was a risky 
and an ambiguous urn. The unknown composition of white and black balls in the 
ambiguous urn remained constant across rows. The risky urn in each row contained a 
known composition of white and black balls, but the proportion changed across rows 
(see Figure C.4 for the list). Subjects were asked to choose between the ambiguous 
and risky urn at each row. Subjects were told that one of the eleven rows would be 
randomly selected for payment. A ball would be drawn from the chosen urn by the 
computer. The subject would receive 800 ECU should the drawn ball’s color match 
the color chosen by the subject.
We use the average of the two winning probabilities of the two risky urns at and below 
the switching row as the “matching probability.” A matching probability lower (higher) 
than 0.5 is interpreted as ambiguity aversion (or ambiguity seeking, respectively). This 
method measures ambiguity attitudes independent of risk attitudes (Dimmock et al., 
2015) and is frequently used in the literature (e.g., Lauriola and Levin, 2001; Dimmock 
et al., 2015; Cavatorta and Schroder, 2018).
4.2.4 General procedures
We ran six experimental sessions with 27 subjects each (162 subjects in total) in 
the Decision lab at Radboud University, The Netherlands. All experiments were pro-
grammed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and subjects were recruited using ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004). Each session lasted approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes. Subjects’
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average earning was 17.01 euro. Payments were paid out in cash at the end of each 
session. The experiment is described in more detail below and depicted schematically 
in Figure C.1.2 in the Appendix.
4.2.5 Hypotheses
By combining the argumentation and prior literature presented in the introduction 
with the experimental design presented in this section, we are able to formulate the 
following three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Informed traders with high disposition effect levels have a higher 
(lower) willingness to hold the asset following a negative (positive) signal than in-
formed traders with low disposition effect levels.
We measure the willingness to hold the asset with the numbers of (submitted and 
accepted) bids and asks, bid prices and ask prices, and trading volumes. A higher 
(lower) willingness to hold the asset corresponds to submitting more bids and/or 
fewer asks, quoting higher bid prices and/or lower ask prices, and holding fewer assets 
in the end.
The private signal is only in the hands of informed traders. For market prices to 
reflect the private signal, informed traders must initiate trades, and only through 
their trading can the private signal be transmitted into market prices. In light of the 
disposition effect, there are two possibilities that are not mutually exclusive. In the 
first possibility, market prices are affected by the general disposition effect levels in a 
market. In our experiment, the general disposition effect levels in different treatments 
are similar. This leaves us with the second possibility, which is also our main focus. 
In the second possibility, market prices are directly affected by the disposition effect 
levels of the informed traders. Following a positive (negative) signal, informed traders 
with high disposition effect levels are likely to submit asks (bids) with lower (higher) 
prices, resulting in weaker buying (selling) forces. Weaker forces are then expected 
to slow down the process by which market prices are adjusted to the new equilibrium 
level. This leads to our second hypothesis about market efficiency:
Hypothesis 2: Following a signal, markets with informed traders who have higher 
levels of the disposition effect exhibit stronger price underreaction.
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We measure price underreaction by the distance between the market prices and the 
naive fundamental values.28
However, as we explained in Subsection 4.2.2, we only expect the above hypotheses 
to hold when informed traders’ disposition effect levels are measured in a domain 
(gain/loss) that matches the sign of the private signal (positive/negative). This leads 
to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 hold only when the informed trader 
disposition effect levels are measured in the domain that matches the sign of the 
private signal.
Hypothesis 3 is consistent with field data and a finding in Weber and Welfens 
(2007a). They find that individual behavior in the two domains is unrelated; there is 
no sys-tematic correlation between the proportions of winners and losers realized 
following a positive and negative signal. Results in support of Hypothesis 3 would 
suggest the importance of eliciting the disposition effect in the loss and gain domains 
separately.
4.3 Experimental results
In the report of our experimental results, we proceed as follows. Subsection 4.3.1 
discusses the individual disposition effect levels that were separately measured in the 
gain and loss domains as well as their relationship with ambiguity attitudes. We 
examine Hypothesis 1 and 2 in Subsection 4.3.2 by comparing trading behavior, 
market prices, and price underreaction in markets with high and low disposition 
informed traders. Subsection 4.3.2 considers only markets in which the disposition 
effect levels according to which the informed traders were selected were measured in 
a domain (gain/loss) that matches the sign of the private signal (positive/negative).
Hypothesis 3 is examined in Subsection 4.3.3, in which we investigate the markets in 
which the informed traders’ disposition effect levels were measured in a domain that 
is different from the sign of the private signal. Comparing trading behavior in 
Subsection
28We did not correct fundamental values for ambiguity attitudes. Ambiguity attitudes 
affect market equilibrium prices systematically only if they are correlated with the 
disposition effect levels of informed traders. As it will be seen later, this is not the case.
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4.3.3 with those in Subsection 4.3.2 allows us to check whether the disposition effect 
measured in the gain and loss domains has different behavioral implications.
All numbers reported below relating to trading quantities reflect the average per-
person behavior of the nine-person asset markets. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, 
a significant difference is over the whole post-signal period.
4.3.1 Individual disposition effect levels
As explained in subsection A.2.2, we used the four-gains series to measure subjects’ 
disposition effect in the gain domain, and the four-losses series to measure subjects’ 
disposition effect in the loss domain. Concretely, for each subject, we count the 
number of lotteries that s/he played in the four-gains series and the four-losses series. 
This means that for both the disposition effect measured in the loss and gain domain, 
each subject receives a level ranging from 0 to 4, with subjects deciding not to play 
any lottery having a level of 0, while subjects deciding to play all four lotteries have a 
level of 4. Based on the prospect value function, we posit that the later (or earlier) a 
subject quits at the four-losses series (the four-gains series, respectively), the higher 
her disposition effect level in the loss (gain) domain is. For sake of comparability 
between the measures in the gain and loss domains, we invert the scale for the four-
gains series. Hence, a level of 4 indicates the highest level of the disposition effect in 
both the loss and gain domains. This construction is consistent with the basic idea 
of the disposition effect: holding a loser for as long as possible or selling a winner as 
soon as possible.
Table 4.3: The disposition effect level distributions
Disposition effect levels 0 1 2 3 4
Gain domain (%) 29.01 12.96 29.01 20.37 8.64
Loss domain (%) 8.02 3.09 10.49 8.64 69.75
Notes: The higher a disposition effect level in the gain (loss) domain is, the sooner (later)
the subject stops playing in the four-gains series (the four-losses series, respectively), and
thus the higher his/her disposition effect level is.
Table 4.3 shows the frequency distribution of the individual disposition effect levels
measured in the lottery task. As it can be seen, the distribution of the disposition effect
levels in the loss domain first degree stochastically dominates that in the gain domain,
suggesting a stronger disposition effect in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover,
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we find a negative correlation (Spearman) of -0.105 (p = 0.182) between individuals’ 
disposition effect levels in the gain and loss domains. The lack of a positive correlation 
as well as the fact that the disposition effect seems more pronounced in the loss 
domain suggest that the two measures capture fundamentally different information. 
Hence, using one general measure for both domains might neglect these differences 
in information. For example, given our results above, it could be that the disposition 
effect is stronger in bear markets than in bull markets, and that different investors are 
driving the disposition effect in the two kinds of markets. In subsections below, we 
examine more concretely the behavioral implications of the disposition effect in the 
two different domains.
In our experiment, we examine how private information that is given to informed 
traders of high disposition effect levels or low disposition effect levels is translated 
into market prices. Informed traders of high (or low) disposition levels were the three 
traders with the highest (lowest, respectively) disposition effect levels in a market. 
For this design to be effective, we need to ensure that there is a sufficiently large 
difference in the disposition effect levels of informed traders of high and low 
disposition effect levels. This is indeed the case in our experiment. As we can see 
from Table 4.4, the mean disposition effect levels of the high and low disposition 
informed traders in the gain and loss domains are economically and statistically 
significantly different (2.94 versus 0.14 in the gain domain and 4.00 versus 2.24 in 
the loss domain; Mann Whitney U tests p = 0.000 in both domains).
Table 4.4: Informed trader disposition effect levels.
High disp. informed traders Low disp. informed traders Mann U test
Gain domain 2.94 0.14 0.000
Loss domain 4.00 2.24 0.000
Notes: Disposition effect levels for informed traders are measured in both the gain and loss
domains. The final column provides the p-values of a Mann Whitney U test for differences in
disposition effect levels between high and low disposition informed traders both in the gain
and loss domains.
The lottery used in the measurement of the disposition effect is ambiguous. One might
suspect a connection between subjects’ ambiguity attitudes and the disposition effect
levels. We find no significant correlation (Spearman) between individual ambiguity
attitudes (as measured by the task discussed in Subsection 4.2.3) and disposition
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effect levels in the gain domain (-0.048; p = 0.548) nor in the loss domain (0.017; p 
= 0.835).29
4.3.2 Markets of high versus low disposition informed traders
In this part, we consider markets where the sign of the signal matches the domain in 
which the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured. Thus, we 
consider markets where the informed traders were determined based on the 
disposition effect measured in the gain domain and received a positive signal, and 
markets where the informed traders were determined based on the disposition effect 
measured in the loss domain and received a negative signal. We compare performance 
in markets with informed traders of high versus low disposition effect levels. In the 
analysis, we start with individual trading behavior, such as the numbers of (submitted 
or accepted) bids and asks, the (submitted or accepted) bid and ask prices, and the 
actual prices at which subjects bought or sold. We then move on to aggregate data, 
such as market prices and price underreactions. Please note that all p-values below 
are obtained using a Wilcoxon signed rank test unless otherwise stated.
The willingness to hold the asset after a signal
The disposition effect dictates a weaker (stronger) willingness to hold the asset fol-
lowing a price increase (decrease, respectively). After a positive signal, the average 
transaction price increases significantly (an average increase of 5.73%, p = 0.000), 
while after a negative signal, the average transaction price decreases significantly (an 
average decrease of 10.39%, p = 0.011). Hence, as suggested by Hypothesis 1, 
following a positive (negative) signal, we should expect high disposition informed 
traders to have a weaker (stronger, respectively) willingness to hold the asset than 
low disposition informed traders.
There is no universally accepted measure to capture the willingness to hold the asset. 
We try to capture it via multiple dimensions. We first consider directly the numbers 
of bids or asks. Intuitively, if an informed trader is less willing to hold the asset,
29We excluded subjects with multiple switching points or those who picked either the risky 
or ambiguous urn in all instances (3% of cases) from this analysis.
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s/he should submit more asks and/or fewer bids, accept more bids and/or make fewer
asks, and buy less and/or sell more. Similarly, if an informed trader is more willing
to hold the asset, s/he should submit more bids and/or fewer asks, accept more asks
and/or make fewer bids, and buy more and/or sell less. Table 4.5 summarizes this
information. A positive (negative) percentage implies more (less) active behavior—
buying or selling—by the high disposition informed traders. Second, we construct
two comprehensive proxies. In the first comprehensive proxy, we compare the change
in the submitted asks and bids of the informed traders after receiving a signal. The
measure is obtained by subtracting the ratio of mean asks per second after and before
receiving a signal from the ratio of mean bids per second after and before receiving a
signal.30 This proxy, which we dub IsubmitB−A (with A standing for asks and B standing
for bids), increases when informed traders are more willing to hold the asset following
a private signal. In a similar fashion, in the second comprehensive proxy, we compare
the change in the accepted asks and bids of the informed traders after receiving a
signal. We denote the second proxy by IacceptB−A . Table C.5 summarizes the two proxies
for the eight rounds.
Table 4.5: Differences in trading behavior between informed traders of high and low
disposition effect levels.
Signal
The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the volume of
Bids Asks Acpt. bids Acpt. asks Bought Sold
a positive signal -63.43*** 54.33*** 61.11 -21.77 -34.08*** 106.00***
a negative signal -3.40 -1.17 -27.84* 94.29** 36.49** -28.39**
Notes: Wilcoxon tests for significance are for the entire trading phase after the signal: ***
stands for p < 0.01,** stands for p < 0.05, * stands for p < 0.1.
We now present our first result regarding the willingness to hold the asset.
Observation 1 Consistent with Hypothesis 1, following a positive (negative) signal,
the informed traders of high disposition effect levels are less (more, respectively)
willing to hold the asset than the informed traders of low disposition effect levels.
30Specifically, letm(A) (m(B)) denote the mean number of the informed trader asks (bids)
per second after receiving the signal, m(a) (m(b)) denote the mean number of asks (bids)
per second made by the same informed traders before receiving the signal, this measure be
written as: m(B)/m(b) -m(A)/m(a). Using all pre-signal traders as the benchmark (instead
of using only those traders who became informed traders in the second trading phase) leads
to qualitatively similar results.
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Support for Observation 1: As we can see from the top half of Table 4.5, following a
positive signal, the informed traders of high disposition effect levels on average have
significantly lower numbers of submitted bids and higher numbers of submitted asks;
they bought less and sold more than the informed traders of low disposition effect
levels (p < 0.01 for all measures). High disposition informed traders also accept
more bids and fewer asks than the low disposition informed traders, although both
differences are statistically insignificant (p > 0.10). According to IsubmitB−A , following
a positive signal, the willingness to hold the asset equals 11.40 for the markets of
the high disposition informed traders, which is significantly lower than the value of
129.47 for the markets with the low disposition informed traders. The proxy IacceptB−A
gives the same result: IacceptB−A equals 60.33 for the high disposition informed traders
and 112.38 for the low disposition informed traders. Thus, following a positive signal,
both proxies indicate a stronger willingness of the high disposition informed traders
to sell the asset than that of the low disposition informed traders.
Following a negative signal, as we can see from the bottom half of Table 4.5, the
informed traders of high disposition effect levels accept fewer bids but more asks, and
generally buy more and sell less than the informed traders of low disposition effect
levels. The differences, with the exception of the number of submitted bids and asks,
are statistically significant.31 The proxies IsubmitB−A and IacceptB−A confirm that the high
disposition informed traders are more inclined to hold the asset. The value of IsubmitB−A
equals -85.92 for the informed traders of high disposition effect levels and -102.34 for
the informed traders of low disposition effect levels. The value of IacceptB−A equals -28.19
for the informed traders of high disposition effect levels and -80.72 for the informed
traders of low disposition effect levels. Both proxies thus show a stronger willingness
to hold the asset for the high disposition informed traders than for the low disposition
informed traders.
A further finding consistent with the disposition effect is the asymmetry of significance
between submitted and accepted bids and asks. The disposition effect predicts active
31We do observe rather big differences within the post signal period when we focus on the
different 30-second trading blocks found in Table 4.5. Especially the percentage differences
between the number of submitted bids and asks show a rather erratic pattern throughout the
four post-shock trading blocks. The pattern is more stable for the differences in accepted
bids and asks, although the 200% difference in terms of accepted asks between the high and
low disposition informed traders is a bit of an outlier. Incidentally, it exactly mirrors the 200%
difference between the number of accepted bids of high and low informed traders found in
markets following a positive signal.
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selling following a positive signal and passive holding following a negative signal. 
Active selling implies initiating more trades, and passive holding implies that traders 
prefer to accept rather than initiate trades. This is exactly what we observed. The 
difference in the willingness to sell the asset is significant only in the active trading 
of submitted bids and asks, while the difference in the willingness to buy the asset is 
significant only in the passive trading of accepted bids and asks.
Share holdings
Given that the informed traders of high disposition effect levels have a weaker 
willingness to hold the asset following a positive signal and a stronger willingness to 
hold the asset following a negative signal than the informed traders of low 
disposition effect levels, we would expect the informed traders of high disposition 
effect level to hold a relatively lower share following a positive signal and to hold 
more shares following a negative signal than the informed traders of low disposition 
effect levels. Our next observation discusses this.
Observation 2 Following a positive (negative) signal, the informed traders of high 
disposition effect levels hold significantly less ( more, respectively) shares than in-
formed traders of low disposition effect levels.
Support for Observation 2: Figure 4.1 depicts the post-signal share holdings for in-
formed traders of high and low disposition effect levels. The figure on the left is after 
a positive signal, and the figure on the right is after a negative signal. As we can see 
from the left figure, following a positive signal, the informed traders of high disposi-
tion effect levels show a consistently slower increase in share holdings than that of low 
disposition informed traders, suggesting high disposition informed traders’ stronger 
post-signal willingness to sell the asset. The right figure is almost the exact inverse of 
the left figure: following a negative signal, informed traders of high disposition effect 
levels show a consistently slower decrease in share holding than that of low disposi-
tion informed traders, suggesting a stronger willingness to hold the asset of the high 
disposition informed traders than that of the low disposition informed traders.
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Figure 4.1. Average post-signal share build-ups for the high and low disposition informed 
traders. The figure on the left is after a positive signal, and the figure on the right is after a 
negative signal.
Trading prices
So far, we have discussed the impact of the disposition effect on trading behavior. 
We now move on to trading prices. In light of the disposition effect, following a 
positive signal, informed traders of high disposition effect levels are more ready to sell
the asset. In order to decrease their share holdings faster (or increase slower) than 
those of the low disposition informed traders, the informed traders of high disposition 
effect levels should be more likely to sell at a lower price and less likely to buy at 
a higher price. Similarly, following a negative signal, the informed traders of high
disposition effect levels are more willing to hold the asset than the informed traders 
of low disposition effect. To retain more of their share holdings (or decrease more 
slowly), the informed traders of high disposition effect levels should be more likely 
to buy at a higher price or less likely to sell at a lower price. Table 4.6 shows the
percentage differences between the high and low disposition informed traders in their 
submitted bid prices and ask prices, their accepted bid prices and ask prices, and the 
prices that they actually bought and sold.32
32Please note that as the uncertainty premium can (and does) differ between different 
periods in our experiment, we cannot simply compare the raw price levels between periods 
within a cohort. Instead, we correct for this by adding the uncertainty premium calculated 
for a particular period to the post-signal (bid-, ask-, accepted bid-, accepted ask-, buy- and 
sell-) prices of that particular period. Note that the uncertainty premium differs for periods 
within Cohorts 1, 3 and 4. However, not correcting for differences in the uncertainty 
premium does not qualitatively change our results.
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Observation 3 Following a positive (negative) signal, the informed traders of high
disposition effect levels ask significantly lower (higher, respectively) prices, accept bids
with lower (higher, respectively) prices, and eventually sell the asset at significantly
lower (higher, respectively) prices than the informed traders of low disposition effect
levels.
Support for Observation 3: As we can see from Table 4.6, following a positive signal,
high disposition informed traders asked significantly lower prices (-11.86%, p < 0.01),
accepted bids with significantly lower prices (-21.13%, p < 0.05), and they eventually
sold the asset at significantly lower prices (-18.88%, p < 0.05).
In contrast, following a negative signal, the informed traders of high disposition ef-
fect levels asked significantly higher prices (10.91%, p < 0.05), accepted bids with
significantly higher prices (20.35%, p < 0.05), and they eventually sold the asset at
significantly higher prices (11.06%, p < 0.05).
Table 4.6: Difference of prices between markets of high and low disposition informed
traders.
Signal
The difference between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in
Bid price Ask price Acpt. bid price Acpt. ask price Buy price Sell price
a positive signal -6.12 -11.86*** -21.13** 3.29 3.57** -18.88**
a negative signal 10.04 10.91*** 20.35*** 1.14 10.12** 11.06***
Notes: This table shows the percentage difference of prices between markets of high and
low disposition informed traders. Wilcoxon rank-sum test for significance (final row only):
*** stands for p < 0.01,** stands for p < 0.05, * stands for p < 0.1.
The disposition effect primarily predicts holding or selling behavior rather than buying
behavior. Following a positive signal, it predicts a stronger tendency to sell, while
following a negative signal, it predicts a stronger tendency to hold. Indeed, as we can
see from Table 4.6, consistent with the disposition effect, differences in the buying
behavior is less clear. In Table 4.6, the measures pointing to buying behavior include
the differences in submitted bid prices, their accepted ask prices, and the prices that
were actually bought. Following either signal, the differences are insignificant in terms
of bid prices and accepted ask prices. There is a significant difference with the bought
prices (p < 0.05), but following a positive signal, the sign is on the wrong direction,
and the economic magnitude (3.57%) is comparatively smaller than the differences in
ask prices, accepted bid prices, and selling prices.
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Market prices
Finally, we move on market prices. Figure 4.2 presents the price paths and the re-
spective price benchmarks corrected for the uncertainty premium in the respective
markets.33 We observe a significant underreaction in all markets. Furthermore, in
general, there is no clear momentum that market prices are approaching the new
fundamental level. So, it seems markets indeed need more time to reflect private
information than public information. Comparing markets of high and low disposi-
tion informed traders, we observe a significant increase in the average transaction
price (4.75%) following the positive private signal (p = 0.018) in markets with high
disposition informed traders. In markets with low disposition informed traders, the
average transaction price increases as well, but the difference (4.47%) is insignificant
(p = 0.392).
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Figure 4.2. Box plots and means of transaction prices per trading block of 30 seconds in
markets of high and low disposition informed traders. The figure on the left is after a positive
signal, and the figure on the right is after a negative signal.
Hypothesis 1 and the results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 suggest that, following a positive
signal, the high disposition informed traders have a stronger willingness to sell the
asset, and this might exert more downward pressure on market prices than in markets
of low disposition informed traders. In contrast, following a negative signal, the in-
formed traders of high disposition effect levels are less willing to sell the asset, and this
might exert more upward pressure on market prices than the low disposition informed
traders do. To measure this downward/upward pressure, we compute, following each
33The uncertainty premium equals 50 for markets of high disposition informed traders and
70 for markets of low disposition informed traders.
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type of signal, the percentage difference between the average transaction price, Ti,
in the ith post-signal 30-second trading block and the respective benchmark B.34
We would then expect stronger underreaction in markets with the high disposition
informed traders than in markets with the low disposition informed traders.
Observation 4 There is a tendency that price underreaction in markets with high
disposition informed traders is stronger than that of markets with low disposition
informed traders. The tendency exists following both positive and negative signals,
but the underreaction is stronger and more consistent following a negative signal.
Support for Observation 4: Table 4.7 presents the percentage amount of underreaction
as compared to the market-specific benchmark in both markets and the differences
in underreaction between the two markets. Overall markets with the high disposition
informed traders underreact more strongly than markets with the low disposition in-
formed traders (20.27% versus 17.79% following a positive signal and 29.09% versus
21.09% following a negative signal). The underreaction is weak following a positive
signal: the difference between the two markets is insignificant overall (p > 0.10) and
is significant only in the fourth trading block (29.93 versus 14.99, p < 0.05). The un-
derreaction is stronger and more consistent following a negative signal: the difference
between the two markets is significant overall (p < 0.01) and is significant in three of
the trading blocks. The last result is consistent with the finding in Subsection 4.3.1
that the disposition effect is stronger in the loss domain than in the gain domain.
The comparison of Observations 1 to 3 with Observation 4 reveals one discrepancy
between individual trading behavior and the aggregate market outcome. Despite
strongly consistent trading behavior with the disposition effect at the individual (in-
formed trader’s) level, in the aggregate we observe only a weak tendency in market
price underreaction. We do not have a clear answer for this discrepancy. One possi-
bility is that, although we have markets of high and low disposition informed insiders,
the overall disposition effect levels are the same across those markets. Thus, unlike
Weber and Camerer (1998), the differences in market prices are purely driven by the
differences in the disposition effect levels of informed traders. Another possibility is
that market prices are the outcome of a complicated and dynamic trading process, in
34Specifically, following a positive signal, underreaction in the trading block i is defined
as (Bpos - Ti)=Bpos, where Bpos is the benchmark following a positive signal. Following a
negative signal, underreaction in the trading block i is defined as (Ti - Bneg)=Bneg , where
Bneg is the benchmark following a negative signal.
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Table 4.7: Underreaction in markets of informed traders
Signals Markets
Post-signal trading block (30s. each)
1 2 3 4 ALL
a Markets of high disp. informed traders 15.90*** 16.65*** 20.76*** 29.93*** 20.27***
positive Markets of low disp. informed traders 16.53*** 17.71*** 19.50*** 14.99*** 17.79***
signal Diff. between the two markets -0.63 -1.06 1.26 14.94** 2.48
a Markets of high disp. informed traders 35.17*** 30.62*** 29.34*** 19.06*** 29.09***
negative Markets of low disp. informed traders 26.54*** 25.42*** 20.80*** 7.27* 21.09***
signal Diff. between the two markets 8.63* 5.20 8.54** 11.79* 8.00***
Notes: This paper shows the underreaction (in percentages) in markets of high and low 
disposition informed traders and the differences between the two. Mann Whitney U test (first 
two rows) and Wilcoxon test (final row) for significance: *** stands for p < 0.01, ** stands 
for p < 0.05, * stands for p < 0.1.
which many factors could be at play. The disposition effect is just one of the factors. 
For example, the discrepancy could be due to the fact that low disposition effect 
informed traders have more sophisticated trading strategies that are more difficult for
other traders to observe. This effect might offset the disposition effect and lead to an 
insignificant effect on the market prices.
4.3.3 When the sign of the signal mismatches the
disposition effect measure
We have thus far discussed markets where the sign of the signal matches the domain in
which the informed traders’ disposition effect levels are measured. We now move on to
markets where the sign of the signal does not match the domain in which the informed
traders’ disposition effect levels are measured. Thus, we are considering markets where
the informed traders are selected based on the disposition effect levels measured in the
loss (gain) domain, but they receive a positive (negative, respectively) signal. Those
markets should deliver qualitatively the same results if the disposition effect measured
in the gain domain and in the loss domain capture qualitatively the same informa-
tion. Significant differences in the results of markets examined in this Subsection and
those of markets considered in Subsection 4.3.2 would, however, suggest that general
measures ignoring the domain where the disposition effect is measured are unlikely to
predict accurately the behavior of traders in bear and bull markets at the same time.
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Indeed, in general we find that when the sign of the signal does not match the
domain in which the informed traders’ disposition effect levels are measured, results
are qualitatively different from Observations 1 to 4. Below, we discuss the most
important differences.
Table 4.8: The trading behavior of informed traders (when mismatched)
Signal
The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the volume of
Bids Asks Acpt. bids Acpt. asks Bought Sold
a positive signal -24.51*** 43.86** -49.12*** 12.12 -9.69 -27.62**
a negative signal -32.65** -33.63*** 48.64** 0.00 -5.75 -10.91
Notes: This table shows the percentage differences in the trading behavior between informed
traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the markets where the sign of the signal
does not match the domain in which the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are
measured. Wilcoxon rank-sum test for significance (final row only): *** stands for p < 0.01,
** stands for p < 0.05, * stands for p < 0.1.
Observation 5 When the sign of the signal does not match the domain in which
the informed traders’ disposition effect levels are measured, there are no consistent
differences between the informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in
a) the willingness to hold the asset, b) the share holding, c) and the trading prices.
Support for Observation 5a): Following a positive signal, as we can see from Table
4.8, unlike markets in Subsection 4.3.2, the high disposition informed traders accept
significantly fewer bids and sell significantly less than the low disposition informed
traders. Moreover, the high disposition informed traders accept more bids and buy
more than the low disposition informed traders, although in both cases, the difference
is not significant. Further differences can be found when we consider the proxies
IsumbitB−A and IacceptB−A . In Subsection 4.3.2, both proxies IsumbitB−A and I
accept
B−A suggest
a stronger willingness to sell the asset for the high disposition informed traders than
for the low disposition informed traders. This is not the case with the markets we
consider here. While we do find a stronger willingness of the high disposition informed
traders to sell the asset following a positive signal than that of the low disposition
informed traders when looking at IsumbitB−A , the opposite is observed when we use
IacceptB−A Specifically, we find IsumbitB−A to equal 47.87 for the high disposition informed
traders and 151.18 for the low disposition informed traders, while IsumbitB−A and IacceptB−A
equal 105.00 and 17.33, respectively, for the high and the low disposition informed
traders. In contrast to markets in Subsection 4.3.2, the latter proxy thus does not
provide clear evidence of a higher positive change in the willingness to hold shares
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between the low disposition informed traders and the high disposition informed traders
following a positive private signal.
Following a negative signal, a comparison of Tables 4.8 and 4.5 reveals that the large
and significant positive differences in the number of accepted asks between the high
and low disposition informed traders in the market of Subsection 4.3.2 has disappeared
in the markets considered here. Moreover, unlike the markets examined in Subsection
4.3.2, in the current markets, the high disposition informed traders actually accept
significantly more bids than the low disposition informed traders. When we consider
the proxies IsumbitB−A and IacceptB−A , similarly, we observe an inconsistency. The proxy
IsumbitB−A gives a similar result as in the market of Subsection 4.3.2: IsumbitB−A equals
-74.25 for the high disposition informed trader and -161.7 for the low disposition
informed trader period. For IacceptB−A , however, we find the opposite: I
accept
B−A equals -
24.82 for the high disposition informed traders and equals -6.10 for the low disposition
informed traders.
Support for Observation 5b): The comparison of Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.1 reveals a
clear difference. While the markets of Subsection 4.3.2 show a clear difference between
the high and low disposition informed traders in post-signal changes in share holdings,
no such differences are visible in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.3. Average post-signal share holds for the high and low disposition informed traders.
The figure on the left is after a positive signal, and the figure on the right is after a negative
signal.
Support for Observation 5c): Comparing Table 4.6 with Table 4.9 shows that, while
the vast majority of differences in the markets of Subsection 4.3.2 are in line with
Hypothesis 1, the differences in the markets considered in this subsection are rather
inconsistent. Some measures even point to the wrong directions. For example, follow-
ing a positive signal, all measures, with the exception of the difference in submitted
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bids, are positive, and following a negative signal, both the differences in the price
of submitted asks and the price at which the informed traders sell their assets are
negative.
Table 4.9: Difference of prices between markets of high and low disposition informed
traders (when mismatched)
Signal
The difference between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in
Bid price Ask price Acpt. bid price Acpt. ask price Buy price Sell price
a positive signal -16.16*** 6.82 19.21** 4.32 5.83** 12.17*
a negative signal 4.14 -4.20 3.99 20.11*** 13.19** -2.04
Notes: This paper shows the percentage difference of prices between markets of high and low
disposition informed traders in the markets where the sign of the signal does not match the
domain that the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured. Wilcoxon test
for significance (final row only): *** stands for p < 0.01, ** stands for p < 0.05, * stands
for p < 0.1.
Moving from individual trading behavior to market dynamics, we find that the markets
examined in this subsection perform qualitatively differently from those in Subsection
4.3.2.
Observation 6 When the sign of the signal does not match the domain in which
the informed traders’ disposition effect levels are measured, there are no consistent
differences between the informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in
underreaction.
Support for Observation 6: Table 4.10 shows the underreaction as well as the dif-
ferences in underreaction between markets of the high and low disposition informed
traders. Unlike the markets discussed in Subsection 4.3.2, following a positive signal,
the underreaction is overall significantly higher in markets with the low disposition in-
formed traders than those with the high disposition informed traders, while following
a negative signal, there is no significant difference in underreaction.
The above results suggest that the disposition effect measure predicts behavior well
only when the market price development matches the domain in which the disposition
effect is measured. We conclude that the disposition effect measured in the gain
domain and in the loss domain are not two sides of the same coin, and a separate
elicitation of the disposition effect in the gain and loss domain is necessary. General
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measures, such as the one in Weber and Welfens (2007a), might not predict behavior 
well in bear and bull markets at the same time.
4.4 Conclusion
We have experimentally examined the role of the disposition effect in market underre-
action following the arrival of private information to a small group of informed traders. 
We measured individual disposition effect levels in both the gain and loss domain via a 
novel method. Subjects then traded an ambiguous asset via a computer-based double 
auction. During the trading a (positive/negative) signal was given to some selected 
informed traders. The informed traders were either of high or low disposition effect 
levels, which were measured either in the gain domain or in the loss domain. This 
translates into a 2×2×2 design: two levels (high/low) of the informed traders’ dis-
position effect levels × two domains (gain/loss) in which the disposition effect levels 
are measured × two types (positive/negative) of private signals.
We find, first, that the disposition effect measured in the gain domain is unrelated to 
that measured in the loss domain. Second, compared to the informed traders of low 
disposition effect levels, following a positive (negative) signal, the informed traders 
of high disposition effect levels: a) are less (more, respectively) willing to hold the 
asset, b) hold significantly less (more, respectively) stocks, and c) ask significantly 
lower (higher, respectively) prices, accept bids with lower (higher, respectively) prices, 
and eventually sell the asset at significantly lower (higher, respectively) prices. Third, 
although we find individual behavior to be in line with informed traders’ disposition 
effect levels, this only weakly translates to differences in terms of price underreaction 
between markets of high and low disposition informed traders. Specifically, there is a 
tendency that price underreaction in markets with high disposition informed traders 
is stronger than that of markets with low disposition informed traders. The tendency 
exists following both signals, but the underreaction is more consistent following a 
negative signal. Finally, we find that results crucially depend on whether the sign of the 
signal matches the domain in which the disposition effect levels of the informed traders 
are measured. When the two do not match, a) there are no consistent differences 
between the informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the willingness 
to hold the asset, the share holding, and the trading prices, and b) there are no 
consistent differences between the informed traders of high and low disposition effect 
levels in underreaction.
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To conclude, we thus observe both the individual behavior and the aggregate market
behavior to be generally in line with Hypotheses 1 and 2. The relatively weak evidence
for Hypothesis 2, however, suggests that the strong impact of the disposition effect
bias on individual behavior does not work through as strongly to aggregate market
prices. Note that price formation is the result of many dynamic interactions, including,
for example, the trading strategies of informed traders and outsiders, the capital
constraints, the asset positions, and the learning of outsiders. The disposition effect
is just one of the forces. Thus, the result that there is stronger support for Hypothesis
1 than for Hypothesis 2 might not be surprising after all. Finally, the clear evidence in
line with Hypothesis 3 stresses the importance of distinguishing the disposition effect
in the gain and loss domain.
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Does it matter how we compose ambiguity in experiments?
This chapter is based on a joint paper with Kim Fairley, Achiel Fenneman, and Utz
Weitzel with the same title.
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5.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, ambiguity has obtained an increasing amount of attention
in experimental economics. Starting with Knight (1921), the literature typically dis-
tinguishes between two different kinds of uncertainties: measurable uncertainty, which
is typically known as risk, and immeasurable uncertainty, which is typically referred to
as ambiguity. In a seminal study, Ellsberg (1961) asked individuals to bet on drawing
a ball from (i) a risky urn with 50 black balls and 50 red balls or (ii) an ambiguous
urn with 100 balls where the composition of black and red balls was not known. The
latter is typically referred to as an Ellsberg urn.35 It was found that people preferred
the risky urn over the ambiguous urn, a behavior that is commonly referred to as
ambiguity aversion. Since then, many empirical studies have been published where
ambiguity aversion was used to explain decisions in real life—for example, stock mar-
ket participation in financial economics (Dimmock et al., 2016a,b), the adoption of
new crops in developmental economics (Warnick et al., 2011), patients’ treatment
choices (Berger et al., 2013), and the take-up of genetic testing (Hoy et al., 2014)
in health economics. Table 5.1 shows a survey of 41 experimental studies in which
the Ellsberg setup was used to measure ambiguity aversion. Interestingly, despite the
widespread use of Ellsberg urns, Table 5.1 shows that the method with which the
ambiguous urns are composed, i.e., the method of production of ambiguity in the
urns, is not unified yet. Based on the survey in Table 5.1, we can distinguish four
different methods of ambiguity production.
The most commonly used method to produce 2-color Ellsberg urns is when the ex-
perimenter arbitrarily chooses a composition of balls in two colors, which is unknown
to the participant. We refer to this method as the unknown method. The urn is
ambiguous because any composition of colored balls is possible. Only the existence
of two colors and the total number of balls is known to the experimental subjects.
One concern with the unknown method is that the ambiguity of the composition of
the Ellsberg urn is confounded with the strategic uncertainty of the experimenter who
composes the urn. For example, participants may think that the experimenter would
compose the ambiguous urn in a way that minimizes their experimental expenses (Hey
et al., 2010; Oechssler and Roomets, 2015). The most common way to reduce this
35The classical Ellsberg urn has both a 2-color design and a 3-color design. For the sake
of brevity, we only used the Ellsberg 2-color design.
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suspicion is to let subjects choose the winning color for themselves prior to drawing a
ball out of the ambiguous urn (Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015b).
However, letting participants choose a winning color may not be sufficient to fully
exclude strategic uncertainty regarding the motives of the experimenter. For example,
the subjects might believe that the experimenter knows that more people choose one
color than the other as the winning color (e.g., more red than grey). Then the experi-
menter would still be able to compose the ambiguous urn with fewer red balls to reduce
the payout of winnings. As a result, the suspicions of participants about a fundamen-
tal strategic uncertainty still exist and cannot be excluded completely. Therefore,
some studies let other subjects, who do not participate in the experiment and know
nothing about it, compose the ambiguous urn. We refer to this method as the human
method. As the other participant has no motivation to minimize experimental payoffs,
the human method should be able to eliminate any strategic uncertainty with regard
to the experimenter.
While studies of strategic uncertainty are concerned with who composes the ambiguous
urn, other studies focus on how the composition of the ambiguous urn is determined.
Segal (1987) suggested that ambiguity can be modeled as a two-stage lottery in which
the first stage resolves the second-order probability distribution over states while the
second stage resolves the probability of each possible outcome within each state. When
the second-order probability is an objective probability, the ambiguity is produced as a
compound risk lottery. We refer to this method as the compound risk method, where
one lottery draw determines the number of balls of each color (in the 2-color Ellsberg
urn), and another lottery draw resolves the ambiguity by producing the actual ball
(color) from the Ellsberg urn.
In the compound risk method, the second-order probability distribution over states
is objectively known, because it stems from a well-defined lottery. Alternatively, the
second-order probability can also be based on subjective probabilities. For example,
the number of balls of one color could be determined by naturally occurring random
numbers, such as the decimals of specific temperature measurements at a certain
time and place. Here, the ambiguity is based on model uncertainty, as proposed by
Marinacci (2015). Participants need to make assumptions about the data generation
process that underlies the distribution of the temperature measurements and, hence,
are confronted with model uncertainty regarding the second-order probabilities. We
therefore refer to this method as the model uncertainty method.
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Table 5.1: Studies with Ellsberg urns
Study No. of colors
Method used to compose the
ambiguous urn
Fox and Tversky (1995) 2&3 Unknown
Andersson and Holm (1998) 2 Unknown
Chow and Sarin (2001) 2 Unknown
Smith et al. (2002) 3 Unknown
Rustichini et al. (2005) 2 Unknown&Model uncertainty
Roca et al. (2006) 2 Unknown
Halevy (2007) 2 Unknown&Compound risk
Trautmann et al. (2008) 2 Unknown
Chakravarty and Roy (2009) 2 Model uncertainty
Liu and Colman (2009) 2 Unknown
Muthukrishnan et al. (2009) 2 Unknown
Bossaerts et al. (2010) 3 Unknown
Haisley and Weber (2010) 2 Compound risk
Rubaltelli et al. (2010) 2 Unknown
Trautmann et al. (2011) 2 Unknown
Akay et al. (2012) 2 Unknown
Binmore et al. (2012) 3 Unknown
Chew et al. (2012) 2 Unknown
Dominiak et al. (2012) 3 Unknown
Charness et al. (2013) 3 Unknown
Holm et al. (2013) 2 Unknown
Trautmann and Zeckhauser (2013) 2 Human
Ahn et al. (2014) 3 Unknown
Attanasi et al. (2014) 2
Compound risk&Model un-
certainty
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Study No. of colors
Method used to compose the
ambiguous urn
Barham et al. (2014) 2 Unknown
Butler et al. (2014) 2 Unknown
Füllbrunn et al. (2014) 2 Human
Keck et al. (2014) 2 Model uncertainty
Abdellaoui et al. (2015) 2
Unknown&Human&Compound
risk
Dimmock et al. (2015) 2 Unknown
Eichberger et al. (2015) 2 Unknown
Dimmock et al. (2016a) 2 Unknown
Dimmock et al. (2016b) 2 Unknown
Hao et al. (2016) 2 Unknown
Koudstaal et al. (2016) 2 Unknown
Mengel et al. (2016) 2 Model uncertainty
Moreno and Rosokha (2016) 2 Unknown&Compound risk
Prokosheva (2016) 2
Compound risk&Model un-
certainty
Qiu and Weitzel (2016) 2 Human
Chew et al. (2017) 2
Compound risk&Model un-
certainty
Peysakhovich and Naecker (2017) 2 Model uncertainty
Notes: As there are several disciplines that investigate human decision-making, we included
studies using Ellsberg urns from 13 academic journals across several disciplines. Specifically,
there are 7 economics journals (i.e., The Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1995; Econo-
metrica in 2007 and 2017; The Review of Financial Studies in 2010; Quantitative Economics
in 2014; Journal of Financial Economics in 2016; and Experimental Economics in 2016), 1
management journal (i.e., Management Science between 2002 and 2016), and 6 multidisci-
plinary journals (i.e., Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization between 1998 and 2017;
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty between 2001 and 2016; Games and Economic Behavior
between 2005 and 2013; Theory and Decision between 2009 and 2015; Journal of Economic
Psychology in 2009; Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics in 2016) which focus
on human decision-making as one of their main areas of publication. The last column of this
table shows the method used to produce ambiguity. For details about the four methods of
ambiguity production, refer to the introduction and subsection 5.3.2.
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Given that there are many ambiguity studies using different methods to operationalize
ambiguity in Ellsberg urns, an important methodological question arises: do different
methods of producing ambiguity confront participants with the same degree of ambi-
guity aversion? To this end, we compared the four methods of ambiguity production
(surveyed in Table 5.1) in one experiment. We used a between-subject design in
which the method of ambiguity production served as the main treatment effect. After
carefully explaining the method of ambiguity production, we elicited ambiguity aver-
sion for three different likelihoods (0.1, 0.5, and 0.9) with matching probabilities in a
multiple choice list format (Jaffray, 1991; Kahn and Sarin, 1988; Wakker, 2010). The
participants’ matched probabilities for these three likelihoods were econometrically
used as input to establish individual ambiguity aversion and the ambiguity-generated
likelihood insensitivity (henceforth a-insensitivity) (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Dimmock
et al., 2015, 2016a,b). For each likelihood, participants also made a direct choice
between a risky and ambiguous urn. The responses to this bivariate choice were com-
pared to the matched probability from the multiple choice list in order to establish
choice consistency.
The only treatment variable in our experiment was the method of ambiguity produc-
tion. In the unknown treatment we, the experimenters, composed the ambiguous urn.
In the human treatment, a randomly chosen subject who did not participate in the
main experiment composed the ambiguous urn. In the compound risk treatment, a
randomly drawn number (lottery with uniform distribution) determined the proportion
of balls of a specific color in the Ellsberg urn. In the model uncertainty treatment, the
random number was determined by the first decimals of the temperatures in Sydney
and Warsaw at the moment of composing the ambiguous urn.
For the experiment, we recruited 233 university students from all disciplines, i.e., on
average 58 participants per treatment. The experimental data showed no statistically
significant differences in the degree of ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity across
the four methods of ambiguity production. We also checked the consistency rate
in participants’ choices and, again, did not find any differences between the four
methods of ambiguity production. As a robustness check, we excluded all subjects
with inconsistent choices and reran all analyses. The above results still held: none
of the four production methods differed from the others regarding ambiguity aversion
and a-insensitivity. All production methods produced similarly strong ambiguity effects
in the lab. Therefore, in future lab experiments, we suggest employing the most
uncomplicated and straightforward production method, i.e., the unknown method,
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where the experimenter produces the ambiguous urn and leaves the choice of the 
winning color up to the participants.
In the next section, we present the related literature and develop our hypotheses. In 
Section 5.3, we explain the design of our experiment. Section 5.4 presents the results 
and Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Related literature and hypotheses
5.2.1 Strategic uncertainty
Chow and Sarin (2002) showed that it matters if subjects are exposed to an uncertainty 
which they know is a known to someone else. For instance, the ambiguity produced 
using the unknown method is not an unknown to the experimenters only to the 
subjects. This kind of information asymmetry between experimenters and subjects 
can increase the suspicion that the subjects feel toward the experimenters, as the 
subjects may suspect that the experimenters might manipulate the ambiguity in order 
to save money (Hey et al., 2010; Oechssler and Roomets, 2015). As a consequence, 
the subjects may become more averse to ambiguity in order to avoid being exposed 
to this potential manipulation.
To reduce this suspicion, many studies let subjects choose the winning color for them-
selves (Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015b), but as explained in the introduction, 
this may not be sufficient to fully exclude strategic uncertainty. Therefore, some 
experimenters ask randomly chosen subjects, who do not participate in the main ex-
periment, to compose the ambiguous urn (see, e.g., Füllbrunn et al., 2014). As the 
randomly chosen subject has no motivation to minimize payoffs, the strategic un-
certainty should be largely eliminated. Sometimes, however, even further steps are 
taken to reduce the strategic uncertainty. For example, in a study by Trautmann and 
Zeckhauser (2013), subjects composed both the risky and ambiguous urns, but wore 
a blindfold when composing the ambiguous urn. In other studies, several subjects 
were asked to co-determine the ambiguous urn in order to reduce suspicion (Chen and 
Schonger, 2016). Assuming that young children are less strategic than adults, Qiu 
and Weitzel (2016) asked the son of one of the authors (a 4-year-old boy) to fill the 
ambiguous urn.
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Although all of those measures succeed in eliminating strategic uncertainty with re-
gard to the budgetary interests of the experimenter, they may still allow for strategic 
uncertainty regarding the beliefs of whoever composed the ambiguity. Even if the 
other subject is blindfolded, some participants might still believe that there was a 
chance for the other to influence the urn. However, since the strategic uncertainty 
concerning the experimenter is completely excluded, it is reasonable to believe that 
the strategic uncertainty in the human method is more limited than in the unknown 
method, and therefore also reasonable to infer that individuals would be less averse 
to ambiguity in the former case than in the latter.
Hypothesis 1: (unknown vs. human) The degree of ambiguity aversion measured 
in the unknown method is greater than that measured in the human method.
5.2.2 Compound risk
According to Segal (1987), ambiguity can be modeled as a two-stage lottery. Com-
bined with the reduction of compound lotteries axiom (RCLA), if those who (fail to) 
reduce the compound objective lotteries are also (non-)neutral to ambiguity, the de-
gree of ambiguity aversion measured when using the compound risk method should 
be the same as that measured when using the human method. Related evidence 
was seen in a study by Halevy (2007), which found a strong correlation between 
the preference for compound risk and ambiguity, and indicated the consistency of 
preferences for compound risk and ambiguity. However, with more studies arising, 
this consistency has been challenged. Contrary to Halevy (2007), Abdellaoui et al.
(2015) reported a disconnect between the preference for compound risk and that for 
ambiguity. For instance, they found a failure to reduce compound risk for the ma-
jority of ambiguity-neutral subjects, and that some who reduced the compound risk 
were non-neutral to ambiguity. Following Abdellaoui et al. (2015), Prokosheva (2016) 
investigated the association between the ability to reduce compound lotteries and am-
biguity neutrality among young adolescents and found that the association between 
the two constructs was weak and susceptible to certain experimental implementations 
and subject characteristics, e.g., cognitive skills. All of these studies indicated that 
individuals’ preferences for compound risk may differ from their ambiguity preferences. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the RCLA holds true for all subjects. If this is the case, 
then the compound risk method is closer to a risky situation and includes less ambi-
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guity than the human method, at least in some situations. We can therefore expect 
a smaller average degree of ambiguity aversion in the former case than in the latter.
In the literature, the compound risk method is usually compared to the unknown 
method. In our experiment, we asked randomly chosen subjects to compose the 
Ellsberg urn in the compound risk method. We therefore compared the compound 
risk method with the human method which is then the closest comparison to the 
compound risk method.36
Hypothesis 2: (compound risk vs. human) The degree of ambiguity aversion 
measured in the compound risk method is smaller than that measured in the human 
method.
5.2.3 Model uncertainty
According to Marinacci (2015), ambiguity can be due to model uncertainty. Compared 
to the known and objective second-order probability in the compound risk method, 
the unknown and subjective second-order probability in the model uncertainty method 
is likely to increase the ambiguity. Thus, the degree of ambiguity aversion measured 
when using the model uncertainty method should be greater than that measured 
when using the compound risk method, since there is more ambiguity involved. Re-
cent studies have provided some evidence for this. For example, Chew et al. (2017) 
measured preferences for compound risk and model uncertainty (called partial ambi-
guity in their study) and found heterogeneous, though partly related, preferences for 
compound risk and partial ambiguity. Moreover, Aydogan et al. (2018) found that 
the ambiguity premium for compound risk was significantly smaller than the premium 
for model uncertainty, implying a smaller degree of ambiguity aversion for compound 
risk.
Hypothesis 3: (compound risk vs. model uncertainty) The degree of ambiguity 
aversion measured in the compound risk method is smaller than that measured in the 
model uncertainty method.
36Our results did not change if we used the unknown method as a comparison.
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5.2.4 Overall effect
Based on the hypotheses above, we also formulated the following general hypothesis, 
which includes all four methods of ambiguity production.
Hypothesis 4: (overall) The four methods of ambiguity production lead to different 
degrees of ambiguity aversion.
We measured not only the degree of ambiguity aversion, but also the degree of a-
insensitivity. However, because of the lack of literature regarding a-insensitivity, we 
did not develop any specific hypotheses on a-insensitivity. This also applies to the 
consistency rate of subjects’ preferences between the four methods of ambiguity pro-
duction. We nevertheless included and analyzed the degree of a-insensitivity and the 
consistency rate in our study for exploratory purposes.
5.3 Experimental design
5.3.1 General setting
Previous studies found that individuals’ ambiguity attitudes differ between very likely 
events and rare events (see Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Dimmock et al., 2015, 2016a,b). 
For instance, individuals are more likely to be ambiguity averse in high or moderate 
likelihood events and are more likely to be ambiguity seeking in low likelihood events 
(Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015b). Given this, we did not measure the ambiguity 
attitudes only in moderate likelihood events, as many previous studies did, but also in 
high and low likelihood events. With the three locally measured ambiguity attitudes, 
we constructed two global ambiguity attitude indexes—the ambiguity aversion index 
and the a-insensitivity index—to measure the ambiguity attitudes over the whole range 
of likelihoods.
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Specifically, each subject in our experiment faced three tasks37 in which we measured
the ambiguity attitudes in low, moderate, and high likelihood events, respectively. In
each of the three tasks, the subjects faced a choice list table with 20 rows, as Figure
5.1 shows. In each row, subjects were asked to draw a chip from one of two urns, urn
U or urn K. Each urn contained 100 chips. In urn K, the composition of colored chips
was known, but changed from row to row. In urn U, the composition of colored chips
was unknown but identical in all 20 rows. In Task 1, each of the two urns contained
chips in one of two colors (green or yellow), which we called urns K2 and U2. In Task
2 and Task 3, the urns contained chips with one of ten colors38, which we called urns
K10 and U10.
Figure 5.1. Screenshot of the choice list table subjects faced in Task 1
In each of the three tasks, the risky situation became more and more attractive as
subjects moved down the rows in the list. Specifically, in Task 1, the number of chips
with the winning color in the risky urn K2 (one out of two colors) increased from 23
37In fact, the subjects experienced four tasks in total. The first three tasks were those
explained in the main body of this paper. As for the fourth task, it was a choice list task
used to elicit subjects’ risk preference for a companion study by Fairley and Weitzel (2017).
Since the fourth task was conducted after the other three tasks were completed, the subjects’
choices in our experiment were not influenced. Considering the irrelevance of the fourth task
to our study, we only presented the details of the first three tasks in this paper.
38Next to green and yellow, the other eight colors were orange, purple, red, pink, grey,
blue, light green, and black.
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to 80 chips with an increment of three chips. Similarly, in Task 2, the number of chips
with the winning color in the risky urn K10 (one out of ten colors) increased from 2
to 40 chips with an increment of two chips. In Task 3, the number of chips with the
winning colors in the risky urn K10 (nine out of ten colors) increased from 60 to 98
with an increment of two chips. For more details, see Figures D.5 and D.6 and the
instructions in the Appendix.
Given the increasing attractiveness of the risky urn as the subjects moved down the
list, there was a row at which subjects switched from the ambiguous urn to the risky
urn (henceforth known as the switch row). We computed a subject’s matching prob-
ability as the midpoint between the probability that a chip with the winning color(s)
was drawn from urn K in the switch row and the corresponding probability one row
above the switch row. Consistent with Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Dimmock et al.
(2016a,b), in Task 1, we measured the matching probability in moderate likelihood
events, i.e., events with ambiguity-neutral subjective probability of 0.5 (referred to as
m(0.5)). In Task 2, we measured the matching probability in low likelihood events, i.e.,
events with ambiguity-neutral subjective probability of 0.1 (m(0.1)), while in Task 3
we measured the matching probability in high likelihood events with ambiguity-neutral
subjective probability of 0.9 (m(0.9)).
To decrease suspicion, all subjects could freely choose their winning color(s) for all
tasks before the instructions were distributed. All instructions for each task were read
aloud. Prior to the tasks, the subjects were required to fill out a short questionnaire
about the setup of the task. The answers were checked, and questions with incorrect
answers were explained again to ensure the subjects had a proper understanding of
each task. Before the start of the experiment, urns U2 and U10 were physically
constructed using poker chips, put in the front of the lab room, and covered with a
cloth so that the composition was unknown.39 The subjects were free to inspect all
urns after the end of the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, one of the 20 rows from one of the three tasks was
randomly selected to determine the payoff. In the selected row, one chip was randomly
drawn from the urn that the subjects had chosen. If the color of the drawn chip was
the same as the subject’s winning color, the subject earned 15 euro on top of their
show-up fee (4 euro). A different color yielded no payoff other than the show-up fee.
39See Appendix D.2 for photos.
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5.3.2 Methods of ambiguity production
The four methods of ambiguity production are summarized in Table 5.2. In the un-
known (hereafter UN) method, the ambiguous urns were composed by one of the
experimenters before the experiment started. The subjects received no further infor-
mation concerning the composition of the colored chips in the ambiguous urn except
that there were 100 chips that were either green or yellow.
In the human (hereafter HU) method, the only difference when compared to the
unknown method was that two randomly selected subjects composed the ambiguous
urns instead of the experimenter. At the beginning of the experiment, we randomly
selected two subjects. The first subject was asked to construct urn U2 while the second
subject was asked to construct urn U10. The instructions provided to the two selected
subjects were publicly explained to all subjects.40 The two subjects then composed
the ambiguous urns in private. After this, they both received a show-up fee and were
dismissed. The remaining instructions were distributed to the other participants and
explained immediately after the two selected subjects left. Therefore, the two selected
subjects knew nothing about the experimental tasks the others would perform. This
way, neither the experimenters nor other subjects knew the exact composition of the
colored chips in the ambiguous urns. In addition, the subjects were told that they
could check the composition of colored chips of each urn after the experiment ended
if they had any suspicion.
In the compound risk (hereafter CR) method, one subject was randomly selected to
construct both urn U2 and urn U10. To fill urn U2, the selected subject randomly drew
one number from an envelope filled with numbers between 0 and 100. The randomly
drawn number determined the number of green chips in urn U2. To compose urn U10,
the selected subject randomly drew ten numbers from ten separate envelopes filled
with numbers between 0 and 9. Each of the ten numbers had to be divided by the
sum of the ten numbers and rounded to a percentage. The ten rounded percentages
were used to determine the percentage of each kind of colored chips in urn U10.41
40The instructions given to the two randomly selected subjects can be seen in Appendix
D.1.
41For example, if the ten numbers drawn from the ten envelopes were 0, 1, 2, ... ,9, the
ten rounded percentages after each of the ten numbers being divided by the sum were 0%,
2%, 4%, ... , 20%. Then, the number of chips for the ten colors was 0, 2, 4, ... , 20.
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The model uncertainty (hereafter MU) method is very similar to the compound risk 
method. We randomly selected one subject who was asked to compose both urn U2 
and urn U10. The difference was that the number of colored chips was not based on 
randomly drawn numbers. Instead, the number of green chips in urn U2 was deter-
mined by the first decimal of the temperatures in Sydney and Warsaw when 
composing the ambiguous urns.42 For example, if the temperatures in Sydney and 
Warsaw were 34.6 and 8.2 degrees Celsius, respectively when composing the 
ambiguous urns, then the selected subject filled urn U2 with 62 green chips (6+2) 
and 38 yellow chips (100-62). For U10, the number of each kind of colored chips 
was based on the first decimal of temperatures in 10 cities.43 Similarly, each of the 
ten generated numbers had to be divided by their sum and rounded to a percentage. 
The ten rounded percentages then decided the percentage of chips for each of the 
ten colors. After the experiment, the subjects were able to check the temperatures 
that were used.
5.3.3 Measuring ambiguity attitudes
Following Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Dimmock et al. (2016a,b), we measured sub-
jects’ ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity. For this, we elicited the matching prob-
ability where a subject was indifferent between drawing a chip from the risky urn 
and drawing a chip from the ambiguous urn (Jaffray, 1991; Kahn and Sarin, 1988; 
Wakker, 2010), as explained in Subsection 5.3.1. With this procedure, no 
assumptions concerning risk attitudes were needed (Wakker, 2010). Using the 
matching probabilities, we calculated the three local ambiguity attitudes indexes 
(hereafter AA) as follows:
AA0.1 = 0.1−m(0.1), (5.1)
AA0.5 = 0.5−m(0.5), (5.2)
AA0.9 = 0.9−m(0.9). (5.3)
Each positive AA index implies a matching probability that is smaller than the
ambiguity-neutral subjective probability, indicating an aversion to ambiguity. Both
42The temperature information was obtained from www.weatherbug.com, which updated
the temperature information every 5 minutes.
43Next to Sydney and Warsaw, the other eight cities were Los Angeles, Mexico City, Madrid,
St Petersburg, New York, Cape Town, Delhi, Buenos Aires, Tokyo and London.
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a negative AA0.9 and a positive AA0.1 imply a-insensitivity, which represents a ten-
dency of being insensitive to likelihoods and results in a transformation of subjective
probabilities toward 0.5.
Following Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Dimmock et al. (2016a,b), we calculated
two global ambiguity attitude indexes—index-a, which captures the degree of a-
insensitivity, and index-b, which captures the degree of ambiguity aversion. Specifi-
cally, for each subject, we estimated a best-fitting line between the matching prob-
ability m(p) and the ambiguity-neutral subjective probability p by means of OLS
regression. We denoted c as the intercept and s as the slope of the best fitting line,
i.e., mp = c+ s ∗ p, and calculated d as the distance of the best-fitting line at p = 1
from 1, i.e., d = 1 − c − s. Finally, we calculated the two global ambiguity attitude
indexes as shown below.
a = 1− s; (5.4)
b = 1− s− 2c = d− c. (5.5)
5.3.4 Consistency
To examine the consistency of the subjects’ preferences, each subject faced three 
consistency check questions before they were confronted with the three tasks. In each 
consistency check question, subjects were asked to choose between an ambiguous 
situation, which was identical to the ambiguous situation in each of the three tasks 
they would later face, and a risky situation with a winning probability that was identical 
to the corresponding ambiguity-neutral subjective probability. Preference-consistent 
subjects should have made the same decisions in the consistency check and later in 
the choice list table of the corresponding task. For instance, the choice between risk 
and ambiguity in a 2-color urn event should be equal to the decision in row 10 of 
the multiple choice list table in Task 1. For a screenshot of the consistency check 
question before Task 1, see Figure D.3 in Appendix D.2.
5.3.5 Procedures
The experiments were conducted at the Nijmegen School of Management (NSM) 
Decision Lab at Radboud University and the Experimental Laboratory for Sociology 
and Economics (ELSE) lab at Utrecht University. A total of 233 students, of which
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55.79% were female, were recruited from all disciplines at the two universities. The ex-
periments were computerized with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The average payment
per subject was 11.50 euro.
We conducted 17 experimental sessions in total, with each session lasting around 90
minutes. We administered all treatments between-subject, i.e., in each session we only
administered one of the four methods of ambiguity production. Table 5.3 provides an
overview of the number of subjects and the method of ambiguity production used in
each session. For a summary of subject demographics per treatment, please refer to
Table D.9 in Appendix D.3.
Table 5.3: The number of subjects and the production method used in each session
Session No. Number of subjects Ambiguity production method
1 8 Unknown
2 15 Human
3 7 Compound Risk
4 10 Model Uncertainty
5 15 Human
6 17 Unknown
7 10 Compound Risk
8 17 Model Uncertainty
9 10 Unknown
10 16 Compound Risk
11 16 Model Uncertainty
12 16 Compound Risk
13 17 Model Uncertainty
14 14 Human
15 11 Human
16 19 Unknown
17 15 Compound Risk
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5.4 Experimental results
5.4.1 Ambiguity attitudes
In this section, we will first describe behaviors towards ambiguity aversion and a-
insensitivity before we test whether the degrees of ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity
differ between the four methods of ambiguity production. Then, we will examine
whether a difference in the degree of ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity exists
between specific methods of ambiguity production.
Consistent with previous studies, the subjects in our experiment generally had match-
ing probabilities below the ambiguity-neutral subjective probabilities of 0.9 and 0.5
in high and moderate likelihood events but had matching probabilities above the
ambiguity-neutral subjective probability of 0.1 in the low likelihood event. For the two
global ambiguity attitude indexes, we found that the ambiguity aversion index, index-
b, was significantly larger than 0 (mean = 0.0928, t(233) = 12.7854, p = 0.000,
two-tailed), which indicates a general tendency of ambiguity aversion. In addition,
we found that the index of a-insensitivity, index-a, was significantly larger than 0
(mean = 0.2548, t(233) = 23.3682, p = 0.000, two-tailed), which indicates a general
tendency of subjects being insensitive to the likelihoods under ambiguity.
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 present two violin plots44 of the degrees of ambiguity
aversion and a-insensitivity for the four methods of ambiguity production.45 In the
two figures, we can clearly see the general tendency of subjects to be ambiguity averse
and insensitive to the likelihoods. However, we do not see major differences between
the four methods of ambiguity production no matter the degree of ambiguity aversion
or the degree of a-insensitivity.
We first examined the overall difference in the degrees of ambiguity aversion and
a-insensitivity between the four methods of ambiguity production. To do so, we con-
44A violin plot is based on a box plot, but has a rotated kernel density plot on each side.
There are usually four layers in a violin plot. The outer area shapes all possible values and the
thickness of the outer area indicates how frequent the corresponding value is. Therefore, the
thickest part is the mode average. The area inside the outer area demonstrates the possible
values 95% of the time. Then, the layer further inside shows the possible values 50% of the
time. Finally, the central dot is the median value.
45The descriptive statistics of the two ambiguity attitude indexes and the three matching
probabilities can be seen in Appendix D.3.
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Figure 5.2. The violin plot for the degrees of ambiguity aversion of the four methods of
ambiguity production
Figure 5.3. The violin plot for the degrees of a-insensitivity of the four methods of ambiguity
production
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ducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the two ambiguity attitude 
indexes—index-b for ambiguity aversion and index-a for a-insensitivity—as dependent 
variables, given the significant positive correlation between the two dependent vari-
ables (correlation coefficient=0.339, p=0.000 for a Spearman correlation test). We 
did not find significant differences in the degree of ambiguity aversion and the degree 
of a-insensitivity between the four methods of ambiguity production (p < 0.1132). 
Hence, Hypothesis 4, which predicts differences between the methods of production, 
is not supported.
In Hypotheses 1 to 3, we were also interested in whether the degrees of ambiguity 
aversion and a-insensitivity differed between specific methods of ambiguity produc-
tion. We looked at three pairwise comparisons, i.e., HU vs. UN (for Hypothesis 1), 
HU vs. CR (for Hypothesis 2), and CR vs. MU (for Hypothesis 3), by conducting a 
MANOVA with Bonferroni correction.46 Similarly, no significant differences in the 
degrees of ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity were found (p=0.4417 for the com-
parison between HU and UN; p = 0.4158 for the comparison between HU and CR; 
p=0.1090 for the comparison between CR and MU). This did not support any of our 
first three hypotheses.
5.4.2 Consistency
The consistency rate is another criterion that researchers may care about when se-
lecting methods of ambiguity production. Thus, we investigated if the four methods 
differed in consistency rates.
Table 5.4 presents the consistency rates for each check question across the four meth-
ods of ambiguity production. Question 1 checked subjects’ consistency in a 2-color 
urn event, Question 2 checked subjects’ consistency in a 10-color urn event with an 
ambiguity-neutral subjective probability of 0.1, Question 3 checked subjects’ consis-
tency in a 10-color urn event with an ambiguity-neutral subjective probability of 0.9. 
We also present the consistency rate across all three of the check questions (hereafter
46Bonferroni correction is one of the methods used for counteracting the problem of multiple 
comparisons. With Bonferroni correction, the significance level α in our paper when examining 
the three pairwise comparisons was then adjusted from 0.05 to 0.05/6=0.008.
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“consistent sample") in the last column of Table 5.4.47 We saw a relatively high
consistency rate within each check question. We also found that no big differences
in the consistency rate across the four methods of ambiguity production except for a
noticeably different consistency rate for the compound risk method.
Table 5.4: The consistency rate across the four ambiguity production methods
Production method Check question 1 Check question 2 Check question 3 Overall
UN 85.19% 77.78% 98.15% 66.67%
HU 85.45% 85.45% 94.55% 69.09%
CR 78.13% 68.75% 92.19% 48.44%
MU 80.00% 75.00% 93.33% 56.67%
To further check whether the four methods of ambiguity production differed in con-
sistency rate, we ran logistic regressions of models (1) to (4) in Table 5.5. In model
(1), we created a dummy variable called Cons as the dependent variable to indicate
the consistent preferences of subjects across the three check questions. The variable
Cons was equal to 1 if a subject’s preference was consistent across the three check
questions, and 0 otherwise. In addition, we created three other dummy variables,
UN , HU , and MU , as independent variables in model (1) to indicate the method
of ambiguity production. UN was equal to 1 if the unknown method occurred and 0
otherwise, HU was equal to 1 if the human method occurred and 0 otherwise, and
MU was equal to 1 if the model uncertainty method occurred and 0 otherwise.
In model (2), we created a dummy variable called ConsCQ1 as the dependent variable,
with a value of 1 indicating that a subject behaved consistently in check question 1,
with other behaviors presenting a value of 0. We included the three dummy variables
UN , HU , andMU as independent variables. In model (3), we created a dummy vari-
able called ConsCQ2 with a value of 1 indicating that a subject behaved consistently
in check question 2 and 0 otherwise. We again used the above-mentioned independent
variables. Finally, in model (4), we created a dummy variable called ConsCQ3 as the
dependent variable to indicate the consistent behaviors of subjects in check question
3. The variable ConsCQ3 was equal to 1 if a subject behaved consistently in check
question 3 and 0 otherwise. The independent variables included are the same as the
independent variables included in models (1) to (3).
47For the sake of robustness, we reran all the analyses with the consistent sample in
Appendix D.4.
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Table 5.5: Consistency rate check (logistic regression, 1=consistent)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
UN 2.129∗∗ 1.61 1.5909 4.4915
(0.8132) (0.7857) (0.6747) (4.9931)
HU 2.3795∗∗ 1.645 2.6705∗∗ 1.4689
(0.9145) (0.8020) (1.2497) (1.1085)
MU 1.3921 1.12 1.3636 1.1864
(0.5028) (0.4953) (0.5482) (0.8261)
Constant 0.9394 3.5714∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗∗ 11.8∗∗∗
(0.2350) (1.0799) (0.5933) (5.4962)
No. of observations 233 233 233 233
LR Chi2 6.73 1.64 4.85 2.57
Prob > Chi2 0.0811 0.6513 0.1829 0.4629
Pseudo R-squared 0.0214 0.0074 0.0191 0.0256
Notes: p-value is given in the parentheses. ***, **, * represent the significance level at 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.1.
Similar to the results in Table 5.4, the positive coefficients in Table 5.5 indicate a 
relatively low consistency rate when using the CR method compared to other three 
methods of ambiguity production. This lower consistency rate when using the CR 
method was found to be statistically significant when compared to HU and UN for 
consistency across the three check questions. However, when only focusing on con-
sistency within one check question, we generally found no significant difference in 
the consistency rates between the CR method and the other three methods of 
ambiguity production.
5.5 Conclusion
Based on the classical Ellsberg setup, our study examined whether different ways 
of operationalizing the Ellsberg urn resulted in the same ambiguity attitudes. In 
accordance with a survey of 41 experimental studies, we differentiated four different 
methods of producing ambiguity—ambiguity that is produced by (i) the experimenter,
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(ii) another participant, (iii) compound risk lotteries, and (iv) compound risk based on
random numbers found in nature. We found that there was no statistically significant
difference in the degrees of ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity between the four
methods of ambiguity production. Our results did not reject the null hypothesis for any
of our four hypotheses, indicating that the four methods can be used interchangeably.
As well as ambiguity aversion, we also checked another relatively new element of ambi-
guity attitudes, a-insensitivity, in regards to the four methods of ambiguity production.
Similar to the results we observed regarding ambiguity aversion, we did not find any
differences in the degrees of a-insensitivity between the four methods of ambiguity
production. Furthermore, we checked the consistency rates of subjects’ preferences
across the four methods of ambiguity production and found no significant differences
except for a slightly lower consistency rate when using method (iii).
To sum up, in this paper, we examined four different methods of composing ambiguity
in an Ellsberg urn regarding the degrees of ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity as
well as the consistency rates. We did not find any significant differences between the
four methods of ambiguity production and therefore concluded that the four methods
of ambiguity production can be treated as interchangeable in future experimental
studies. As method (i) is the most uncomplicated and straightforward production
method, we suggest using it in future studies.
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6.1 Summary
The main aim of this dissertation is to expand the understanding of individual 
decision making from risky scenarios to the more realistic scenarios of ambiguity. 
The extension from decision making under risk to ambiguity is not trivial. There are 
numerous important differences when individuals face ambiguity. For example, 
individuals are ambiguity averse, less confident in ambiguous priors, more likely to 
exhibit the disposition effect, and could polarize in their beliefs. A deeper 
understanding of individuals’ perception of ambiguity and their attitudes toward 
ambiguity helps to better predict their behavior, and, in the long run, provides them 
with normative guidance.
In Chapter 2, we focus on one individual judgmental bias, base rate neglect, that 
was first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) as the tendency of individuals 
to underweight or neglect prior information, while they overweight the signal in 
belief updating. The way in which prior information is considered is critical for 
generating an accurate prediction. Given that most of the previous studies 
investigate base rate neglect under risky scenarios, this chapter turns to the more 
widely applied ambiguous scenarios, to have a broader view of base rate neglect 
behavior. To do this, we design a within-subject experiment in which we create one 
treatment factor concerning the ambiguity about the prior information and another 
treatment factor for the level of the prior information. We find, both theoretically 
and experimentally, that base rate neglect, which is typically regarded as a bias of 
insufficient consideration of prior information under risk, is a natural outcome for 
ambiguity-averse individuals under ambiguity. More specifically, we find that 
individuals tend to consider prior information more when it is less ambiguous. Given 
ambiguous prior information, individuals tend to assign more weight to prior 
information when they are more ambiguity averse.
In Chapter 3, our interest lies in a phenomenon called belief polarization, which is 
defined as the more polarized beliefs after a common observation among individuals 
who have heterogeneous priors. According to the theory from Baliga et al. (2013), 
we hypothesize that the degree of ambiguity aversion has a positive effect on the 
occurrence of belief polarization. In a lab experiment, we examine the role of ambi-
guity attitudes, especially ambiguity aversion, and the dynamic consistency condition 
in belief polarization. The results in this chapter show that more ambiguity-averse 
individuals are more likely to update their posteriors in a way that deviates from the 
Bayesian posterior, which indicates a positive relationship between the degree of 
ambiguity aversion and the occurrence of belief polarization. In addition, we find that
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an effective implementation of the dynamic consistency condition creates a positive
relationship between exposure to ambiguity and the occurrence of belief polarization.
In Chapter 4, we study one of the most pronounced psychological biases of investors,
namely the disposition effect. The disposition effect, as well as the impact of the
disposition effect on financial market efficiency, has been well documented. To further
investigate how the disposition effect has an impact on financial market efficiency, we
designed a two-stage lab experiment. In the first stage, we measured the levels of
the disposition effect in two separate domains, i.e., the gain domain and the loss
domain. In the second stage, we composed a double-auction market and observed
the market price reactions when private signals were provided to traders who have
either the highest or the lowest levels of the disposition effect. In addition, in the
trading market, we provided an ambiguous trading asset, i.e., the probabilities of
each possible trading asset value is unknown. Our results suggest that we need to
distinguish, at the individual level, between the disposition effect in the gain domain
and the disposition effect in the loss domain. At the market level, we find that market
prices generally underreact to private signals. Moreover, we find that market price
underreaction is stronger in markets with informed traders who have higher levels
of the disposition effect. Finally, the impact of the disposition effect on market price
underreaction exists only when the sign of private signals matches the domain in which
the disposition effect is measured.
In Chapter 5, we investigate four different methods of composing ambiguity in the
traditional Ellsberg urn. According to our survey of 41 previous experimental studies,
the method of producing ambiguity in the classic Ellsberg setup has not yet been uni-
fied, although many variations of this setup have frequently been used in experimental
studies on ambiguity attitudes. This motivates us to question whether the method of
composing ambiguity induces differences in measurements of ambiguity attitudes. To
this end, we conduct a between-subject experiment using the method of producing
ambiguity as the main treatment factor. Our results show no significant differences
between the four methods of producing ambiguity we included in measuring ambiguity
attitudes. We conclude that the four methods of composing ambiguity can be seen as
interchangeable and, therefore, provide future experimental studies with a suggestion
of choosing the most direct and uncomplicated method when composing ambiguity,
i.e., the method of letting the experimenters compose the ambiguous urn.
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6.2 Implications
Our results in Chapter 2 suggest that the features of the prior information itself, i.e.,
ambiguity about the prior information, could also determine how much one tends to
neglect this prior information, i.e., how much one falls prey to base rate neglect. An
example that is related to our results concerns the most recent news about Brexit, in
which the call for a second Bexit referendum has increased. According to former U.K.
Prime Minister Tony Blair, through the experience of Bexit negotiation, people have
learned, and better understood, what Brexit means for the United Kingdom. Thus, it is
appropriate to let the British people have a second referendum.48 This is exactly what
our results imply. During the first Brexit vote, because the prior information about
the probability that the United Kingdom would benefit from Brexit was ambiguous,
people might not seriously consider this prior information and might underestimate
the influence of Brexit on the United Kingdom when voting for Brexit. In the process
of Brexit negotiation, however, more information was observed and learned. As a
consequence, the prior information concerning the probability that Brexit would benefit
the United Kingdom became less ambiguous. Based on our results in Chapter 2, when
the ambiguity in the prior information is less, individuals tend to assign more weight
to the prior information. Thus, it is likely that people in the United Kingdom will
give more consideration to the consequences of Brexit in a second referendum, which
might be the reason Tony Blair called for one. Our results then provide suggestions
to policy makers who would like to conduct referendums that it is important to let
general information concerning one certain issue be as less ambiguous as possible,
so that people can have the most clear beliefs possible on that issue and, therefore,
take the referendum seriously. For other decision-makers, our paper suggests that
the collection and communication of less-ambiguous prior information—for instance,
information that is collected with a larger sample size—decreases the tendency to
neglect or underweight the prior information in belief updating.
In Chapter 3, our results point out a positive relationship between the degree of
individual ambiguity aversion and deviation from the Bayesian posterior. According
to this result, we infer that the degree of individual ambiguity aversion positively
correlates with the occurrence of belief polarization. A relevant example of our results
in real life concerns the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Before the first presidential
48Source:https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/14/uk/tony-blair-brexit-second-
referendum-gbr-intl/index.html.
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debate, people in different states held different views on the winner of the election. For
example, polling showed that more support for Donald Trump was found in Ohio,49
while in Florida, it was found that more people supported Hillary Clinton.50 During
the first debate, there was no certain information conveyed, since both candidates
demonstrated strong performance in some parts and weak performance in other parts
(Stewart et al., 2018). Under the ambiguous scenario and the inconclusive signal
conveyed from the debate, the beliefs of ambiguity-averse individuals with different
priors are likely to be polarized. Consequently, after the first presidential debate, people
who supported Donald Trump were likely to be more convinced that he would win the
election. Similarly, the supporters of Hillary Clinton believed that she was more likely to
be the winner. In other words, belief polarization occurred. Knowing the underlying
mechanism and potential triggers of belief polarization is crucial to governments,
especially for policy makers, since too-polarized beliefs after the release of a policy
or a certain signal may have a huge impact on both governments and society. Our
results, therefore, provide insights on belief polarization in two regards. First, before
releasing a policy, governments and policy makers should consider the fact that belief
polarization is a natural consequence of the belief updating of individuals who are
ambiguity averse and dynamically consistent under ambiguity. Second, considering
that most people in the world are ambiguity averse, one possible way for policy makers
to decrease belief polarization is to provide a signal that is as unambiguous as possible.
By doing so, there is less ambiguity perceived by individuals, and, consequently, belief
polarization is less likely to occur.
In Chapter 4, our results indicate that investors behave consistently with the dispo-
sition effect. According to evidence in previous studies, the disposition effect might
influence investors’ trading profit, to some extent. Our results strengthen the necessity
of taking measures to decrease the disposition effect. For example, one possible mea-
sure for decreasing the disposition effect is the automatic “stop loss and take gain”
selling device (Fischbacher et al., 2017). In addition, the link between the disposi-
tion effect and market price underreaction found in our paper emphasizes the need for
identifying investors who behave consistently with the disposition effect. For example,
studies in literature have found that the disposition effect differs between individuals
who have different socioeconomic conditions and professions (Dhar and Zhu, 2006)
49Source:https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/oh/ohio_
trump_vs_clinton_vs_johnson_vs_stein-5970.html.
50Source:https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/fl/florida_
trump_vs_clinton_vs_johnson_vs_stein-5963.html
142
Conclusion
and trading experience (Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Da Costa et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
our result that the disposition effect in the gain domain is qualitatively different from 
the disposition effect in the loss domain indicates the necessity of measuring and con-
sidering the disposition effect separately in the two domains. An intuitive implication 
of this result is that we can make an explicit distinction between the disposition effect 
in bull markets, where most traders experience gains, and the disposition effect in 
bear markets, where most investors experience losses.
In Chapter 5, our results suggest the insignificant difference in measured ambiguity 
attitudes between the four methods of composing ambiguity in the classic Ellsberg 
setup. For most of the studies on decision making under ambiguity, the measurement 
of ambiguity attitudes is a critical part. The most intuitive implication of this chapter is 
that we exclude the potential risk that different ways of composing ambiguity may 
lead to differences in the measured ambiguity attitudes and provide suggestions to 
future experimental studies that they can freely choose the most direct and 
uncomplicated method when composing ambiguity in the Ellsberg setup, i.e., the 
method of letting the experimenters compose the ambiguous urn.
6.3 Limitations
In all four studies of this dissertation, we conduct lab experiments to answer our 
research questions. There is no doubt that in a lab environment we are able to 
obtain more control (internal validity) over many potentially confounding variables. 
For instance, the ambiguity about the prior information we controlled and manipulated 
in Chapter 2, the type of priors and signals we controlled in Chapter 3, the ambiguous 
trading asset and the type of fundamental shocks we controlled in Chapter 4, and the 
method of composing ambiguity we controlled in Chapter 5. However, this comes at 
the price of lower external validity of experimental studies. For example, most of the 
subjects in our subject pool are university students, which might invite criticism that 
groups of students are insufficiently representative of people in society. Furthermore, 
many of our subjects have an economics background and, therefore, might know some 
of the experimental tasks from class or previous experiments. We do not deny the 
criticism of the external validity of experimental studies. However, as our study mainly 
investigates the theoretical foundations of behavior under ambiguity, we believe that it 
is important to have strong internal validity, to be able to provide credible evidence for 
basic underlying mechanisms. We readily acknowledge that future research is needed 
to show how these mechanisms translate into more externally valid situations.
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A specific limitation concerns the lottery urns in Chapter 3. Belief polarization in real 
life is often based on a specific real issue. The lottery urns used in this lab 
experiment are somewhat distant from issues in real life. As a result, subjects may 
not take the experimental tasks as seriously as in real life and may feel difficulties in 
connecting to the artificial scenario. As a consequence, the beliefs we elicited in the 
lab may not be updated according to the predictions of Baliga et al. (2013), which 
may, to some extent, explain the mixed results we obtained in our experiment.
A further limitation relates to the composed experimental markets in Chapter 4. We 
try our best to compose markets resembling real financial markets, for example, the 
double-auction market with the ambiguous trading asset. Nonetheless, a composed 
market is still just a simplified version of the real markets, in terms of trading rules, 
trading stakes, traders’ experience and behaviors, and so forth. Even when markets 
are established as close as possible to the real markets, it is still difficult to build a 
market that is fully identical to the real one. However, the aim of our study is not to 
rebuild a financial market but to fundamentally investigate the relationship between 
investors’ trading behaviors and typical market outcomes. According to our results in 
this chapter, we indeed find a clear relationship between the disposition effect and 
market price underreaction.
6.4 Future research
Based on the implications and limitations mentioned above, there are some sugges-
tions for the direction of future research. First, regarding the factors that influence 
the consideration of prior information in belief updating we studied in Chapter 2, the 
ambiguity about prior information is only one of many factors. It has been docu-
mented that there are still many other factors that influence the consideration of 
prior information, for example, the representation form of the prior information. For 
future research, both the factors that influence the consideration of prior information 
and the consequences of the underweighting of prior information are interesting 
follow-up studies of Chapter 2.
Second, regarding the limitation of the lottery urns scenario in Chapter 3, a suggested 
direction for future research could be a ﬁeld experiment or a lab experiment based on 
a natural event. In a more natural scenario, individuals are more likely to connect to 
the experimental tasks and more seriously update beliefs.
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Third, according to the results in Chapter 4, we link the disposition effect to market 
price underreaction. A promising direction for future research could be to focus on 
the identification of investors who behave consistently with the disposition effect. By 
doing so, investors who are influenced by the disposition effect could first be 
identified, and then the impact of their trading behaviors on market outcomes could 
be predicted. Thus, in the future, studies could focus on the characteristics of 
investors behaving consistently with the disposition effect. Moreover, since we 
distinguish the disposition effect in the gain domain and that in the loss domain, a 
more elaborate study could investigate the characteristics of investors who behave 
consistently with the disposition effect in the gain domain and those who trade 
according to the disposition effect in the loss domain.
This dissertation is a humble quest into the vast field of decision making under 
ambiguity. It shows that individuals’ perception of ambiguity and attitudes toward 
ambiguity play important roles in belief updating and valuation of assets. Much 
research in this field is needed in order to properly understand individuals’ behavior 
under ambiguity. For example, how do individuals perceive ambiguity, and what 
factors are important in affecting their perception? Would key concepts in behavioral 
economics, such as loss aversion, mental accounting, and probability weighting, 
exhibit similar patterns when individuals face ambiguity? Despite our endeavours to 
shed some light on the role of ambiguity, we have to leave these, and many other 
important questions, to future research.
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A.1 Experimental procedures and instructions
A.1.1 Overview of the experimental procedures
Figure A.1. The overview of experimental procedures
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A.1.2 Experimental instructions
General instruction
Thank you for participating in our experiment. The purpose of this experiment is
to understand how people behave in certain situations. There are no right or wrong
answers. Please make the choice that you feel most comfortable with. Your identity
will never be revealed; others will not be able to identify you with the choices you made.
You will be able to make some money in this experiment. The amount of money
you can make depends on your choices and some luck. The money you earned will be
transferred to the bank account you supplied at the end of the experiment.
There are in total two parts in this experiment. The detailed instructions for each
part will be shown on the screen before that part starts. Your final payment is the
sum of payment in part 1 and part 2.
Part 1 of the experiment starts in the next screen.
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Instruction for part 1
This is part 1 of the experiment. In this part, there are in total 4 rounds. In each of
the 4 rounds, you will face 20 mining areas. Each mining area consists of 10 mining
sites that contain either copper or iron, but the positions of copper mining sites and
iron mining sites in each area are random. Each mining area can be of two kinds:
either it contains 8 copper mining sites and 2 iron mining sites, which we call the
copper area, or it contains 8 iron mining sites and 2 copper mining sites, which we
call the iron area. The picture below shows the example of mining sites and mining
areas.
At the beginning of each round, all of the 20 mining areas are hidden. Thus, you do
not know how many copper areas and iron areas there are among the 20 mining areas.
To help you learn about the proportions of the two kinds of mining areas, you will be
allowed to click either 5 or 15 mining areas in each round. Afterwards, you will be
randomly placed into one of the 20 mining areas, and allowed to reveal one mining
site from this area. Your task in each round is to figure out the probability that
the mining area you are randomly placed in is a copper area.
At the end of this part, one out of the four rounds will be randomly chosen to
determine your payment in part 1.
Round 1 of part 1 of the experiment starts in the next screen.
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Instructions shown on the first screen in each round of part 1
ROUND 1- PART 1
This is round 1 of part 1. In this round, you see 20 mining areas below which are
either copper area (8 copper mining sites and 2 iron mining sites) or iron area (8 iron
mining sites and 2 copper mining sites). However, as you can see, the 20 areas below
are hidden. Thus, you do not know how many copper areas and iron areas there are.
To help you learn about the proportions of the two kinds of mining areas, you are
allowed to click in total 5 mining areas. Then, you can continue by clicking the red
button at the bottom.
Screenshot:
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Instructions shown on the second screen in each round of part 1
As you can see below, we have covered the 20 mining areas again.
As part of the experiment, the computer has randomly placed you into one of the 20
areas.
By scrolling down, you see the single mining area you are placed in at the bottom.
Below you see the mining area you are randomly placed in.
You can choose to reveal one of the 10 mining sites in this area by clicking it.
Afterwards, in the next screen, you will face your task in this round.
165
Instructions shown on the fourth screen in each round of part 1
The number of copper mining areas you have opened in previous screens is
[here showing the number of copper mining areas revealed in the first screen].
The number of iron mining areas you have opened in previous screens is
[here showing the number of iron mining areas revealed in the first screen].
The mining site revealed from the area you are placed in is
[here showing the type of the mining site revealed in the second screen].
For the example of mining sites and mining areas, click here.
Your task in this round
Please give us your best guess about the probability that the mining area you are 
randomly placed in is a copper area. (Note: The slider below presents the probability 
in percentage. Thus, if the probability you estimate is 50%, please put the slider at 50.)
(sentence shown below the slider) We have designed the payment in such a way 
that it is in your best interest to report your true guess. Specifically, the closer your 
estimation is to the real kind of the mining area you are placed in, the higher your 
final payoff will be.
Screenshot:
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Instruction for part 2
This is part 2 of the experiment. In this part, you will face a table with 11 rows. Each
row offers you a choice between drawing a ball from two different urns, urn 1 or urn
2. Both urns contain 10 balls, either black or white. The compositions of white and
black balls in urn 1 and urn 2 are shown as below:
Urn 1: The composition of urn 1 changes from one row to the next. While the
number of balls in one color (e.g., white) increases from 0 to 10, the number of balls
of the other color (e.g., black) decreases accordingly.
Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical in each row. However, you do not
know how many balls are white and how many balls are black. Any combination is
possible.
Before making your choices in each of the 11 rows, please note that only one color
yields payment. At the end of this part, one out of the 11 rows will be randomly
chosen by the computer. Then, the computer will randomly draw a ball from the urn
you have chosen to draw a ball from in the selected row. You earn 1.0 euro if the
color of the drawn ball is the same as the color that yields payment.
Now please choose the color of the ball that provides you payment:
◦White◦Black
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Instruction for part 2 (second screen)
As you can see below, in each of the 11 rows we would like you to indicate which urn
(urn 1 or urn 2) you prefer drawing a ball from. At the end of this part, the computer
will randomly select one out of the 11 rows. Then, one ball will be randomly drawn
from the urn you have chosen at the selected row. You earn 1.0 euro if the color of
the randomly drawn ball is the same as the color you have chosen to yield payment
in the previous screen.
As explained before, the compositions of the two urns are:
Urn 1: The composition of urn 1 changes from one row to the next.
Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical but unknown in each row. Any compo-
sition is possible.
Please note that the color of the ball you have chosen for payment is: BLACK
Now please choose in each row from which urn you prefer to draw a ball, urn 1 or
urn 2?
You earn 1.0 euro if the color of the drawn ball is BLACK.
Situations Your choices
0 White ball, 10 black balls Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
1 White ball, 9 black balls Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
2 White balls, 8 black balls Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
3 White balls, 7 black balls Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
4 White balls, 6 black balls Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
5 White balls, 5 black balls Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
6 White balls, 4 black balls Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
7 White balls, 3 black balls Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
8 White balls, 2 black balls Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
9 White balls, 1 black ball Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
10 White balls, 0 black ball Urn 1◦◦Urn 2
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A.2 The simulation of the set of subjective base
rates and posterior beliefs
As mentioned in Section 2.3, at the very beginning, since there is no information
provided, the set of beliefs concerning the probability that the type of the randomly
selected mining area is a copper mining area, Prob(C), is [0, 1]. For simplicity, we
assume that the probability distribution of Prob(C) is uniformly distributed, i.e., the
individual believes that each point between 0 and 1 is equal likely (see the solid black
line). After sampling mining areas, the set of subjective base rates is narrowed down,
and the objective base rate is only one possibility in the set of subjective base rates
with the highest confidence weight.51 Similarly, after revealing a confirming signal, the
set of posterior beliefs is narrowed down again while after revealing a contradicting
signal the set of posterior beliefs seems to be widened. In our task, an individual
has to report one posterior from the set of posteriors. Which posterior within the
set of posterior beliefs is reported depends on the set of posterior beliefs and the
ambiguity attitudes of the individual. The simulation of reporting posteriors can be
seen in Appendix A.3 and A.4. Figures A.2 to A.4 show the process of how the set
of subjective base rates is formed after sampling the mining areas, and how the set of
posteriors is formed.
51The detailed calculation of confidence weight on each subjective base rate can be seen
in Appendix A.4.
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Figure A.2. The set of subjective base rates and posterior beliefs given an objective base rate
0.6
170
Figure A.3. The set of subjective base rates and posterior beliefs given an objective base rate
0.8
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Figure A.4. The set of subjective base rates and posterior beliefs given an objective base rate
1.0
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A.3 The simulation of posterior estimations if
the α-Maxmin rule is applied
Appendix to Chapter 2
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A.4 The simulation of posterior estimations if
the smooth ambiguity model is applied
Except for the α-Maxmin model applied above, we also apply the smooth model
of ambiguity (Klibanoff et al., 2005) as the rule that subjects used to report their
final estimations. We first make some assumptions for applying the smooth model of
ambiguity as below:
1) Payoff function: As mentioned in Subsection 2.2.2, we used the QSR to elicit the
probability estimations and calculate the final payoff. According to this, we assume
the expected payoff function of the individual as below:
Ep(RP ) = p[1− (1−RP )2] + (1− p)(1−RP 2)
where p indicates beliefs in the set of posterior beliefs, RP stands for the reported
posterior estimation.
2) Utility function: For simplicity, we assume that the individual in our experiment
is risk neutral (Note that this does not imply ambiguity neutrality). Thus, the utility
function of the individual is as below:
u(x) = x
3) The criterion of deciding to report which posterior estimations: If the individual
in our experiment decides to report posterior estimation according to the smooth
model of ambguity, then s/he will evaluate each to-be-reported posterior in the set
of posterior beliefs as below:
V (RP ) =
∑
µ(p
′
)Φ(Ep′u(RP ))
γ
where µ(p′) is the probability that a subject believes a randomly selected mining
area is a copper mining area with probability p′ , Φ is the function that captures the
attitudes to ambiguity aversion. Following Klibanoff et al. (2005), here we assume
φ = − e−γu (γ 6= 0) , in which γ is the parameter to capture the extent of ambiguity
aversion. To satisfy the concavity, γ is assumed to be larger than 0, and a larger γ
means a more averse attitude to ambiguity. Note that, compared with the α-Maxmin
model, there is one more element that we need to know if we apply the smooth
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model of ambiguity, i.e., subjects’ confidence weight on each possible probability that 
a randomly selected mining area is a copper mining area. We still use the situation of 
objective base rate 0.6 followed by a confirming signal as an example.
A.4.1 Calculating the confidence weight
Confidence weight at the very beginning (CW 0)
At the very beginning when no information is revealed, due to the extremely ambiguous 
scenario, the probability that a randomly selected mining area is a copper mining area is 
a set of beliefs between 0 and 1. We assume that the confidence weight CW 0 on each 
of the possible belief within the set of [0, 1] is subject to the uniform distribution. 
Considering the 21 possibilities of the composition of mining areas, i.e., from the 
possibility of 0 copper mining areas to the possibility of 20 copper mining areas, CW 0 
on each possibility is then the same as 1/21. That is, due to no information obtained, 
a subject just believes that each possibility is equally likely to occur.
Confidence weight after sampling mining areas (CW 1)
After the sampling of mining areas, due to more information obtained, the confidence 
weight on each possibility started to change, which could be calculated as below:
CW 1 = Prob(prior = p
′ |samplingi,j) = Prob(samplingi,j |prior = p
′) ∗ CW 0
Prob(samplingi,j)
Where samplingi,j indicates the sampling results, in which i means the number of
copper mining areas sampled, j means the total number of mining areas sampled. For
example, sampling3,5 means the sampling results of 3 copper mining areas out of all
the 5 sampled mining areas.
Consider an example of calculating the probability that one believes that a randomly
selected mining area would be a copper mining area with 60% probability after sam-
pling 3 copper mining areas from the 5 sampling areas.
CW 1 = Prob(prior = 0.6|sampling3,5) = Prob(sampling3,5|prior = 0.6) ∗ CW
0
Prob(sampling3,5)
Prob(sampling3,5|prior = 0.6) means the probability of sampling 5 mining areas in
which there are 3 copper mining areas and 2 iron mining areas from 20 mining areas,
Appendix to Chapter 2
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given the composition of 12 copper mining areas and 8 iron mining areas in the 20
mining areas, i.e., Prob(sampling3,5) means the probability of sampling 5 mining
areas with 3 copper mining areas and 2 iron mining areas from 20 mining areas. That
is, Prob(sampling3,5) =
∑
Prob(sampling3,5|prior = p′) ∗ Prob(prior = p′)
Confidence weight after sampling a copper mining site (CW 2)
After sampling a mining site from a randomly selected mining area, due to more
information coming, one’s confidence weight on the probability that the randomly
selected mining area is a copper mining area would be adjusted accordingly. Then,
we have the calculation of CW 2 as below:
CW 2 = Prob(posterior = p
′ |samplingc) = Prob(samplingc) ∗ CW
1
Prob(samplingc)
Where samplingc means the results of sampling a copper mining site from a randomly
selected mining area.
Based on all this above, how the confidence weight on each possibility being adjusted
could be seen in Table A.4.
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V (RPP ′ ) =
A.4.2 Calculating the reported posterior estimation
The valuation that one uses to evaluate each reported estimation (RP) is:∑
CW 2Φ(Ep′u(RPp′ )).
Note that in the smooth model of ambiguity, due to the consideration of confidence
weight on each possibility, the probability that is more close to the benchmark pos-
terior probability is then more likely to be reported. Nevertheless, ambiguity aversion
still plays a role in driving one to shift the estimation from the direction toward the
benchmark estimation to the direction toward 0.5. Table A.5 below shows the es-
timation that would be reported with increase of the ambiguity aversion parameter
γ. According to Table A.5, the same as the results we found when employing the α-
Maxmin rule, the posterior estimation reported in treatment L was found to be more
close to the benchmark posterior estimation 0.86 than that reported in treatment S.
Table A.5: Reported posterior in treatment S/L if the smooth model of ambiguity applied
Ambiguity aversion (γ) Reported posterior (treatment L) Reported posterior (treatment S)
0 0.86 0.86
1 0.86 0.84
2 0.85 0.83
5 0.85 0.81
10 0.85 0.78
20 0.84 0.73
50 0.82 0.64
100 0.79 0.58
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Figure A.5. The cumulative distribution function of deviation between treatments
A.5 Additional analyses
The figures and tables in this section present additional analyses of what we have 
done in Section 2.4 given a positive deviation from the benchmark posterior.
Figure A.6. Deviation from the benchmark posterior between different ambiguity 
aversion levels
Appendix to Chapter 2
Table A.6: The OLS regression of Deviation on the ambiguity about the objective base rate
Dependent variable: Deviation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Large −0.044∗∗∗ −0.0412∗∗ −0.0398∗∗
(0.001) (0.034) (0.039)
Order 0.0185
(0.338)
Large*Order -0.0056
(0.838)
Signal 0.042∗∗
(0.037)
Large*Signal -0.0113
(0.677)
Matching Probability -0.019
(0.205)
Constant 0.1713∗∗∗ 0.1652∗∗∗ 0.1519∗∗∗ 0.1368∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
No. of observations 1088 1088 1088 436
Adjusted R-squared 0.0088 0.0082 0.0130 0.0014
Note: p-value is given in the parentheses. ***, **, * for the significance level at 0.01,
0.05, 0.1.
181
Table A.7: The Random effects regression of Deviation on the ambiguity about the
objective base rate (with positive Deviation)
Dependent variable: Deviation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Large −0.026∗∗ −0.0133 −0.0345∗∗
(0.021) (0.414) (0.024)
Order 0.0106
(0.574)
Large*Order -0.0544
(0.279)
Signal 0.1066∗∗∗
(0.000)
Large*Signal 0.0099
(0.661)
Matching Probability -0.0077
(0.644)
Constant 0.2699∗∗∗ 0.2645∗∗∗ 0.2207∗∗∗ 0.2361∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
No. of observations 882 882 1088 355
Adjusted R-squared 0.0051 0.0059 0.0921 0.0010
Note: p-value is given in the parentheses. ***, **, * for the significance level at 0.01,
0.05, 0.1.
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B.1 Experimental procedures and instructions
B.1.1 Overview of experimental procedures
Figure B.1. The overview of experimental procedures
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B.1.2 Instructions (in English)
Welcome
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is
to understand how people behave in certain situations. There are no right or wrong
answers. Please make the choice that you feel most comfortable with. Your identity
will never be revealed; others will not be able to identify you with the choices you made.
In the experiment you will be able to make some money. The amount of money
you can make depends on your choices and some luck. The money you earn will be
immediately paid out to you in private after the experiment.
If you have any question during the experiment, please raise your hand. An ex-
perimenter will come to you and answer your questions individually. Please put your
cell phone on airplane mode and do not talk with other participants in the experiment;
otherwise, we may be forced to exclude you from the experimental payment.
The experiment consists of three parts. Detailed instruction for each part is pro-
vided below and also shown on the computer screen before that part starts. In the
experiment we talk about Experimental Currency Units (ECU) instead of Euro. The
exchange rate between ECU and euro is
200 ECU = 1 euro
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Instruction for part 1
In this part of the experiment, you face a choice task which consists of a table with
10 rows. At each row of the table, you will be asked to choose one option out of two
options, option A and option B. Option A is a lottery of receiving 0 ECU with 50%
probability and 1000 ECU with 50% probability. Option B is a sure payoff. Since the
amount of the sure payment is increasing, you may find option B becomes more and
more attractive when you move down the rows.
At the end of the experiment, one row out of the 10 rows in this table will be randomly
chosen to determine your payment in part 1:
Your payment in part 1 = payment from the randomly chosen row of the table
The screen shot of the multiple choice table subjects faced (shown on the screen):
Figure B.2. The screenshot for risk attitudes measurement task
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Instruction for part 2
In this part of the experiment, you will face three rounds. Please remember that,
right from the beginning of the experiment, you and other participants in this lab
each entered 5 pairs of numbers, X and Y, into the computer.
The pool of urns and the hidden urn
Before each round starts, one number x out of all entered Xs and one number y
out of all entered Y s will be randomly selected. That is, the randomly chosen x and
y are likely to come from different participants. Then the computer constructs a pool
of urns in which the type of urns are either urn 1: 5 white balls, 3 yellow balls and 2
black balls, or urn 2: 5 black balls, 3 yellow balls and 2 white balls. The number of
urn 1 is determined by the randomly chosen x and the number of urn 2 is determined
by the randomly chosen y.
At the beginning of each round, one single urn will be randomly drawn from the
pool of urns, but the type of the drawn urn will not be revealed until the end of each
round. Thus, your main task in each round is to try to figure out how likely the type
of the hidden urn is urn 1 or urn 2. You can also see the details of the pool of urns
and the hidden urn in Figure B.3 below.
Figure B.3. The pool of urns and the hidden urn
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Decisions
To help you find out the type of the hidden urn, balls will be drawn from it and
shown to you. Balls are drawn with replacement, which means that all the drawn
balls will be put back to the hidden urn once shown to you. In each round, there are
two draws. After each draw, you will be asked to make a number of decisions which
are based on your estimate of how likely you think the type of the randomly drawn urn
is urn 1 or urn 2. That is, you will meet and make these decisions twice in each round.
Each time after making these decisions, you will face a table which includes a summary
of your choices in those situations you faced as well as a suggestion of your choices in
some situations you did not face. You can check the choices in the table and change
if you want to.
Then, at the end of each round, one row out of each table will be randomly cho-
sen. And your preferred choices in the two randomly chosen rows will both determine
parts of your payment.
Betting
At the beginning of each round, you will receive 10 chips. Then in each round,
before being shown the second drawn ball, you will be asked to bet the 10 chips on
either of the two events below, depending on the color of the second drawn ball:
Event 1: the type of the hidden urn is urn 1;
Event 2: the type of the hidden urn is urn 2;
As you know, the drawn ball could be black, yellow or white. Thus, you need to
decide how many chips you want to place on event 1 and event 2 if the color of the
second drawn ball is black, yellow or white.
At the end of each round, the number of chips you placed on the true event will
determine one part of your payment. The more chips you placed on the true event,
the higher your payment will be.
In detail, your payment from your betting strategy in each round will be calculated as
below:
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Your payment from betting strategy
= [1000− 10 ∗ (10− the number of chips placed on Event 1)2]ECU, if Event 1 is
true;
= [1000−10∗(10−the number of chips placed on Event 2)2]ECU, if Event 2 is true.
Your payment in each round consists of three parts, the payments from the two
randomly chosen decisions and the payment from your betting strategy.
At the end of this part, payment from one of the three rounds will be randomly
chosen to determine your payment in part 2.
Your payment in part 2 = payment from the randomly chosen round
Instruction for part 3
In part 3 of the experiment, you face three rounds, and in each of them you face either
4 or 6 tasks. In each task, there are two boxes, both containing 100 balls with different
colors. For one of the boxes (box K) you can see the exact proportions of balls of each
color, while the other box (box U) contains unknown proportions of balls of each color.
In each task, you will be asked to choose a box. A ball will then be drawn from
your chosen box, and you earn 1000 ECU if the color of the drawn ball is the same
as a certain color mentioned in that task.
At the end of each round, you will face a table. The table summarizes your choices in
those tasks you faced and suggests choices for some tasks you did not face. You can
check the choices in the table and change them if you want to. For payment in each
round, one row out of the table will be randomly chosen, and your preferred choice in
the randomly chosen row determines your payoff.
At the end of this part, one of the three rounds will be randomly chosen to determine
your payment in part 3.
Your payment in part 3 = payment from the randomly chosen round
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Your final experimental payment
Your final experimental payment will be the sum of your payment from part 1, part 2
and part 3.
189
B.1.3 Instructions (in Dutch)
Welcome
Bedankt voor het meedoen aan dit experiment. Het doel van dit experiment is om
te begrijpen hoe mensen zich gedragen in bepaalde situaties. Er zijn dan ook geen
goede of foute antwoorden; maak a.u.b. de keuze waar u zich het meest comfortabel
bij voelt. Uw identiteit zal nooit openbaar worden gemaakt; andere personen zullen
op geen moment u kunnen identificeren aan de hand van uw keuzes.
In dit experiment is het mogelijk om geld te verdienen. De exacte hoeveelheid geld die
u verdient is afhankelijk van uw keuzes en een mate van geluk. Het bedrag dat u wint
zal aan het eind van het experiment privaat en onmiddellijk aan u worden uitbetaald.
Als u gedurende enig moment vragen heeft gedurende het experiment, steek dan
a.u.b. uw hand op. Eén van de experiment-leiders zal dan naar u toe komen om uw
vragen individueel te beantwoorden. Wij willen u verder vragen om uw telefoon op
airplane-mode te zetten en niet te communiceren/praten met de andere deelnemers
van het experiment; in het geval dat u zich hier niet aan houd kan het zijn dat wij
ons genoodzaakt voelen om uit te sluiten van uitbetaling.
Het experiment bestaat uit drie delen. Gedetailleerde instructies voor ieder deel zijn
hieronder meegeleverd. Deze instructies zullen ook op uw computerscherm te zien
zijn voordat ieder onderdeel start. In dit experiment wordt u betaald in Experimental
Currency Units (ECU, vertaling: experimentele geld-eenheden) in plaats van in Euros.
De wisselkoers tussen ECU en Euro is als volgt:
200 ECU = 1 euro
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Instructies voor deel 1
In dit deel van het experiment zult u een keuze-taak krijgen. Deze taak bestaat uit
een tabel met 10 regels. Op iedere regel wordt u gevraagd om te kiezen tussen één
van de twee opties: optie A of optie B. Optie A is een loterij waarbij u 50% kans heeft
om 0 ECU te winnen en 50% kans om 1000 ECU te winnen. Optie B is een zekere
uitbetaling. Aangezien het bedrag van deze zekere uitbetaling toeneemt met iedere
rij, zult u merken dat optie B steeds aantrekkelijker wordt hoe verder u naar beneden
gaat in de tabel.
Aan het eind van het experiment zal één van de 10 rijen uit de tabel willekeurig
gekozen worden om uw uitbetaling voor deel 1 vast te stellen. Dit wordt gedaan als
volgt:
Uw uitbetaling in deel 1 = uw uitbetaling van de willekeurig gekozen rij uit de
tabel
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Instructies voor deel 2
Het tweede deel van het experiment bestaat uit drie rondes. Denk terug aan het begin
van het experiment, waarin u en de andere participanten in dit lab allemaal vijf paar
nummers (X en Y) ingetypt hebben.
De verzameling urnen en de verborgen urn
Voordat iedere ronde start zal één nummer x willekeurig getrokken worden uit alle in-
getypte X-en en zal één nummer y getrokken worden uit alle ingetypte Y -en. Anders
gezegd: de willekeurig gekozen nummers x en y worden waarschijnlijk getrokken uit
de set nummers die door een andere participant zijn ingetypt. Hierna zal de computer
een verzameling van urnen creëren waarin de types van deze urnen twee vormen aan
kunnen nemen: of urn type 1 (bevat 5 witte ballen, 3 gele ballen en 2 zwarte ballen)
of urn type 2 (5 zwarte ballen, 3 gele ballen en 2 witte ballen). Het aantal urnen van
type 1 wordt bepaald door het willekeurige gekozen nummer x, en het aantal urnen
van type 2 wordt bepaald door het willekeurig gekozen nummer y.
Aan het begin van iedere ronde zal één unieke urn uit de verzameling van urnen
getrokken worden. Het type van de getrokken urn zal niet geopenbaard worden tot
het einde van de ronde. Dit is de verborgen urn. Het is uw taak in iedere ronde om
proberen te achterhalen hoe waarschijnlijk het is dat de verborgen urn een type 1 of
een type 2 urn is. De details van de verzameling van urnen en de verborgen urn is te
vinden op figuur 1 hieronder.
Figure B.4. The pool of urn and the hidden urn (Dutch version)
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Beslissingen
Om u te helpen met het achterhalen van het type van de verborgen urn zullen we
ballen uit de urn trekken en aan u tonen. Ballen zullen getrokken worden met terug-
legging, wat wil zeggen dat iedere bal terug de urn in gaat nadat deze aan u getoond
is. In iedere ronde zijn er twee trekkingen. Na iedere trekken zal u gevraagd worden
om een aantal beslissingen te maken op basis van uw schatting van de waarschijnli-
jkheid dat de verborgen urn een type-1 of een type-2 urn is. Oftewel, u krijgt deze
vragen tweemaal per ronde.
Na iedere keer dat u deze beslissingen maakt zal u een tabel te zien krijgen met
daarin een samenvatting van uw keuzes in die ronde, tezamen met een suggestie voor
uw keuzes in situaties die mogelijk niet aan bod zijn gekomen. U kunt deze keuzes
controleren en aanpassen indien u dit wenst.
Daarna, aan het einde van iedere ronde, zal één rij uit deze tabel willekeurig gekozen
worden. Het door u gekozen alternatief in deze rij zal uw uitbetaling voor die ronde
bepalen.
Wedden
Aan het begin van iedere ronde ontvangt u 10 chips. Daarna kunt u in iedere ronde
(voordat u de tweede trekking te zien krijgt) aangeven hoe u met die tien chips wilt
gokken op één van de twee mogelijkheden hieronder (afhankelijk van de kleur van de
tweede getrokken bal):
Mogelijkheid 1: de type van de verborgen urn is type 1;
Mogelijkheid 2: de type van de verborgen urn is type 2.
Zoals u hierboven had kunnen achterhalen kan de getrokken bal één van drie kleuren
hebben: zwart, geel of wit. U zult dus moeten kiezen hoeveel van de tien chips u
wilt gokken op mogelijkheid 1 en mogelijkheid 2 als de kleur van de tweede getrokken
bal zwart, geel of wit is.
Aan het einde van iedere ronde zal het aantal chips dat u gewed heeft op de ware
mogelijkheid bepalen hoe hoog uw uitbetaling is. In detail, uw uitbetaling van uw
gok-strategie zal bepaald worden als volgt:
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Uw betaling van gok-strategie
= [1000− 10 ∗ (10−het aantal chips gewed op mogelijkheid 1)2]ECU, als mogeli-
jkheid 1 waar is;
= [1000− 10 ∗ (10−het aantal chips gewed op mogelijkheid 2)2]ECU, als mogeli-
jkheid 1 waar is.
Uw uitbetaling van iedere ronde bestaat dus uit drie delen; de betalingen van de
twee willekeurig gekozen beslissingen en de betaling van uw gok-strategie.
Aan het eind van dit deel van het experiment, uw uitbetaling van één uit de drie
rondes zal willekeurig gekozen worden om uw uitbetaling in deel 2 van het experiment
te bepalen.
Uw uitbetaling in deel 2= de uitbetaling van de willekeurig getrokken ronde
Instructies voor deel 3
Deel drie van dit experiment bestaat uit drie rondes, waarbij iedere ronde weer bestaat
uit 4 of 6 taken. In iedere taak zijn er twee dozen, beiden met een inhoud van 100
ballen in verschillende kleuren. Voor één van de dozen (doos K) kunt u de exacte pro-
porties van ballen in iedere kleur zien, terwijl de andere doos (doos U) een onbekende
proporties van ballen in iedere kleur bevat.
In iedere taak wordt u gevraagd om een doos te kiezen. Eén bal zal daarna getrokken
worden uit de door u getrokken doos en u verdient 1000 ECU indien de kleur van de
getrokken bal gelijk is aan de kleur die in de taak vermeld wordt.
Aan het einde van iedere ronde krijgt u een tabel te zien. Deze tabel geeft een samen-
vatting van uw keuzes in de door u uitgevoerde taken tezamen met een suggestie voor
taken die niet aan bod zijn gekomen. U kunt uw keuzes in de tabel controleren en
indien gewenst aanpassen. In iedere ronde zal één rij willekeurig gekozen worden uit
de tabel en zullen uw keuzes in deze rij uw uitbetaling bepalen.
Aan het einde van dit deel van het experiment zal één van de drie rondes willekeurig
gekozen worden om uw uitbetaling voor deel 3 te bepalen.
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Uw uitbetaling voor deel 3 = uitbetaling van de willekeurig gekozen ronde
Uw uiteindelijke uitbetaling voor dit experiment
Het bedrag dat u uiteindelijk verdient in dit experiment is gelijk aan de som van
uw uitbetaling voor deel 1, deel 2 en deel 3.
195
B.2 Figures and tables
Figure B.5. Screenshot for one of the six iterative decisions in prior elicitation
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Figure B.6. Screenshot for the prediction strategy
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Figure B.7. Screenshot for the first decision in the ambiguity measurement task
198
Appendix to Chapter 3
Ta
bl
e
B
.1
:
Th
e
po
st
er
io
re
st
im
at
io
ns
an
d
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gi
es
of
ris
k
ne
ut
ra
l(
λ
=
0)
bu
t
am
bi
gu
ity
av
er
se
(γ
>
0)
in
di
vi
du
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
A
(p
rio
r=
0.
71
)
In
di
vi
du
al
B
(p
rio
r=
0.
29
)
Si
gn
al
ty
pe
H
ig
h
N
eu
tr
al
Lo
w
H
ig
h
N
eu
tr
al
Lo
w
λ
=
0,
γ
=
1
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
82
72
0.
65
69
0.
43
37
0.
56
63
0.
34
31
0.
17
28
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
0.
90
21
0.
72
38
0.
40
15
0.
59
85
0.
27
62
0.
09
79
λ
=
0,
γ
=
5
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
77
27
0.
57
63
0.
35
24
0.
64
76
0.
42
37
0.
22
73
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
0.
98
11
0.
74
47
0.
11
06
0.
88
94
0.
25
53
0.
01
84
λ
=
0,
γ
=
10
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
75
06
0.
54
62
0.
32
50
0.
67
50
0.
45
38
0.
24
94
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
0.
99
78
0.
75
20
0.
01
43
0.
98
57
0.
24
80
0.
00
22
λ
=
0,
γ
=
20
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
73
49
0.
52
58
0.
30
73
0.
69
27
0.
47
42
0.
26
52
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
1
0.
75
68
0
0.
99
98
0.
24
32
0
199
Ta
bl
e
B
.2
:
Th
e
po
st
er
io
re
st
im
at
io
ns
an
d
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gi
es
of
ris
k
av
er
se
(λ
=
5)
an
d
am
bi
gu
ity
av
er
se
(γ
>
0)
in
di
vi
du
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
A
(p
rio
r=
0.
71
)
In
di
vi
du
al
B
(p
rio
r=
0.
29
)
Si
gn
al
ty
pe
H
ig
h
N
eu
tr
al
Lo
w
H
ig
h
N
eu
tr
al
Lo
w
λ
=
5,
γ
=
1
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
76
64
0.
56
75
0.
34
42
0.
65
58
0.
43
25
0.
23
36
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
0.
98
77
0.
74
68
0.
07
49
0.
92
51
0.
25
32
0.
01
23
λ
=
5,
γ
=
5
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
75
06
0.
54
62
0.
32
50
0.
67
50
0.
45
38
0.
24
94
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
0.
99
78
0.
75
20
0.
01
43
0.
98
57
0.
24
80
0.
00
22
λ
=
5,
γ
=
10
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
74
06
0.
53
31
0.
31
36
0.
68
64
0.
46
69
0.
25
94
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
0.
99
97
0.
75
50
0.
00
17
0.
99
83
0.
24
50
0
λ
=
5,
γ
=
20
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
73
12
0.
52
11
0.
30
33
0.
69
67
0.
47
89
0.
26
88
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
1
0.
75
76
0
0.
1
0.
24
24
0
200
Appendix to Chapter 3
Ta
bl
e
B
.3
:
Th
e
po
st
er
io
re
st
im
at
io
ns
an
d
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gi
es
of
ris
k
av
er
se
(λ
=
10
)
an
d
am
bi
gu
ity
av
er
se
(γ
>
0)
in
di
vi
du
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
A
(p
rio
r=
0.
71
)
In
di
vi
du
al
B
(p
rio
r=
0.
29
)
Si
gn
al
ty
pe
H
ig
h
N
eu
tr
al
Lo
w
H
ig
h
N
eu
tr
al
Lo
w
λ
=
10
,γ
=
1
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
74
80
0.
54
28
0.
32
20
0.
67
80
0.
45
72
0.
25
20
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
0.
99
86
0.
75
27
0.
00
94
0.
99
06
0.
24
73
0.
00
14
λ
=
10
,γ
=
5
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
74
06
0.
53
31
0.
31
36
0.
68
64
0.
46
69
0.
25
94
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
0.
99
97
0.
75
50
0.
00
17
0.
99
83
0.
24
50
0
λ
=
10
,γ
=
10
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
73
49
0.
52
58
0.
30
73
0.
69
27
0.
47
42
0.
26
51
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
1
0.
75
68
0
0.
99
98
0.
24
32
0
λ
=
10
,γ
=
20
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
72
87
0.
51
79
0.
30
06
0.
69
94
0.
48
21
0.
27
13
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
1
0.
75
87
0
0.
1
0.
24
13
0
201
Ta
bl
e
B
.4
:
Th
e
po
st
er
io
re
st
im
at
io
ns
an
d
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gi
es
of
ris
k
av
er
se
(λ
=
20
)
an
d
am
bi
gu
ity
av
er
se
(γ
>
0)
in
di
vi
du
al
s
In
di
vi
du
al
A
(p
rio
r=
0.
71
)
In
di
vi
du
al
B
(p
rio
r=
0.
29
)
Si
gn
al
ty
pe
H
ig
h
N
eu
tr
al
Lo
w
H
ig
h
N
eu
tr
al
Lo
w
λ
=
20
,γ
=
1
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
73
41
0.
52
47
0.
30
63
0.
69
37
0.
47
53
0.
26
59
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
1
0.
75
70
0
0.
99
90
0.
24
30
0
λ
=
20
,γ
=
5
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
73
12
0.
52
11
0.
30
33
0.
69
67
0.
47
89
0.
26
88
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
1
0.
75
76
0
1
0.
24
24
0
λ
=
20
,γ
=
10
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
72
87
0.
51
79
0.
30
06
0.
69
94
0.
48
21
0.
27
13
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
1
0.
75
87
0
1
0.
24
13
0
λ
=
20
,γ
=
20
Ex
an
te
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
0.
72
53
0.
51
37
0.
29
70
0.
70
30
0.
48
63
0.
27
47
D
yn
am
ica
lly
co
ns
ist
en
t
ex
po
st
pr
ed
ict
io
n
st
ra
te
gy
Po
st
er
io
r
1
0.
75
97
0
0.
1
0.
24
03
0
202
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Experimental procedures and instructions
C.1.1 Experimental procedures
Figure C.1. Experimental procedure
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C.1.2 Instructions
Welcome
Thank you for participating in this experiment. By showing up on time you receive a
s show-up fee of 4 Euro. The purpose of this experiment is to understand how
people behave in certain situations. There are no right or wrong answers. Please
make the choice that you feel most comfortable with. Your identity will never be
revealed; others will not be able to identify you with the choices you made.
In the experiment you will be able to make some money. The amount of money you
can make depends on your choices and some luck. The money you earn will be
immediately paid out to you in private after the experiment.
If you have any question during the experiment, please raise your hand. An
experimenter will come to you and answer your questions individually. Please put
your cell phone on airplane mode and do not talk with other participants in the
experiment; otherwise, we may be forced to exclude you from the experimental
payment.
The experiment consists of three parts. Detailed instruction for each part is provided
below and also shown on the computer screen before that part starts. In the
experiment we talk about Experimental Currency Units (ECU) instead of Euro.
The exchange rate between ECU and euro is 1000 ECU = 1 Euro
Measuring individual disposition levels
You face six rounds in this part of the experiment. In each round you face a lottery.
There is a computerized bag with 10 balls, which are either black or white but are of
unknown proportion. The bag remains unchanged in each round. The lottery is such
that you gain 400 ECU (+400 ECU) if the drawn ball is white and lose 400 ECU (-
400 ECU) if the drawn ball is black. Here the ball is drawn with replacement. You
need to decide whether you want to play the lottery.
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If you decide not to play the lottery, the round ends and the next round begins. If
you decide to play the lottery, the payment of the lottery will be immediately
determined by the computer and given to you. In each round you can play the
lottery sequentially up to four times.
At the end of the experiment, one of the six rounds will be randomly chosen by the
computer to determine your payment in part 1. Your earning in part thus equals the
payments from the lottery of the randomly chosen round.
Figure C.2. Lottery task
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Market stage
Instructions for subjects: In this part of the experiment, you are one of the nine
traders in a stock market. There are 8 trading rounds. Each trading round lasts 5
minutes. You trade a stock, and trading relates to units of the stock (“share”
hereafter). One share is one unit of the stock.
The value of each share is determined as follows. There is a box with 100 balls of
four colors: black, white, yellow and purple, but you don’t know the proportions of
these colored balls. The proportions of the colored balls are changed in each round.
At the beginning of each trading round, a ball will be drawn randomly from the box,
and the color of the ball determines the value of each share. The color of the ball
will be revealed at the end of the trading round. Black ball corresponds to 0 ECU
for each share, white ball corresponds to 100 ECU for each share, yellow ball
corresponds to 600 ECU for each share, and purple ball corresponds to 700 ECU for
each share. That is:
The Box
The color of the drawn Ball Black White Yellow Purple
Value of each share 0 ECU 100 ECU 600 ECU 700 ECU
At the beginning of each round, you receive an initial endowment. You then have 2
minutes to trade with other participants in the stock market. For detailed
instruction on trading screen and trading rules please see the trading instruction
sheet that have been provided to you. After 2 minutes trading pauses, and three of
the nine traders receive a private signal. The private signal excludes one potential
color of the drawn ball. For example, the signal could state that the drawn ball is
NOT white. Then trading continues for another two minutes.
Prior to the first trading round there will be ONE TRIAL ROUND in which you
can familiarize yourself with the trading screen and trading rules. Your decisions in
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the trial round will NOT affect your payoff. At the end of part 2 one trading round
will be randomly chosen. Your payment in the chosen round will be your payoff in
part 2. Your payment in a trading round = the number of shares in your portfolio at
end of the round.
In part 2 of the experiment, buying and selling shares in the stock market will be
processed by the computer. During each trading round, you will see the following
trading screen.
Figure C.3. Trading screen
How to buy a share: If you want to buy a share, you can do so in two ways:
1. When there are sell orders in the “Selling Orders” column that you want to buy,
you can directly click on the listed order price at which you want to buy and
press the “Buy” button, and the share will be immediately bought.
2. You can enter a price that you are willing to pay in the field above the red button
of “submit BUY order”, and click the red button (“submit BUY order”). Your
buy order will then be displayed in the “Buying Orders” column. Your order
will be only executed when other traders want to sell the share at your buying
price.
How to sell a share: If you want to sell a share, you also have two ways to do this:
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1. When there are buy orders in the “Buying Orders” column that you want to
sell, you can directly click on the listed order price at which you want to sell
and press the “Sell” button, and then the share will be immediately sold.
2. You can enter a price that you are willing to sell in the field above the red button
of “submit SELL order”, and click the red button(“submit SELL order”). Your
sell order will then be displayed in the “Selling Orders” column. Your order will
be only executed when other traders want to buy the share at your selling price.
Restrictions
208
Appendix to Chapter 4
Measuring ambiguity attitudes (shown on screen)
Screen 1
In this part, we present you a decision table with 11 situations. Each situation offers
you a choice between drawing a ball from two different urns, urn 1 or urn 2. Both
urns contain 10 balls, either black or white.
As explained before, both urns contain 10 balls, either white or black:
Urn 1: The composition of urn 1 changes from one situation to the next. While the
number of balls in one color (e.g., white) increases from 0 to 10, the number
of balls of the other color (e.g., black) decreases accordingly.
Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical in each situation. However, you don
not know how many balls are white and how many balls are black. Any com-
bination is possible. There might be anywhere from 0 to 10 white balls, with
the remaining balls being black.
One ball will be drawn from the urn you choose. The payment you can earn depends
on the color of the ball drawn. Only one color yields payment. You can choose
whether the color that yields payment is white or black. Please choose the color of
the ball that provides you payment:
Please choose the color of the ball that provides you payment:
[X] White
[X] Black
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Screen 2
Please take a look at the table below. In each of the 11 situations we would like you
to indicate which urn (urn 1 or urn 2) you prefer drawing a ball from. At the end
of this part, the computer will randomly select one out of the 11 situations. Then,
depending on whether you have chose urn 1 or urn 2 in that situation, the computer
will randomly draw one ball from that urn. Depending on the color of the ball, you
earn the payment indicated in the table. Both urns contain 10 balls, either white or
black.
As explained before, both urns contain 10 balls, either white or black:
Urn 1: The composition changes from one situation to the next
Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical in each situation. However, you do not
know how many balls are white and how many balls are black. Any combination
is possible.
Please note that the color of the ball you have chosen for payment is: [insert color]
Now please choose in each situation, from which urn you prefer to draw a ball, urn 1
or urn 2 ?
Figure C.4. Ambiguity task
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C.2 Additional tables
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Table C.3: Percentage differences in the trading behavior between informed traders of high
and low disposition effect levels.
Signal
Seconds The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the volume of
after the signal Bids Asks Acpt. bids Acpt. asks Bought Sold
0-30 -59.46 -5.26 200.00 21.73 -2.13 90.91
a 31-60 -62.64 122.58 66.67 -25.00 -31.75 180.00
positive 61-90 -62.65 27.03 200.00 -48.48 -49.12 107.69
signal 91-120 -71.05 109.52 -10.00 -21.88 -48.21 68.74
ALL -63.43*** 54.33*** 61.11 -21.77 -34.08*** 106.00***
0-30 30.30 25.38 -26.32 200.00 40.00 -23.21
a 31-60 -15.90 -8.93 -43.75 63.63 44.44 -30.99
Negative 61-90 11.11 -12.50 -9.52 120.00 36.36 -30.36
signal 91-120 -25.58 -18.75 -24.00 83.33 29.16 -28.30
ALL -3.40 -1.17 -27.84* 94.29** 36.49** -28.39**
Notes: Wilcoxon tests for significance are for the entire trading phase after the signal: ***
stands for p < 0.01, **stands for p < 0.05, *stands for p < 0.1.
Table C.4: Percentage difference of prices between markets of high and low disposition
informed traders.
Signal
Seconds The difference between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in
after the signal Bid price Ask price Acpt. bid price Acpt. ask price Buy price Sell price
0-30 -5.90 -14.74 -38.61 8.12 8.37 -31.17
a 31-60 -7.27 -3.88 -32.85 7.09 4.84 -24.10
positive 61-90 -11.39 -11.34 -3.97 0.87 2.42 -6.58
signal 91-120 16.77 -18.94 -20.60 -9.75 -7.94 -25.82
ALL -6.12 -11.86*** -21.13** 3.29 3.57** -18.88**
0-30 23.86 8.16 14.34 8.84 34.90 8.50
a 31-60 13.15 5.00 17.13 -12.89 -2.13 10.80
negative 61-90 3.91 14.90 26.67 6.04 15.39 10.52
signal 91-120 -9.26 14.04 23.58 8.34 5.19 16.48
ALL 10.04 10.91*** 20.35*** 1.14 10.12** 11.06***
Notes: Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): *** stands for p < 0.01,**stands for
p < 0.05, * stands for p < 0.1.
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Table C.5: Percentage differences in the trading behavior between informed traders of high
and low disposition effect levels in the markets where the sign of the signal does not match
the domain that the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured.
Signal
Seconds The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the volume of
after the signal Bids Asks Acpt. bids Acpt. asks Bought Sold
0-30 -5.73 84.62 -58.33 50.00 9.80 -22.22
a 31-60 -42.99 13.33 -70.59 -15.63 -27.58 -48.38
positive 61-90 -47.70 0.00 -64.29 20.83 -22.00 -28.00
signal 91-120 7.14 65.00 0.00 8.70 8.11 -4.55
ALL -24.51*** 43.86** -49.12*** 12.12 -9.69 -27.62**
0-30 -13.63 -31.90 85.71 42.86 41.67 -16.00
a 31-60 -5.00 -46.94 0.00 0.00 -22.72 -37.50
negative 61-90 -42.31 -16.10 114.28 -8.33 -21.88 2.22
signal 91-120 -56.67 -36.72 50.00 -5.26 9.52 31.82
ALL -32.65** -33.63*** 48.64** 0.00 -5.75 -10.91
Notes: Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): *** stands for p < 0.01, **stands for
p < 0.05, * stands for p < 0.1.
Table C.6: Percentage difference of prices between markets of high and low disposition
informed traders in the markets where the sign of the signal does not match the domain
that the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured.
Signal
Seconds The difference between informed traders of high and low disposition levels in
after the signal Bid price Ask price Acpt. bid price Acpt. ask price Buy price Sell price
0-30 -18.81 1.91 8.28 12.82 8.03 5.83
a 31-60 -16.62 -6.81 28.37 -5.25 -2.11 14.10
positive 61-90 -13.04 23.96 13.32 6.60 8.71 9.63
signal 91-120 -12.38 11.35 26.32 8.43 9.27 19.96
ALL -16.16*** 6.82 19.21** 4.32 5.83** 12.17*
0-30 -2.86 -3.20 -3.14 23.70 6.40 -2.72
a 31-60 -4.92 -4.61 2.28 15.48 3.16 -5.94
negative 61-90 17.07 -7.39 2.73 26.98 24.58 -3.19
signal 91-120 8.80 3.01 29.70 8.03 9.15 22.79
ALL 4.14 -4.20 3.99 20.11*** 13.19** -2.04
Notes: Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): *** stands for p < 0.01,** stands for
p < 0.05, * stands for p < 0.1.
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D.1 Experimental instructions for the production
of ambiguous urns
Unknown
Urn U2 is already produced and has an unknown composition of green and yellow
balls. Please see urn U2 here.
Urn U10 is also already produced and has an unknown composition of red, yellow,
grey, green, blue, purple, pink, orange, light green and black chips. Please see urn
U10 here.
Human
We will first explain how urn U2 will be produced. Before you came into the lab, we
have randomly drawn two persons from the pool of participants. Both are waiting
outside the lab now and know nothing about the experiment. Shortly, the first of
these randomly drawn persons will be called into the lab. This person may create Urn
U2 without any of us knowing its composition. We will ask him/her to go behind
the curtain where you can see two holders each filled with 100 green and 100 yellow
chips. Shortly, the randomly selected person may step behind the curtain and create
an urn with 100 chips in any combination of green and yellow chips as he/she pleases.
This urn is urn U2, which will be visibly placed for all to see in the lab once it is
produced. As we all cannot look into the urn, nobody in the lab except the randomly
drawn person knows the exact composition of green and yellow chips. After having
produced urn U2, the person will be dismissed without learning anything else about the
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experiment. Now we call in the first randomly selected person and instruct him/her
to create urn U2 as described above.
[The instructions for the first randomly chosen subject can be seen as below:]
You may create an urn which we call urn U2. Behind the curtain you find two bowls
each filled with 100 green and 100 yellow chips. In a moment you (the selected person)
may step behind the curtain and create an urn with 100 chips in any combination of
green and yellow chips as you please. Please step behind the curtain, create the urn,
and put the urn on the table here. [We wait for the person to be finished]. This urn
is Urn U2.
We will now pay you a fixed amount for your participation and you may leave the
room now. To keep your payment private, we give it to you in an envelope. Please
sign this receipt after you have looked into the envelope and checked its content.
Your payment does not depend in any way on the choices yet to be made in this
experiment. Thank you for your cooperation [participant leaves the laboratory].
We will now explain how urn U10 will be produced. Behind the curtain you can see
10 holders each filled with 100 red, 100 yellow, 100 grey, 100 green, 100 blue, 100
purple, 100 pink, 100 orange, 100 light green and 100 black chips. Shortly, the second
randomly selected person may step behind the curtain and create an urn with 100
chips in any combination of red, yellow, grey, green, blue, purple, pink, orange, light
green and black chips as he/she pleases. This urn is U10, which will be visibly placed
for all to see in the lab once it is produced. As we all cannot look into the urn, nobody
in the lab except the randomly drawn person knows the exact composition of urn U10.
After having produced U10, the person will be dismissed without learning anything
else about the experiment. Now we call in the second randomly selected person and
instruct him/her to create urn U10 as described above.
[The instructions for the second randomly chosen subject can be seen as below:]
You may create an urn which we call urn U10. Behind the curtain you find ten holders
each filled with 100 red, 100 yellow, 100 grey, 100 green, 100 blue, 100 purple, 100
pink, 100 orange, 100 light green and 100 black chips. You (the selected person)
can create an urn with 100 chips in any combination of red, yellow, grey, green, blue,
purple, pink, orange, light green and black chips as you please. Please step behind
the curtain, create the urn, put the urn on the table here and leave the experiment.
[We wait for the person to be finished]. This urn is Urn U10.
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We will now pay you a fixed amount for your participation and you may leave the
room now. To keep your payment private, we give it to you in an envelope. Please
sign this receipt after you have looked into the envelope and checked its content. Your
earnings will not depend in any way on the choices yet to be made in this experiment.
Thank you for your cooperation [participant leaves the laboratory].
Compound Risk
We will first explain how urn U2 will be produced. Before you came into the lab,
we have randomly drawn one person from the pool of participants. This person is
waiting outside the lab now and knows nothing about the experiment. Shortly, this
randomly drawn person will be called into the lab. This person may create urn U2
without any of us knowing its composition. Let us explain to you how he/she will be
instructed to produce Urn U2. Here we have 101 pieces of paper. Each is labeled with
a number between 0 and 100 (including 0 and 100). We place these numbered pieces
of papers in one envelope. In a short moment the randomly selected person will be
called into the lab and select one piece of paper from the envelope. The number of
GREEN chips in urn U2 will then be equal to the number written down on the paper
he/she will draw from the envelope. The number of YELLOW chips in urn U will
then be equal to 100 minus the number of green chips. For example: suppose he/she
will draw the number 45 from the envelope, then urn U2 will contain 45 green chips
and 55 yellow chips. He/she will produce urn U2 behind the curtain by means of the
number he draws from the envelope. Urn U2 will be visibly placed for all to see in the
lab once it is produced. As we all cannot look into the urn, nobody in the lab except
the randomly drawn person knows the exact composition of urn U2.
The randomly drawn person will also create urn U10 without any of us knowing its
composition. We will now explain how urn U10 will be produced. Here we have 10
piles each consisting of 10 pieces of paper. In each pile, every number between 0
and 9 (including 0 and 9) is written down on these pieces of paper exactly once. We
now place each pile in a separate envelope. Thus we have 10 envelopes, one for each
color, with numbers running from 0 to 9. In a short moment the randomly selected
person will be called into the lab and select one number from each envelope. Each
number drawn will be linked to a color. Please see Table D.1 for the sequence of
drawn numbers that will be linked to each color.
We will now scale up the number of chips to 100 in total as follows: Behind the curtain
an empty table can be found, similar like Table D.2. After the randomly selected
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Table D.1: The sequence of the drawn numbers that are linked to each color
Color Number selected
Red Number drawn from the first envelope
Yellow Number drawn from the second envelope
Grey Number drawn from the third envelope
Green Number drawn from the fourth envelope
Blue Number drawn from the fifth envelope
Purple Number drawn from the sixth envelope
Pink Number drawn from the seventh envelope
Orange Number drawn from the eighth envelope
Light green Number drawn from the ninth envelope
Black Number drawn from the tenth envelope
participant draws a number from one envelope, he/she goes behind the curtain and
writes that number behind the correct color (red). Then he/she draws a number from
the second envelope, walks behind the curtain and again puts the number behind the
correct color (yellow). He/she will repeat this process ten times so that every color
has a number written behind it.
For example: suppose that he/she draws the number 5 linked to the color red (column
2 in Table D.2). In this case, he/she enters the number 5 in the second column in the
row for red. The randomly selected person will then produce Urn U10 in the following
way: he/she will fill in the ten numbers in an excel file which will automatically sum
all numbers that are listed behind each color (Column 2). Then for each individual
color the ratio of its number to the sum of all numbers is automatically calculated
and rounded (see first cell column 3 in Table D.2). This ratio number will determine
the amount of chips each color gets represented in the urn U10.. For the unlikely
event that all randomly drawn numbers are 0 (effectively not a single color is drawn
and the sum of all colors is 0), then he/she will be instructed to fill the urn with 10
chips of each color. It is possible that only one color has a positive number and all
colors have a zero. In that case the urn only contains one color. It is also possible
each color has the same positive number drawn. In that case, all colors are equally
frequent. All other distributions in between these two extremes are also possible.
He/she will produce urn U10 behind the curtain by means of the ten numbers he
draws from the ten envelopes. Urn U10 will be visibly placed for all to see in the lab
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Table D.2: The empty table the randomly selected subject needs to fill in
Color Number selected Chips of this color in urn U10
Red 5 5/sum ∗ 100 = X,Xchips
Yellow
Grey
Green
Blue
Purple
Pink
Orange
Light green
Black
Sum Sum 100 chips
once it is produced. As we all cannot look into the urn, nobody in the lab except the
randomly drawn person knows the exact composition of urn U10.
Now we call in the randomly selected person and instruct him/her to create urns U2
and U10 as described above.
[The instructions for the randomly selected subject can be seen as below:]
You may create an urn which we call urn U2. Let us explain to you how Urn U2 will
be produced now. In this envelope you can find 101 pieces of paper. Each is labeled
with a number between 0 and 100 (including 0 and 100). In a short moment you may
draw one piece of paper from the envelope. The number of GREEN chips in urn U2
will then be equal to the number written down on the paper you will draw from the
envelope. The number of YELLOW chips in urn U will then be equal to 100 minus
the number of green chips.
For example: suppose you will draw the number 45 from the envelope, then urn U2
will contain 45green chips and 55 yellow chips.
Please select one number from the envelope now. [Participant selects number now].
Now please walk behind the curtain, create urn U2 accordingly and put the urn on
the table here. Please put the selected piece of paper with the number in urn U2 so
we can check the content after the experiment for anybody who wishes to see.
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You may now also create a second urn called Urn U10. Let us explain to you how
Urn U10 will be produced now. In a moment you may draw one number from each
of these 10 envelopes. Each envelope is filled with pieces of papers numbered from
0-9. Please see Table D.1 for the sequence of the numbers you will draw and you will
link to each color [Show Table D.1]. Behind the curtain you will find an empty table,
similar like Table D.2. After you have drawn a number from one envelope, please go
behind the curtain and write that number behind the correct color (red), exactly as
you can see in Table D.2 (second column). Then draw a number from the second
envelope, walk behind the curtain and again put the number behind the correct color
(yellow). You will repeat this process ten times so that every color has a number
written behind it, as in Table D.2 [Participants selects the 10 numbers].
Let us assume for illustration purposes that you draw the number 5 from the first
envelope which then will be linked to the color red (column 2 in Table D.2). In this
case, you enter a 5 in the second column in the row for red. The remaining nine
numbers you will draw, you will enter in the same column for each color. You may
produce Urn U10 in a moment in the following way: fill all these ten numbers in an
excel file on the laptop behind the curtain. Automatically the sum of all numbers that
are listed behind each color (Column 2) will be calculated. Then for each individual
color the ratio of its number to the sum of all numbers is calculated and rounded
(see column 3 in Table D.2). This ratio number will determine the amount of chips
each color gets represented in the 10-color urn U10. For the unlikely event that all
randomly drawn numbers are 0 (effectively not a single color is draw and the sum of
all colors is 0), then please fill the urn with 10 chips of each color.
Now please walk behind the curtain, create urn U10 accordingly to the Table you
have made based on the ten numbers you have drawn and which are automatically
calculated via excel. Then put Urn U10 on the table here. Please save the Table with
all the information on the desktop of the laptop so we can check the content of urn
U10 after the experiment for anybody who wishes to see.
We will now pay you a fixed amount for your participation and you may leave the
room now. To keep your payment private, we give it to you in an envelope. Please
sign this receipt after you have looked into the envelope and checked its content. Your
earnings will not depend in any way on the choices yet to be made in this experiment.
Thank you for your cooperation [participant leaves the laboratory].
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Model Uncertainty
We will first explain how urn U2 will be produced. Before you came into the lab, we
have randomly drawn one person from the pool of participants. This person is waiting
outside the lab now and knows nothing about the experiment. Shortly, this randomly
drawn person will be called into the lab. This person may create urn U2 without any
of us knowing its composition. Let us explain to you how he/she will be instructed
to produce Urn U2. The randomly selected person will browse to the weather website
WeatherBug on this laptop to check the current temperature in Sydney (Australia)
and Warschau (Poland). This website updates the exact temperature on a 5-minute
interval. Then he/she will have to make a print screen of the current temperature and
will have to save the information on the desktop. Based on the current temperatures
in Sydney and Warschau Urn U2 will then be produced in the following manner. The
number of GREEN chips in urn U will be equal to the digit after the decimal point of
Sydney and Warschau. The number of YELLOW chips in urn U will be equal to 100
minus the number of green chips.
For example: suppose that it is 24.4 degrees Celsius in Sydney and 3.5 degrees in
Warschau. In this case, urn U2 will contain 45 green chips and 55 yellow chips.
He/she will produce urn U2 behind the curtain by means of the actual temperatures
in Sydney and Warschau. Urn U2 will be visibly placed for all to see in the lab once
it is produced. As we all cannot look into the urn, nobody in the lab except the
randomly draw person knows the exact composition of urn U2.
The randomly drawn person will also create urn U10 without any of us knowing its
composition. We will now explain how urn U10 will be produced. The randomly
selected person will browse to the weather website WeatherBug on this laptop to
check the current temperature in Los Angeles (USA), Mexico City (Mexico), Madrid
(Spain), St Petersburg (Russia), New York (USA), Cape Town (South Africa), Delhi
(India), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Tokyo (Japan) and London (UK). This website
updates the exact temperature on a 5-minute interval. Then he/she will have to
make a print screen of the current temperatures in these ten cities and will have to
save the information on the desktop. Based on the current temperatures in these ten
cities Urn U10 will then be produced in the following manner. The temperatures in
each city will be linked to a color in the sequence of Table D.3.
The randomly selected person will list the first number behind the digit of the tem-
perature in these ten cities. Please see column 3 in Table D.4.
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Table D.3: The link between the temperatures in cities and the ten colors
Color City Temperature (first number behind comma)
Red Los Angeles ?
Yellow Mexico City ?
Grey Madrid ?
Green St. Petersburg ?
Blue New York ?
Purple Cape Town ?
Pink Delhi ?
Orange Buenos Aires ?
Light green Tokyo ?
Black London ?
Sum Sum of all numbers above (0 through 9)
For example: suppose that it is 24,5 degrees Celsius in Los Angeles. In this case, he
/she enters a 5 (1st digit after comma of 24,5) in the second column in the row for
Los Angeles. He/she will fill all ten numbers (based on the 1st digit after the comma
of the temperature of these 10 cities) in an excel file on the laptop behind the curtain.
Automatically the sum of all numbers that are listed behind each color (Column 3)
will be calculated. Then for each individual color the ratio of its number to the sum
of all numbers is calculated and rounded (see column 4 in Table D.4). This ratio
number will determine the amount of chips each color gets represented in the 10-color
urn U10. For the unlikely event that all randomly drawn numbers are 0 (effectively
not a single color is drawn and the sum of all colors is 0), then please fill the urn with
10 chips of each color.
It is possible that only one color has a positive number and all colors have a zero.
In that case the urn only contains one color. It is also possible each color has the
same positive number drawn. In that case, all colors are equally frequent. All other
distributions in between these two extremes are also possible.
He/she will produce urn U10 behind the curtain by means of the ten temperatures
(first digit behind the comma) he/she looked up on WeatherBug. Urn U10 will be
visibly placed for all to see in the lab once it is produced. As we all cannot look
into the urn, nobody in the lab except the randomly drawn person knows the exact
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Table D.4: The empty table concerning the temperature of cities subjects need to fill in
Color City first number behind comma Chips of this color in urn U
Red Los Angeles 5 5/sum ∗ 100 = X,Xchips
Yellow Mexico City
Grey Madrid
Green St. Petersburg
Blue New York
Purple Cape Town
Pink Delhi
Orange Buenos Aires
Light green Tokyo
Black London
Sum Sum 100 chips
composition of urn U10. Now we call in the randomly selected person and instruct
him/her to create urns U2 and U10 as described above.
[The instructions for the randomly selected subject can be seen as below:]
In a moment you may browse to the weather website WeatherBug on this laptop to
check the current temperature in Sydney (Australia) and Warschau (Poland). This
website updates the exact temperature on a 5-minute interval. Then you will have
to make a print screen of the current temperature and you will have to save the
information on the desktop [show the laptop and how/where to save print screen].
Based on the current temperatures in Sydney and Warschau Urn U2 will then be
produced in the following manner. The number of GREEN chips in urn U2 will be
equal to the digits after the decimal point in both cities. The number of YELLOW
chips in urn U2 will be equal to 100 minus the number of green chips.
For example: suppose that it is 24.4 degrees Celsius in Sydney and 3.5 degrees in
Warschau. In this case, urn U2 will contain 45 green chips and 55 yellow chips.
Please go to the laptop and check the current temperature in Sydney and Warschau
and save the print screens [Participant walks to the laptop]. Now please walk behind
the curtain, create urn U2 accordingly and put the urn on the table here.
You may now also create Urn U10. In a moment you will have to look up the
temperature in Celsius in the 10 following cities: Los Angeles (USA), Mexico City
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(Mexico), Madrid (Spain), St Petersburg (Russia), New York (USA), Cape Town
(South Africa), Delhi (India), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Tokyo (Japan) and London
(UK). The temperatures in each city will be linked to a color in the sequence of
Table D.3 [show Table D.3]. Again you can look up the temperature on the weather
website WeatherBug on this laptop. Then you will have to make a print screen of
the temperature in all 10 cities and you will have to save the information [show the
laptop and how/where to save]. Based on the current temperatures in the 10 cities
Urn U10 will then be produced in the following manner.
Behind the curtain you will find an empty table, similar like Table D.4 [show Table
D.4]. With your ten print screens of the actual temperature in the ten cities listed
above, you will fill in Table D.4. We will explain to you how. First note for each
temperature, the first number behind the digit (column 3 in Table D.4). For example:
suppose that it is 24,5 degrees Celsius in Los Angeles. In this case, enter a 5 (1st digit
after comma of 24,5) in the second column in the row for Los Angeles. Please fill the
ten numbers (based on the 1st digit after the comma of the temperature of these 10
cities) in an excel file on the laptop behind the curtain. Automatically the sum of all
numbers that are listed behind each color (Column 3) will be calculated. Then for
each individual color the ratio of its number to the sum of all numbers is calculated
and rounded (see column 4 in Table D.4). This ratio number will determine the
amount of chips each color gets represented in the 10-color urn U10. For the unlikely
event that all randomly drawn numbers are 0 (effectively not a single color is draw
and the sum of all colors is 0), then please fill the urn with 10 chips of each color.
Now please walk behind the curtain, fill in the empty table by the temperatures on
your ten print screen and create urn U10 accordingly. Please save the Table with all
the information on the desktop of the laptop so we can check the content of urn U10
after the experiment for anybody who wishes to see. Then put Urn U10 on the table
here.
We will now pay you a fixed amount for your participation and you may leave the
room now. To keep your payment private, we give it to you in an envelope. Please
sign this receipt after you have looked into the envelope and checked its content. Your
earnings will not depend in any way on the choices yet to be made in this experiment.
Thank you for your cooperation [participant leaves the laboratory].
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D.2 Photo materials and screenshots
D.2.1 Photo materials
Figure D.1. The photo of physical chips and the two urns used in our experiment
Figure D.2. The photo of one session of the experiment
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D.2.2 Screenshots
Figure D.3. The screenshot of a consistency check question for task 1 (assuming subjects
chose green as the winning color)
Figure D.4. The screenshot of the choice list table subjects faced in task 1 for eliciting m(0.5)
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Figure D.5. The screenshot of the choice list table subjects faced in task 2 for eliciting m(0.1)
Figure D.6. The screenshot of the choice list table subjects faced in task 3 for eliciting m(0.9)
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D.3 Additional tables
In Table D.5 to D.8, we provide the descriptive statistics of matching probabilities
and the two global ambiguity attitudes indexes in the method of unknown, human,
compound risk and compound uncertainty respectively. In Table D.9, we present the
distribution of subjects’ gender and age in each ambiguity production method.
Table D.5: Descriptive statistics under the unknown method
Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
Matching probability m(0.1) 0.158 0.15 0.0756 0.02 0.41
Matching probability m(0.5) 0.4619 0.485 0.0888 0.23 0.8
Matching probability m(0.9) 0.7276 0.71 0.1098 0.6 0.98
Index-b (ambiguity aversion) 0.1017 0.1167 0.1229 -0.4667 0.3233
Index-a (a-insensitivity) 0.2880 0.3125 0.1673 0 0.7625
Table D.6: Descriptive statistics under the human method
Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
Matching probability m(0.1) 0.1291 0.11 0.0624 0.02 0.33
Matching probability m(0.5) 0.4771 0.485 0.0717 0.23 0.635
Matching probability m(0.9) 0.7235 0.69 0.1115 0.6 0.91
Index-b (ambiguity aversion) 0.1136 0.11 0.1019 -0.0633 0.4333
Index-a (a-insensitivity) 0.2570 0.25 0.1671 -0.025 0.6625
Table D.7: Descriptive statistics under the compound risk method
Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
Matching probability m(0.1) 0.1352 0.13 0.0492 0.02 0.31
Matching probability m(0.5) 0.4714 0.485 0.0742 0.23 0.755
Matching probability m(0.9) 0.7552 0.75 0.1110 0.6 0.98
Index-b (ambiguity aversion) 0.0922 0.07 0.0902 -0.13 0.2633
Index-a (a-insensitivity) 0.225 0.2375 0.1688 -0.2125 0.5375
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Table D.8: Descriptive statistics under the model uncertainty method
Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
Matching probability m(0.1) 0.156 0.15 0.0680 0.07 0.41
Matching probability m(0.5) 0.492 0.485 0.0901 0.245 0.8
Matching probability m(0.9) 0.75232 0.78 0.1066 0.6 0.93
Index-b (ambiguity aversion) 0.0664 0.0533 0.1237 -0.3467 0.37
Index-a (a-insensitivity) 0.2546 0.25 0.1607 0 0.6125
Table D.9: Gender and age distribution in each ambiguity production method
Ambiguity production method Gender (% of female) Age (mean)
Unknown (UN) 46.30% 21.02
Human (HU) 60% 20.8
Compound risk (CR) 53.13% 23.13
Model uncertainty (MU) 63.33% 21.55
Total 55.79% 21.68
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D.4 Additional analysis
To make our results section be more robust, we rerun all the analysis we did in Section
5.4 with the consistent sample in the following.
Similarly, we first checked the two general ambiguity attitudes indexes and found a
significantly positive ambiguity aversion index indicating a general averse attitude to
ambiguity (mean= 0.1062, t(139)=11.9577, p=0.000, two-tailed) and a significantly
positive a-insensitivity index indicating a general insensitive tendency to likelihoods
under ambiguity (mean=0.2585, t(139)=17.7555, p=0.000, two-tailed).
To examine Hypothesis 1, we conduct a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
to examine the difference in the degree of ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity be-
tween the four different ambiguity production methods. Similar to the results in
Section 5.4, no significant difference was found (p<0.3362). Furthermore, to exam-
ine the three sub-hypothesis, we conduct the MANOVA again within each specific pair
comparison with Bonferroni correction. Similarly, no significant difference was found
between HU and UN (p=0.5369), HU and CR (p=0.3801), CR and MU (p=0.6399).
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Nederlandstalige samenvatting
De hoofddoelstelling van deze dissertatie is het vergroten van de kennis over indi-
viduele besluitvorming, niet zo zeer in risicovolle scenario’s maar in meer realistische 
scenario’s waarin ambiguïteit (meerduidigheid) een rol speelt. Het verschuiven van 
de aandacht voor besluitvorming bij risico naar besluitvorming bij ambiguïteit is niet 
onbelangrijk. Er zijn talrijke, belangrijke verschillen in besluitvorming wanneer mensen 
te maken krijgen met ambiguïteit. Bijvoorbeeld, mensen houden niet van ambiguïteit, 
zij zijn minder zelfverzekerd in ambigue situaties, zullen eerder het dispositie-effect 
laten zien en kunnen polariseren in hun overtuigingen. Een dieper inzicht in de am-
biguïteitsperceptie van individuen en in hun houding ten opzichte van ambiguïteit 
helpt hun gedrag beter te voorspellen en kan hen, op de lange termijn, normatieve 
sturing geven.
In Hoofdstuk 2 leggen we de nadruk op een individuele beoordelingsbias, namelijk 
het negeren van achtergrondinformatie (base rate neglect). Base rate neglect is als 
eerste geïntroduceerd door Kahneman and Tversky (1973), als de tendens van indi-
viduen om aanwezige informatie minder te waarderen of te negeren, terwijl zij een 
signaal om de eigen overtuiging bij te werken overwaarderen. De manier waarop 
aanwezige informatie wordt beschouwd is doorslaggevend voor het maken van een 
accurate voorspelling. De meeste eerdere onderzoeken hebben base rate neglect on-
derzocht bij risicovolle scenario’s. Om een breder inzicht te krijgen in het base rate 
neglect-gedrag schenken we in dit hoofdstuk aandacht aan de vaker voorkomende am-
bigue scenario’s. Daartoe hebben we een within-subject experiment opgezet, waarin 
we één factor hebben gecreëerd met betrekking tot de ambiguïteit ten opzichte van 
aanwezige informatie en een andere factor met betrekking tot het niveau van de aan-
wezige informatie. Zowel vanuit de theorie als op basis van het experiment vonden 
we dat base rate neglect—waarvan wordt verondersteld dat deze typerend is voor 
het hebben van onvoldoende aandacht voor aanwezige informatie in risicosituaties—
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in ambigue situaties normaal is voor mensen die een afkeer hebben van ambiguïteit.
Meer specifiek vonden we dat mensen meer geneigd zijn om aanwezige informatie te
acht te nemen, wanneer deze minder ambigue is. In het geval de aanwezige infor-
matie ambigue is, tenderen mensen met een grotere afkeer van ambiguïteit ernaar
meer gewicht toe te kennen aan aanwezige informatie.
In Hoofdstuk 3 gaat onze belangstelling uit naar belief polarization. Dit fenomeen
geeft aan dat de denkbeelden van mensen met een heterogene achtergrond over een-
zelfde observatie sterk gepolariseerd zijn. Op basis van de theorie van Baliga et al.
(2013), veronderstellen we dat de mate van afkeer van ambiguïteit een positief effect
heeft op het bestaan van belief polarization. In een laboratoriumexperiment hebben
we de rol onderzocht zowel van houdingen ten opzichte van ambiguïteit, met name
de afkeer van ambiguïteit, als van de dynamische consistentie conditie op belief po-
larization. De in dit hoofdstuk gepresenteerde resultaten laten zien dat hoe groter de
afkeer van ambiguïteit is, het des te waarschijnlijker is dat individuen hun gedrag aan-
passen op een manier die afwijkt van de Bayesian posterior. Dit resultaat indiceert een
positieve relatie tussen de mate van afkeer van ambiguïteit en het bestaan van belief
polarization. Tevens vonden we dat een effectieve implementatie van de dynamische
consistentie conditie een positieve relatie bewerkstelligt tussen de blootstelling aan
ambiguïteit en het voorkomen van belief polarization.
In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we een van de meeste geprononceerde psychologische
biases van investeerders, namelijk het dispositie-effect. Het dispositie-effect en ook
de invloed van het dispositie-effect op de efficiëntie van de financiële markt zijn goed
gedocumenteerd. Om nader te onderzoeken op welke manier het dispositie-effect van
invloed is op de efficiëntie van de financiële markt, hebben we een laboratoriumexperi-
ment opgezet in twee fasen. In de eerste fase hebben we het niveau van het dispositie-
effect gemeten op twee aparte domeinen, namelijk bij winst en bij verlies. In de tweede
fase hebben we een aanbod/vraag-markt gecreëerd en de reacties op de marktprijs
geobserveerd wanneer er vertrouwelijke signalen werden gegeven aan handelaren met
enerzijds de hoogste en anderzijds de laagste niveaus van het dispositie-effect. Tevens
hebben we deze handelsmarkt voorzien van ambigue handelswaar; dat wil zeggen,
het is niet te voorspellen wanneer dit handelsgoed de verschillende mogelijke waarden
aanneemt. Onze resultaten wijzen in de richting dat we, op individueel niveau, onder-
scheid moeten maken tussen het dispositie-effect bij winst en het dispositie-effect bij
verlies. Op marktniveau vonden we dat de marktprijzen over het algemeen traag rea-
geren op vertrouwelijke signalen. Bovendien vonden we dat deze trage reactie sterker
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is in markten waarin de handelaren een hoog niveau van het dispositie-effect vertonen.
Tenslotte, de invloed van het dispositie-effect op de trage reactie van de marktprijzen
doet zich alleen maar voor wanneer de boodschap van deze vertrouwelijke signalen
overeenkomt met het domein (winst of verlies) waarin het dispositie-effect is gemeten.
In Hoofdstuk 5 hebben we vier verschillende methoden onderzocht om ambiguïteit te
creëren in de klassieke Ellsberg paradox. Volgens onze survey van 41 eerdere exper-
imentele studies bestaat er tot nu toe geen eenduidige methode om ambiguïteit te
creëren in de klassieke Ellsberg opstelling, hoewel vele variaties van deze opstelling
frequent worden gebruikt in experimentele studies naar houdingen ten opzichte van
ambiguïteit. Dit heeft ons gemotiveerd om te onderzoeken of de methode van het
creëren van ambiguïteit verschillen met zich meebrengt in het meten van de houding
ten opzichte van ambiguïteit. Daartoe hebben we een between-subject experiment
uitgevoerd waarbij de methode van het produceren van ambiguïteit als belangrijkste
factor is gekozen. Onze resultaten laten zien dat er geen significante verschillen zijn
tussen de vier methoden van het produceren van ambiguïteit bij het meten van de
houdingen ten opzichte van ambiguïteit. We concluderen hieruit dat de vier meth-
oden van het creëren van ambiguïteit onderling uitwisselbaar zijn. Derhalve geven
we toekomstige experimentele studies de suggestie mee om de meest direct en onge-
compliceerde methode te kiezen als het gaat om het creëren van ambiguïteit; dat wil
zeggen, de methode waarin de onderzoekers zelf de ambigue schaal samenstellen.
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